THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.   IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Fariborz Z. Babaee and Malihe Babaee, Appellants/Respondents

v.

Moisture Warranty Corporation d/b/a Moisture Free Warranty; and Preferred Home Inspections, Inc., Defendants,

Of Whom Moisture Warranty Corporation d/b/a Moisture Free Warranty is the Respondent/Appellant

Appeal From Richland County
Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-030
Heard September 13, 2011 – Filed January 25, 2012   

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED

Robert B. Phillips, of Columbia, for Appellants-Respondents.

C. Mitchell Brown, Thomas William McGee, III, A. Mattison Bogan, and Emma T. Dean, all of Columbia; and Mark Phillips, of Charleston, for Respondent-Appellant.

PER CURIAM:  Appellants/Respondents Fariborz Babaee and Malihe Babaee (the Babaees) brought this breach of warranty action against Respondent/Appellant Moisture Warranty Corporation (Moisture Warranty) to recover damages for Moisture Warranty's refusal to pay the full cost of repairs to the Babaees' home after it sustained moisture damage.  The circuit court granted Moisture Warranty's motion for a directed verdict on the Babaees' claims for fraud and violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 to -560 (1976 & Supp. 2010).  The jury returned a verdict for the Babaees in the amount of $140,000 on their breach of warranty claim.  The circuit court granted Moisture Warranty's motion for a new trial nisi remittitur, reduced the verdict to $20,000, and denied Moisture Warranty's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and new trial absolute.  The Babaees appeal, and Moisture Warranty cross-appeals.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.     

1.  As to the reduction of the jury's verdict, we disagree with the Babaees' argument that this reduction was based on warranty terms to which they did not agree.  Significantly, when the Babaees closed on the purchase of their home, they were provided with Moisture Warranty's Letter of Approval, which indicated the home qualified for a warranty against moisture damage, with one exclusion.  The Letter of Approval indicated the "level of warranty chosen" was a three-year warranty with a total limit of $60,000 and a $20,000 annual limit.  The Babaees signed the Letter of Approval, just below the following statement: "I have read and understand this Letter of Approval dated 11/11/04 and the Moisture Warranty Terms and Conditions.  I accept the warranty and any exclusions listed for the home . . . ."[1] 

The language in the Letter of Approval was clear and unambiguous in its expression of coverage limits and in its incorporation of the Terms and Limitations document, which also set forth coverage limits of $20,000 per year for a total of $60,000 over the full term of the warranty.  Further, the warranty stated it did not cover consequential damages.  Therefore, the circuit court properly considered the warranty's coverage limits in granting Moisture Warranty's motion to reduce the jury's verdict.  See S.C. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Town of McClellanville, 345 S.C. 617, 623, 550 S.E.2d 299, 303 (2001) (holding that the determination of the parties' intent is a question of fact only when the language of a contract is ambiguous); Becker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 339 S.C. 629, 637, 529 S.E.2d 758, 762 (Ct. App. 2000) ("The trial court has wide discretionary power to reduce the amount of a verdict which in his or her judgment is excessive.") (citation and quotation marks omitted).  We affirm the trial court's reduction of the jury's verdict to the limits stated i