

**THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.**

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals**

Michael Gerald Dunbar, Respondent,

v.

State of South Carolina, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2011-186255

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appeal From Lexington County
Rodney A. Peeples, Trial Judge
William P. Keesley, Post-Conviction Relief Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-259
Heard June 2, 2014 – Filed June 25, 2014

REVERSED

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General John Walter Whitmire, of Columbia,
for Petitioner.

John Dennis Delgado and John Clarke Newton, both of
Bluestein Nichols Thompson & Delgado, LLC, of

Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: The State appeals the order of the circuit court granting Michael Dunbar post-conviction relief. We find the circuit court erred in holding Dunbar was prejudiced by trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance. *See Porter v. State*, 368 S.C. 378, 383, 629 S.E.2d 353, 356 (2006) ("In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCR applicant must prove: (1) that counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance under prevailing professional norms; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the applicant's case."); *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (stating a court does not need to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one and that "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed"); *Walker v. State*, 407 S.C. 400, 405, 756 S.E.2d 144, 146 (2014) ("To prove prejudice, an applicant must show there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.").

REVERSED.

HUFF, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.