## THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

## THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

U.S. Bank, National Association, as trustee for the Holders of The Banc of America Funding Corporation, 2008-FT1 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2008-FT1, Respondent,

v.

Rhonda Lewis Meisner a/k/a Rhonda L. Meisner; Bank of America, N.A.; and SCBT, Defendants,

Of whom Rhonda Lewis Meisner is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001019

Appeal From Richland County DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-066 Submitted January 1, 2019 – Filed February 13, 2019

## APPEAL DISMISSED

Rhonda Lewis Meisner, of Blythewood, pro se.

Magalie Arcure Creech, of Finkel Law Firm LLC, and Jacob Shuler Barker, of Graybill, Lansche & Vinzani, LLC, both of Charleston; and Trent M. Grissom, of

McGuire Woods LLP, of Charlotte, North Carolina, all for Respondent.

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**PER CURIAM:** Dismissed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 194, 607 S.E.2d 707, 708 (2005) ("The right of appeal arises from and is controlled by statutory law."); S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330(2) (2017) ("[Our s]upreme [c]ourt shall have appellate jurisdiction for correction of errors of law in law cases, and shall review upon appeal: . . . [a]n order affecting a substantial right made in an action when such order (a) in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken or discontinues the action, (b) grants or refuses a new trial or (c) strikes out an answer or any part thereof or any pleading in any action . . . "); Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 341 S.C. 68, 72, 533 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2000) ("Pursuant to [section] 14-3-330(2), this [c]ourt has held on numerous occasions that when a trial court's order deprives a party of a mode of trial to which it is entitled as a matter of right, such order is immediately appealable."); Williford v. Downs, 265 S.C. 319, 321, 218 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1975) ("Ordinarily the granting or refusal of an order of reference is not appealable unless the granting of the reference deprives a party of a mode of trial to which he is entitled by law . . . . "); id. ("Hence, the issue before the [c]ourt is whether the appellant is entitled to a jury trial [a]s a matter of right. If she is not, the appeal should be dismissed."); id. ("The only issue [that] must be decided is whether the case at bar is a legal or equitable action. If it is equitable, the order of reference is not directly appealable."); Hayne Fed. Credit Union v. Bailey, 327 S.C. 242, 248, 489 S.E.2d 472, 475 (1997) ("A mortgage foreclosure is an action in equity."); Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Blackburn, 407 S.C. 321, 328, 755 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2014) ("In equity the parties are not entitled, as a matter of right, to a trial by jury." (quoting Williford, 265 S.C. at 321, 218 S.E.2d at 243)); id. ("However, counterclaims including those raised in equitable actions—may, at times, be entitled to a jury trial."); id. at 329, 755 S.E.2d at 441 ("If both the complaint and the counterclaim are in equity, the entire matter is triable by the court."); id. ("If both are at law, the issues are triable by a jury."); id. at 330, 755 S.E.2d at 441 ("If the complaint is equitable and the counterclaim is legal and permissive, the defendant waives his right to a jury trial."); id. at 330, 755 S.E.2d at 441-42 ("If the complaint is equitable and the counterclaim is legal and compulsory, the plaintiff or the defendant has a right to a jury trial on the counterclaim unless a valid jury trial waiver exists that encompasses the counterclaim."); Blackburn, 407 S.C. at 330 n.7, 755 S.E.2d at 442 n.7 ("We have previously adopted the 'logical relationship' test to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory . . . ."); id. ("Under this

test, 'the "logical relationship" determination is made by asking whether the counterclaim would affect the lender's right to enforce the note and foreclose the mortgage." (quoting *Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Smith*, 398 S.C. 487, 496, 730 S.E.2d 328, 333 (Ct. App. 2012))); *id.* ("If the defendant's prevailing on his counterclaim would affect the bank's right to enforce the note and foreclose the mortgage, there is a logical relationship between the counterclaim and the underlying suit, and the counterclaim is therefore compulsory.").

APPEAL DISMISSED.<sup>1</sup>

LOCKEMY, C.J., and THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.