



OPINIONS
OF
THE SUPREME COURT
AND
COURT OF APPEALS
OF
SOUTH CAROLINA

ADVANCE SHEET NO. 44
December 14, 2022
Patricia A. Howard, Clerk
Columbia, South Carolina
www.sccourts.org

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**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court**

In the Matter of William Edwin Griffin, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001120

Opinion No. 28124

Submitted December 2, 2022 – Filed December 14, 2022

DISBARRED

Disciplinary Counsel John S. Nichols and Senior
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Ericka M. Williams, both
of Columbia, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

William Edwin Griffin, of Columbia, Pro Se.

PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, Respondent William Edwin Griffin failed to respond to allegations that funds were missing from his trust account and failed to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation or the receiver appointed to protect his clients' interests. Respondent also failed to respond to the formal charges filed against him and failed to appear at a hearing before a panel of the Commission on Lawyer Conduct. Following the hearing, the Commission issued a report recommending Respondent be disbarred. No exceptions were filed. We concur in the Commission's recommendation, and we disbar Respondent.

I.

Respondent was admitted to practice law in 2002 and most recently worked as a solo practitioner handling real estate transactions, among other things. His

disciplinary history includes a 2011 public reprimand for financial misconduct involving real estate transactions.¹

On September 30, 2016, Client A retained Respondent to assist her with a purchase of real estate. Client A gave Respondent a guaranteed-funds check dated November 2, 2016, as payment for the real estate purchase. The check was made payable to Respondent in the amount of \$8,969. Respondent deposited the check into his trust account on November 2, 2016. The balance in Respondent's trust account prior the deposit was \$0.15. Between November 14, 2016, and November 30, 2016, Respondent negotiated nine checks made payable to himself totaling \$365.

On December 1, 2016, Respondent issued a check from his trust account in the amount of \$8,969 to the seller. At the time Respondent issued that check, the balance in his trust account was only \$8,604.15. The seller presented the check for payment on December 8, 2016, and again on December 15, 2016. Both times, the check was returned unpaid, as Respondent had insufficient funds in his trust account to cover the check. By letters dated December 9, 2016, and December 16, 2016, the bank notified the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) that Respondent's trust account contained insufficient funds. Client A also filed a complaint with ODC on December 15, 2016.

ODC issued notices of investigation on December 15, 2016, and December 19, 2016, both of which were mailed to Respondent's address in the Attorney Information System (AIS). Respondent failed to respond to the notices of investigation, despite being served with reminder letters pursuant to *In re Treacy*, 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982).

From December 2016 through March 2017, Respondent repeatedly misappropriated trust funds by writing a series of checks from his escrow account totaling \$8,175.58 made payable to himself and other unauthorized entities. As of

¹ See *In re Griffin*, 393 S.C. 142, 711 S.E.2d 890 (2011) (citing Rule 1.15 (requiring the safekeeping of client property); Rule 4.5 (prohibiting threats of disciplinary complaints to gain advantage in a civil proceeding); Rule 8.1(a) (prohibiting false statements of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter); and Rule 417, SCACR, (requiring proper financial recordkeeping)).

March 31, 2017, the balance in Respondent's trust account was \$356.57. Respondent never properly disbursed funds to the seller in the real estate transaction.²

On March 8, 2017, Respondent was placed on interim suspension, and a receiver was appointed to protect his clients' interests.³ *In re Griffin*, 419 S.C. 260, 797 S.E.2d 534 (2017). All of the receiver's attempts to contact Respondent were unsuccessful. On March 30, 2017, the Commission issued an order directing Respondent to cooperate with the receiver within five days. Respondent failed to cooperate with the receiver and failed to produce any client files or trust account records.⁴

ODC issued a notice of investigation regarding Respondent's failure to cooperate with the receiver on July 27, 2017, and a supplemental notice of investigation on March 30, 2021. Respondent again failed to respond to either notice, despite being served with a *Treacy* reminder letter.

