THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

HHH Ltd. of Greenville, Respondent,

v.

Randall S. Hiller, Robert E. Hiller, and Randall S. Hiller, P.A., Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000159

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Appeal From Greenville County Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-338 Submitted April 1, 2016 – Filed June 29, 2016

APPEAL DISMISSED

Randall Scott Hiller, of Greenville, for Appellants.

Randy A. Skinner, of Skinner Law Firm, LLC, John T. Crawford, Jr., of Kenison Dudley & Crawford, LLC, and M. Stokely Holder, of Holder, Padgett, Littlejohn & Prickett, LLC, all of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Appeal dismissed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: *Mountain Lake Colony v. McJunkin*, 308 S.C. 202, 204, 417

S.E.2d 578, 579 (1992) (finding ordinarily, a decision granting or denying an order of reference is not immediately appealable); Williford v. Downs, 265 S.C. 319, 321, 218 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1975) (noting an exception to the general rule if the reference order's result will deprive a party of a mode of trial to which he is entitled); Verenes v. Alvanos, 387 S.C. 11, 15, 690 S.E.2d 771, 772 (2010) ("Whether a party is entitled to a jury trial is a question of law."); Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Blackburn, 407 S.C. 321, 328, 755 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2014) ("Appellate courts may decide questions of law with no particular deference to the circuit court's findings."); Albertson v. Robinson, 371 S.C. 311, 315, 638 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An action to set aside a transfer as fraudulent pursuant to the Statute of Elizabeth is an action in equity."); Williford, 265 S.C. at 321, 218 S.E.2d at 243 ("In equity the parties are not entitled, as a matter of right, to a trial by jury."); *Blackburn*, 407 S.C. at 328, 755 S.E.2d at 441 ("However, counterclaims—including those raised in equitable actions—may, at times, be entitled to a jury trial."); id. at 329, 755 S.E.2d at 441 ("If the complaint is equitable and the counterclaim is legal and compulsory, the plaintiff or the defendant has a right to a jury trial on the counterclaim." (emphasis added)); id. at 328, 755 S.E.2d at 441 ("If the complaint is equitable and the counterclaim is legal and permissive, the defendant waives his right to a jury trial."); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of S.C. v. Hucks, 305 S.C. 296, 298, 408 S.E.2d 222, 223 (1991) ("By definition, a counterclaim is compulsory only if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim."); N.C. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. DAV Corp., 298 S.C. 514, 518, 381 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1989) (adopting the "logical relationship test" to determine whether a claim is compulsory or permissive); Beach Co. v. Twillman, Ltd., 351 S.C. 56, 61, 566 S.E.2d 863, 865 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Whether a counterclaim is logically related to the initial claim depends upon the facts of each case.").1

APPEAL DISMISSED.²

LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

¹ Appellant also appeals the circuit court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. We do not address this issue because it too is not immediately appealable. *See Watson v. Underwood*, 407 S.C. 443, 457, 756 S.E.2d 155, 162 (Ct. App. 2014) ("The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable because it does not finally determine anything about the merits or strike a defense.").

² We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.