Appeal may be taken, as provided by law, from any final judgment or appealable order.

This Rule 72 parallels, in part, S.C. Code § 14-3-330, but is designed to reduce appeals from interlocutory or intermediate orders in an action. It accords with the modern decisions of the Supreme Court narrowing "dilatory appeals" from such interlocutory orders as grant or deny motions addressed to the pleadings, motions at trial, and the like. All such questions are left to the appeal from final judgment or order of dismissal. There is no conflict with the Supreme Court jurisdictional statutes and all statutory rights to appeal are preserved specifically by subdivision (6).

The jurisdiction of all courts is determined by the Constitution, the jurisdictional statutes, and the case law interpreting those provisions. Rule 72 as originally written created confusion and unintended arguments that the civil rules changed the scope of appeal. Rule 72 was not intended to alter, amend or supercede previously existing law concerning appeals. The amendment rephrases Rule 72 as a general statement that appeals are as provided by law, and is consistent with Rule 73 which states that the procedure on appeal is governed by the Rules of the Supreme Court.

Article V, § 5, of the Constitution sets forth the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Some of the relevant statutes are § 14-3-320 (equitable matters); § 14-3-330 (matters of law); § 17-17-140 (habeas corpus). Some of the important cases are: North Carolina Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Twin States Dev. Corp., 289 S.C. 480, 347 S.E.2d 97 (1986) (§ 14-3-330 controls appeals not Rule 72); Coleman v. Keels, 30 S.C. 614, 9 S.E. 270 (1889) (certiorari); Ex parte Mackey, 15 S.C. 322 (1880) (mandamus); Southern Railway Co. v. Coltex, 285 S.C. 213, 329 S.E.2d 736 (1985) (new trial because of error of law); Simms v. Phillips, 46 S.C. 149, 24 S.E. 87 (1896) (subject matter jurisdiction); Nat. Exchange Bank v. Stelling, 32 S.C. 102, 10 S.E. 766 (1890) (personal jurisdiction); Godley v. Uniroyal, Inc., 278 S.C. 571, 300 S.E.2d 78 (1983) (venue not immediately appealable).