Formal charges were filed on June 17, 2021, and Respondent was personally served with a copy of those charges by an agent of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED). Respondent failed to file an answer, and on August 23, 2021, the Commission issued an order finding him in default. On December 21, 2021, SLED personally served Respondent with a notice of hearing and order to appear before the Commission on January 27, 2022.

² Client A filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, which reimbursed her in the amount of \$9,139 on June 7, 2017.

³ Additionally, Respondent was placed on administrative suspension on February 21, 2017, and April 20, 2017, for failing to pay his annual license fees and failing to comply with annual CLE requirements, respectively. *See In re Admin. Suspensions for Failure to Pay License Fees*, S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated Feb. 21, 2017; *In re Admin. Suspensions for Failure to Comply with Continuing Legal Educ. Requirements*, S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated Apr. 20, 2017.

⁴ ODC issued a subpoena to Respondent's bank to obtain copies of Respondent's banking records from November 1, 2016, through March 31, 2017.

Respondent failed to appear for the hearing, and on August 10, 2022, the Commission issued a report finding Respondent had committed misconduct as alleged in the formal charges and recommending Respondent be disbarred. In evaluating the proper sanction, the Commission considered the severity of Respondent's misconduct and the resulting harm to Client A, along with various aggravating circumstances including: (1) Respondent's prior disciplinary history involving violations of some of the same Rules of Professional Conduct; (2) Respondent's dishonest and selfish motive in knowingly misappropriating client funds from his trust account for his own personal use; and (3) Respondent's bad-faith obstruction of the proceedings by intentionally failing to cooperate with ODC's investigation; failing to cooperate with the receiver; failing to comply with an order of the Commission; failing to answer the formal charges; and failing to appear at the hearing before the Commission.

The Commission's report was filed with this Court on August 15, 2022. On August 19, 2022, a SLED agent personally served Respondent with a copy of the Commission's report recommending disbarment, along with a letter directing the parties' attention to Rule 27, RLDE, concerning briefing schedules and review by this Court. Neither ODC nor Respondent filed exceptions to the report.

II.

An attorney's failure to answer formal charges is an admission of the factual allegations set forth in those charges. Rule 24(a), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. Similarly, an attorney's failure to appear before the hearing panel of the Commission when ordered to do so is an admission of the factual allegations that were the subject of the hearing. Rule 24(b), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. Further, after the Commission's report is filed with this Court, a party's failure "to file a brief taking exceptions to the report constitutes acceptance of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations." Rule 27(a), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.

As a result of the foregoing, we accept the Commission's factual findings as set forth above. We further conclude that in misappropriating Client A's funds from his trust account and failing to properly disburse those funds to the seller in the real estate transaction, Respondent violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct found in Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.15(a) (requiring the safeguarding of client funds); Rule 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver funds a third

party is entitled to receive); Rule 8.4(b) (prohibiting criminal acts that reflect adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer); Rule 8.4(d) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(e) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). We also find that in failing to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation and failing to file written responses to the notices of investigation, Respondent violated Rule 8.1(b), RPC (prohibiting knowing failures to respond to lawful ODC inquiries). Additionally, in failing to cooperate with the receiver and failing to turn over client files to the receiver, we find Respondent violated Rule 1.16(d), RPC (requiring a lawyer, upon termination of representation, to surrender papers and property to which clients are entitled); Rule 8.4(e), RPC (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); and Rule 30(g), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR (requiring a suspended lawyer to cooperate with the receiver and comply with the receiver's requests to take specific actions regarding client files and accounts).

We further find Respondent committed misconduct as proscribed by the following Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR: Rule 7(a)(1) (prohibiting violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct); Rule 7(a)(3) (prohibiting willful violations of orders of the Commission and knowing failures to respond to lawful demands from ODC); and Rule 7(a)(5) (prohibiting conduct tending to bring the legal profession into disrepute and conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice law).

