THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS 
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services, Respondent,

v.

Loretta Henry, Richard Howard, Jr. and Tommie Thornton, Defendants,

IN THE INTEREST OF:

Destiny Howard, DOB: 10/05/90 Richard Howard, IV, DOB  07/14/94

Dakota Howard, DOB: 06/21/97 Crystal Howard, DOB: 12/26/99 Minor Children Under the Age of 18

Of whom Richard Howard, Jr. is Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County
 Stephen S. Bartlett, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2006-UP-259
Heard April 19, 2006 – Filed May 23, 2006

REVERSED AND REMANDED

A.M. Quattlebaum, Jr., of Greenville; for Appellant.

Danielle M. Mitchell, of Greenville; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Richard Howard, Jr., appeals the family court’s order finding the emergency removal of his children from his home had merit.[1]  We reverse and remand.

FACTS

On January 10, 2005, the Department of Social Services (DSS) was contacted concerning a black eye and cut or scratch on the face of ten-year-old Richard Howard, IV (Son).  According to Son and his mother, Loretta Henry (Mother), his injuries were caused when Richard Howard, Jr. (Father) slapped Son on the back of his head, causing him to fall forward and hit his head on the kitchen table.  During the DSS investigation, allegations were made that Father trained pit bulls on the family’s property to fight; had several weapons; was physically and emotionally abusive towards Mother; threatened the life of the children’s maternal grandmother; and suffered from bipolar disorder.  As a result, Son and his three sisters were taken into emergency protective custody on January 13, 2005.  

A probable cause hearing was held on January 18, 2005.  Mother appeared, but Father was not present because he was involuntarily placed at the Carolina Center for Behavioral Health.  The family court issued an order appointing counsel and a guardian ad litem for Father and finding probable cause existed to keep the children in protective custody.  The Probable Cause Removal Hearing Order gave the parties notice that a merits hearing would be held on February 15, 2005.  A merits removal order was issued on February 15, 2005,[2] and Father was personally served with the order.  Included in the order was a notice for the trial date of March 17, 2005.  

Father failed to appear at the March 17, 2005 hearing because he was incarcerated in federal prison in North Carolina awaiting a mental evaluation.  Father’s guardian ad litem and appointed counsel appeared on his behalf.  Counsel moved for a continuance, arguing that he did not have access to Father and there was no way for Father to participate in the hearing.  Counsel stated he was informed that he would not have access to Father until after the mental evaluation, which would be at least four or five months after the hearing.  The family court noted the removal statute only allows for a thirty-day continuance and requires the matter to be concluded within sixty-five days.  Noting that Father still would be unavailable within thirty days, the matter was already near the sixty-five day mark, and Father had a guardian ad litem, the court denied the request for a continuance.  After a hearing on the merits, the court made a finding that Father physically struck Son and placed the other children at substantial risk of abuse.  The court also approved Mother’s plea agreement with DSS, finding a substantial risk of abuse to the children based on a failure to protect.  The court approved a treatment plan for both parents.  The court approved placement of the oldest daughters with their maternal grandmother and placement in foster care for Son and the youngest daughter.  Father appeals. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In appeals from the family court, this court has authority to find the facts in accordance with our own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Woodall v. Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 10, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1996).  However, this broad scope of review does not require us to disregard the findings of the family court.  Stevenson v. Stevenson, 276 S.C. 475, 477, 279 S.E.2d 616, 617 (1981).  We are mindful that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony.  Bowers v. Bowers, 349 S.C. 85, 91, 561 S.E.2d 610, 613 (Ct. App. 2002).  “This degree of deference is especially true in cases involving the welfare and best interests of a minor child.”  Ex Parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56, 62, 624 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2006).  Further, this broad scope of review does not relieve the appellant from the burden of showing the family court erred.  Id.  Whether to grant or deny a motion for a continuance is a matter within the sole discretion of the family court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.  Bridwell v. Bridwell, 279 S.C. 111, 112, 302 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1983).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Father argues the family court erred in failing to grant his motion for a continuance because it resulted in a violation of his due process rights.  He asserts the merits hearing concer