III.

A "central purpose of the disciplinary process is to protect the public from unscrupulous and indifferent lawyers." *In re Davidson*, 409 S.C. 321, 328, 762 S.E.2d 556, 559 (2014). An attorney who fails to answer charges or appear to defend or explain alleged misconduct is obviously disinterested in the practice of law and is likely to face the most severe of sanctions. *Id.* at 329, 762 S.E.2d at 560; *see also In re Sifly*, 279 S.C. 113, 115, 302 S.E.2d 858, 859 (1983) (observing that a lawyer's failure to participate in a disciplinary process is entitled to substantial weight in determining the sanction).

"This Court has made it abundantly clear that an attorney is charged with a special responsibility in maintaining and preserving the integrity of trust funds." *In re Hardee-Thomas*, 391 S.C. 451, 457, 706 S.E.2d 507, 510 (2011) (citation omitted).

We have "never regarded financial misconduct lightly, particularly when such misconduct concerns expenditure of client funds or other improper use of trust funds." *In re Wern*, 431 S.C. 643, 649, 849 S.E.2d 898, 901 (2020) (citation omitted) (disbarring attorney for using client funds held in trust for his own personal purposes). Indeed, this Court often disbars attorneys who misappropriate client funds from trust. *See, e.g., In re Murdaugh*, 342 S.C. 59, 61–62, 536 S.E.2d 370, 371 (2000) (disbarring attorney who misappropriated client funds, diverted them to her own use, and failed to return client files and cooperate with the attorney appointed to protect client interests); *In re Hendricks*, 319 S.C. 465, 468, 462 S.E.2d 286, 287 (1995) (disbarring attorney who misappropriated client funds and diverted them to his personal use).

Based on the severity of Respondent's misconduct, the resulting harm to Client A, and the aggravating circumstances, particularly Respondent's failure to respond or participate in the disciplinary proceedings, we hereby disbar Respondent from the practice of law. Prior to seeking readmission to the practice of law, Respondent shall pay the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission and make full restitution, including reimbursing the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for all payments made on his behalf. Within fifteen days of the date of this opinion, Respondent shall: (1) file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR; and (2) surrender his Certificate of Admission to the Practice of Law to the Clerk of this Court.

DISBARRED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina

In the Matter of Miles Brockman Mitchell, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001684

ORDER

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place respondent on interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).

IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended until further order of this Court.

s\ Donald W. Beatty _____ C.J.
FOR THE COURT

Columbia, South Carolina
December 7, 2022

**THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals**

Trident Medical Center, LLC, d/b/a Trident Medical
Center, Respondent,

v.

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control and Medical University Hospital Authority d/b/a
MUSC Radiation Therapy Center - Berkeley County,
Respondents,

Of Which, Medical University Hospital Authority d/b/a
MUSC Radiation Therapy Center - Berkeley County is
the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001159

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Harold W. Funderburk, Jr., Administrative Law Judge

Opinion No. 5956
Heard October 5, 2022 – Filed December 14, 2022

REVERSED

Daniel J. Westbrook, William C. Wood, Jr., Travis
Dayhuff, and Allen Mattison Bogan, all of Nelson
Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

David Beam Summer, Jr., and William R. Thomas, both of Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, of Columbia, for Respondent Trident Medical Center, LLC.

Ashley Caroline Biggers and Vito Michael Wicevic, both of Columbia, for Respondent South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control.

Robert L. Widener, Celeste T. Jones, and Jane W. Trinkley, all of Burr & Forman, of Columbia, for Amici Curiae Medical University of South Carolina and MUSC Strategic Ventures.

THOMAS, J: Trident Medical Center, LLC, d/b/a Trident Medical Center (Trident), filed this action in the Administrative Law Court (ALC) against the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) and Medical University Hospital Authority, d/b/a MUSC Radiation Therapy Center – Berkeley County (MUHA). The action contested DHEC's approval of MUHA's Certificate of Need (CON) application for a new radiation therapy center in Berkeley County. After a contested case hearing, the ALC reversed DHEC's approval and denied the application. MUHA appeals, arguing, *inter alia*, the ALC erred in exceeding its statutory authority by ruling on the validity and constitutionality of MUSC Strategic Ventures (MSV) and MUSC Health Center Cancer Care Network, LLC (the Network) when DHEC had neither considered nor addressed the issues. We reverse.

FACTS

In May of 2017, MUHA filed a CON application requesting approval of a radiation therapy center in Berkeley County. MUHA was identified as the licensee, and the Network¹ was identified as the management company. The CON application identified the owners as follows: Alliance² "is the majority owner of [the Network] with a 51% membership interest. [MSV] is the minority owner . . . with

¹ The Network was formed in January 2016, is authorized to do business in SC, and is owned 51% by Alliance Oncology, LLC, and 49% by MSV.

² A for-profit Delaware company headquartered in California.

a 49% membership interest." The application proposed to "increase the capacity of MUSC Health's radiation therapy by adding a sixth linear accelerator." By letter dated June 7, 2017, Trident notified DHEC it was an affected person with respect to MUHA's application, and it opposed the approval of the application. On November 22, 2017, DHEC granted the CON to MUHA. DHEC's findings indicate it considered the South Carolina Health Plan and the various regulations regarding community need, medically underserved groups, and financial feasibility. There is no indication DHEC considered the validity and/or the constitutionality of MSV or the Network.³ The DHEC Board declined Trident's request for a review.

Trident filed a petition for a contested case with the ALC, arguing DHEC's decision to grant the application was arbitrary, capricious, and affected by other error of law or fact. In its opening statement at the contested hearing before the ALC, Trident also argued the proposed project did not comply with the South Carolina Health Plan; MUHA did not meet the requirements of community need, medically underserved groups, and accessibility; the project did not meet the financial feasibility requirements; and Trident would be adversely impacted by the project. DHEC opened, arguing in part that although the hearing before the ALC was de novo, the ALC could not consider issues not raised to or considered by the agency.

Trident offered numerous witnesses in support of its position during the five-days-long hearing. DHEC called one witness, Margaret Murdock, the DHEC attorney who reviewed the MUHA application. Murdock was asked if DHEC was concerned "that a company called Alliance [was]" the manager of the project rather than MUHA. MUHA objected on several grounds, including that the issue was not raised to DHEC. Counsel for Trident stated, "Thankfully it was in the CON application, so we know that it was considered." When asked what she knew about the entity Alliance, Murdock answered, "I don't recall specifically sitting here today."

³ DHEC acknowledges in its brief that nothing in the CON Act, Regulations, or South Carolina Health Plan authorizes it to rule on the constitutionality of a legal entity listed in a CON application.

At the end of all testimony, Trident argued it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Trident argued DHEC was not aware of the ownership of the joint venture. Trident acknowledged the operating agreement explaining the ownership was not before DHEC, asserting it was not revealed until discovery for the ALC hearing. Trident argued the ownership structure violated the statutory mandates governing MUSC. The ALC accepted Trident's written motion and adjourned to give MUHA time to respond.

The ALC granted Trident judgment as a matter of law. The ALC found "[d]espite the fact that The Network or Alliance is clearly funding the project . . . , the Application identifies The Network as only the management company engaged by the licensee to manage or operate the facility." The ALC found that although the application provided various answers regarding the ownership and/or control of the facility, the "answers provide[d] a somewhat murky picture of the overall organizational structure of the proposed project" and DHEC was not aware of the ownership until the ALC hearing. The ALC found neither MUSC nor MUHA had the authority to create a joint venture with a private, for-profit company. The ALC concluded MUSC violated the constitutional prohibition against joint ownership and the Network was an unconstitutional and, therefore, an illegal or *ultra vires* entity. Finally, the ALC found Alliance, rather than MUHA, was the actual licensee of the proposed project; thus, the CON previously issued was void. Accordingly, the ALC denied the CON for MUHA's proposed project. The ALC summarily denied MUHA's motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The ALC presides over the hearing of a contested case from DHEC's decision on a CON application and serves as the finder of fact." *Spartanburg Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Oncology & Hematology Assocs. of S.C., LLC*, 387 S.C. 79, 89, 690 S.E.2d 783, 788 (2010). In reviewing the appeal of a contested CON case, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) establishes the standard of review. *See id.* at 89–90, 690 S.E.2d at 788–89 (applying the APA to the appeal of a contested case from DHEC's decision on a CON application).

The APA provides that an appellate court

may affirm the decision or remand the case for further proceedings; or, it may reverse or modify the decision if

the substantive rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding, conclusion, or decision is:

- (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
- (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
- (c) made upon unlawful procedure;
- (d) affected by other error of law;
- (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
- (f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2022).

LAW/ANALYSIS

MUHA and DHEC argue the ALC erred in ruling on the validity and constitutionality of MSV and the Network because (1) such a ruling exceeded the statutory authority of the ALC and (2) the issues were not presented to or considered by DHEC. We agree.

A. Statutory Authority

We first find the ALC did not have the statutory authority to rule on the constitutionality of MSV and the Network. The General Assembly created the ALC as "an agency and a court of record within the executive branch of the government of this State." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-500 (Supp. 2022). "The General Assembly has the authority to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of a court it has created; therefore, it can prescribe the parameters of the ALC's powers." *Amisub of S.C., Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env'tl. Control*, 403 S.C. 576, 585, 743 S.E.2d 786, 791 (2013). "An administrative agency has only such powers as have been conferred upon it by law and must act within the granted authority for an authorized purpose. It may not validly act in excess of its powers . . ." *S.C. Tax Comm'n v. S.C. Tax Bd. of Rev.*, 278 S.C. 556, 560, 299 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1983) (quoting 2 Am. Jur. 2d, *Admin. Law*, § 188, at 21); *see generally Travelscape, LLC v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue*, 391 S.C. 89, 108, 705 S.E.2d 28, 38

(2011) ("It is well settled in this State that ALCs, as part of the executive branch, are without power to pass on the constitutional validity of a statute or regulation.").

MUHA relies on *SGM-Moonglo, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue*, 378 S.C. 293, 662 S.E.2d 487 (Ct. App. 2008). In *SGM-Moonglo*, this court reviewed the ALC's approval of an off-premises beer and wine permit. 378 S.C. at 294, 662 S.E.2d at 488. "The ALC held it did not have jurisdiction to enforce a restrictive covenant because its jurisdiction was limited to whether a proposed location meets the criteria established by statute and case law." *Id.* This court stated:

An administrative agency has only the powers conferred on it by law and must act within the authority created for that purpose. Pursuant to [the] . . . South Carolina Code[,] . . . the ALC must determine whether a proposed location is proper and suitable prior to granting an off-premises beer and wine permit. Restrictions in the chain of title of a proposed location, however, are not a legitimate concern of the ALC in determining whether the location is suitable. Accordingly, the ALC did not err in refusing to consider the existence of the restrictive covenant.

Id. at 295, 662 S.E.2d at 488 (internal footnotes omitted); *see Be Mi, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue*, 408 S.C. 290, 299, 758 S.E.2d 737, 741–42 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding the ALC could not resolve the issue of compliance with a master deed in a contested liquor license case because such an issue had to be resolved by the circuit court). Trident argues *SGM-Moonglo* is distinguishable because the issue in *SGM-Moonglo* concerned an unrelated private contract right, whereas in this case, the purpose of the CON Act, to "guide the establishment of health facilities and services which will best serve public needs," is at issue. *See* S.C. Code Ann. § 44-7-120 (2018).

However, we find nothing in the CON Act authorizes the ALC to rule on the constitutionality of a legal entity listed in a CON application. *See MRI at Belfair, LLC v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't Control*, 392 S.C. 314, 319, 709 S.E.2d 626, 628–29 (2011) ("The express purposes of the CON Act are 'to promote cost containment, prevent unnecessary duplication of health care facilities and services,

guide the establishment of health facilities and services which will best serve public needs, and ensure that high quality services are provided in health facilities in this State." (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 44-7-120 (2002))). DHEC must deny a Certificate of Need if an application does not comply with the South Carolina Health Plan. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-7-210(B) (2018). Under the applicable South Carolina Health Plan, the project review criteria included compliance with the need standards, community need documentation, accessibility, projected revenues, projected expenses, financial feasibility, and cost containment. Like the court in *SGM-Moonglo*, we find the ALC's jurisdiction was limited to whether the application met the criteria established by the governing law.⁴

B. Contested Cases Before the ALC

We also find the ALC erred in ruling on an issue not presented to or considered by DHEC.

A party in a contested case regarding an agency decision is required to file a notice including "the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; . . . reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved; [and a] . . . short and plain statement of the matters asserted." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-320 (B) (Supp. 2022). The ALC has the authority to hear contested cases and is allowed to conduct de novo hearings. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-380, -505(3), & -600 (Supp. 2022). Although the ALC conducts de novo hearings, under the CON Act, "[t]he *issues considered at the contested case hearing* considering a Certificate of Need are *limited to those presented or considered* during the staff review." S.C. Code Ann. § 44-7-210(E) (2018) (emphasis added); *see* SCALC Rule 21(B) ("Discovery in Certificate of Need (CON) contested cases is *limited to the issues presented or considered* during the staff review.") (emphasis added). "Findings of fact must be based exclusively on the evidence *and on matters officially noticed*." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-320(I) (Supp. 2022) (emphasis added).

DHEC reviews an application to determine compliance "with the South Carolina Health Plan, Project Review Criteria, and other regulations." § 44-7-210(B).

⁴ DHEC acknowledges in its brief that nothing in the CON Act, governing regulations, or South Carolina Health Plan authorizes it to rule on the constitutionality of a legal entity listed in a CON application.

DHEC's review includes, but is not limited to "the application, comments from affected persons . . . concerning the application, data, studies, literature and other information available to the Department" S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-15 § 308 (Supp. 2022). The regulations require the "Name and address of licensee or prospective licensee[, who is] . . . defined as the legal entity who, or whose governing body, has the ultimate responsibility and authority for the conduct of the facility or service; the owner of the business." S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-15 § 202(2)(b)(8)(b) (Supp. 2022).

We find the issues of the constitutionality and validity of MSV and the Network were neither raised by Trident in its request for final review to DHEC nor presented to or considered by DHEC during its staff review. *See* S.C. Code Ann. § 44-7-210(E) (2018) (stating the ALC's review under the CON Act is limited to issues "presented or considered during the staff review"); § 44-7-210(C) (stating "a person may not file a request for final review in opposition to the staff decision on a Certificate of Need unless the person provided written notice to the department during the staff review that he is an affected person and *specifically states his opposition* to the application under review" (emphasis added)). On this matter, we find the ALC's reliance on *Marlboro Park Hospital v. South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control*, 358 S.C. 573, 595 S.E.2d 851 (Ct. App. 2004) is misplaced. The ALC correctly read the holding in *Marlboro Park*, interpreting section 44-7-210(E) as limiting a contested case hearing to the issues presented or considered by DHEC, but permitting evidence to be presented that was not presented to DHEC. 358 S.C. at 579, 595 S.E.2d at 854. However, the ALC did more than merely allow evidence to be heard that was not before DHEC by ruling on the legality and constitutionality of MSV and the Network where the ownership issue was not presented to or considered by DHEC.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the ALC's order is

REVERSED.

HILL, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.