Questions Presented

Statement of the Case

This matter is before the South Carolina Supreme Court pursuant to the Claimant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 

The original hearing was held on October 10, 2002, in Beaufort, South Carolina, before Commissioner Lisa D. Chavis.  (A. p.103).  The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the Petitioner’s alleged stress-induced mental injury was caused by an extraordinary and unusual condition of employment as specifically required by the penultimate paragraph of S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160. (A. pp. 105—106).

By Order dated September 19, 2003, the Hearing Commissioner determined that the greater weight of the evidence in the record did not support a conclusion that the Petitioner sustained a compensable work-related injury pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §42-1-160. (A.pp. 173-182).  Specifically, the Hearing Commissioner found the Petitioner failed to prove the conditions of her employment with Beaufort County School District were either unusual or extraordinary. (A. p. 181).  As a result, the Hearing Commissioner denied the Petitioner’s claim for benefits under the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act. (A. p. 182).

Thereafter, the Petitioner sought a de novo review by the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s Appellate Panel pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-50.  The Petitioner’s grounds for review were as follows: (1) the Hearing Commissioner erred in failing to find the Petitioner sustained a compensable injury by accident on October 18, 2001; (2) the Hearing Commissioner erred in finding Kathryn Jacobson, a sociologist, was not qualified to render medical opinions; (3) the Hearing Commissioner erred in refusing to allow DA. Hucks, an internist, to testify as to certain medical issues pertaining to the Petitioner’s psychiatric condition; (4) the Hearing Commissioner made numerous errors in her findings relating to the Claimant’s employment environment; and (5) the Hearing Commissioner erred in both ordering the Petitioner to undergo an independent medical evaluation and then relying on the opinions of the Board Certified licensed practicing psychiatrist over that of DA. Hucks, an internist. (A. pp.183—185).

The South Carolina Worker’s Compensation Commission issued its Decision and Order on May 17, 2004. The Full Commission affirmed the Hearing Commissioner’s Decision and Order, only reversing the Hearing Commissioner’s decision not to allow Kathryn Jacobson’s deposition to be made part of the record and also allowing certain opinions of DA. Hucks’ deposition into the record. (A. pp. 223—226).  Despite allowing the additional opinions into the record, as the Claimant requested, the Commission still unanimously found the greater weight of the evidence supports the Hearing Commissioner’s Decision and Order that the Claimant did not sustain a compensable accident in accordance with the Act and the applicable case law. (A.p. 225).

After a hearing on June 1, 2005, Judge Curtis L. Coltrane affirmed the Decision and Order of the South Carolina Worker’s Compensation Commission by finding the Claimant did not sustain a compensable accident on October 18, 2001 in accordance with the Act and the applicable case law. (A. p. 238; p. 255-266).  The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Circuit Court on February 8, 2007. (A. pp. 1—4).  Thereafter, on April 19, 2007 the South Carolina Court of Appeals denied Petitioner Marsha Tennant’s Petition for Rehearing. (A. p. 10).  The Petitioner now petitions the South Carolina Supreme Court to issue a Writ of Certiorari to review the final decision of the South Carolina Court of Appeals.  

I. The Petitioner failed to preserve her argument for review by failing to raise it before the Court of Appeals or in her Petition for Rehearing. 

In her Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Petitioner argues the Court of Appeals erred “because this decision by the Appellate Panel is conclusory.”  The issue of whether the Commission’s findings are sufficiently detailed was not raised before the Court of Appeals or in the petition for rehearing.  Therefore, this issue is procedurally barred under Rule 226(d)(2) and is not preserved for review by the Supreme Court. Sloan v. Department of Transp., 365 S.C. 299, 618 S.E.2d 876 (2005); Kleckley v. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co., 338 S.C. 131, 526 S.E.2d 218 (2000); Anonymous v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 329 S.C. 371, 496 S.E.2d 17 (1998); Camp v. Springs Mtg. Corp., 310 S.C. 514, 426 S.E.2d 304 (1993)

Under Rule 226(d)(2) SCACR:

Only those questions raised in the Court of Appeals and in the petition for rehearing shall be included in the petition for writ of certiorari as a question presented to the Supreme Court. 

In the present case, the Petitioner’s “Statement of Issues on Appeal” to the Court of Appeals sets forth the following:

1.      The Court erred in not considering the opinions of Dr. Andrea Hucks and Kathryn Jacobson, MSW, as stated in the order of the full Workers’ Compensation Commission.

2.      The Court erred in not finding that the substantial evidence in the record supports the unusual strain and exertion on the Appellant which caused [sic] the injury and subsequent disability.

3.      The Court erred in finding that from the substantial evidence in the record, Appellant failed to prove extraordinary and unusual conditions compared to normal conditions of employment.

(Appellant’s Final Brief to Court of Appeals p. 3).  Therefore, nowhere in the Petitioner’s own “Statement of Issues on Appeal” to the Court of Appeals is the issue of the sufficiency of the Commission’s findings raised. 

Furthermore, “conclusory statements unaccompanied by argument and citation to authority are insufficient to preserve an issue for appellate review.” State v. Crocker, 366, S.C. 394, 399, 621 S.E.2d 890, 893 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Fields v. Melrose Ltd. P’ship, 312 S.C. 102, 106, 439 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ct. App. 1993) and Jean Hoefer Toal et al., Appellate Practice in South Carolina 75—76 (2d. ed. 2002)).  Thus, any vague reference to whether the Commission set forth facts to support its findings contained in the Appellant’s brief to the Court of Appeals still fails to preserve the issue for review as a matter of law, as the Petitioner cited no authority or argument. Id.

Most importantly, however, is the fact that the issue of whether the Commission’s findings are sufficiently detailed was not raised in the Petitioner’s Petition for Rehearing before the Court of Appeals. (A. pp. 5—7).  By her Petition for Rehearing, the Claimant briefly enumerates nine alleged errors, not one of which in any way incorporates the issue of the sufficiency of the Commission’s findings.  Moreover, the Petition for Rehearing fails to even comply with the requirements of Rule 224(c)(2), SCACR, as the Petitioner failed to file any memorandum with citation of authorities in support of her Petition.

Therefore, a careful review of the record in this matter reveals the Claimant did not raise the issue of whether the Commission’s findings are sufficiently detailed before the Court of Appeals or in her Petition for Rehearing.  Therefore, pursuant Rule 226(d)(2), SCACR, the Respondents respectfully request that the Court of Appeals be affirmed. 

II. The Workers’ Compensation Commission’s finding that the Petitioner’s alleged mental injury was not caused by any extraordinary or unusual circumstances in her employment is supported by substantial evidence, as properly determined by the Circuit Court and Court of Appeals.

Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that the Claimant’s alleged mental injury was not caused by any extraordinary or unusual circumstances in her employment, as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160.  However, the Commission’s finding that the Petitioner’s alleged mental injury was not caused by any extraordinary or unusual circumstances in her employment is, in fact, supported by substantial evidence and the applicable law.  Mental injuries are compensable under Workers’ Compensation Law if induced either by physical injury or by unusual or extraordinary conditions in comparison to the normal conditions of the employment.  S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160; Getsinger v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 335 S.C. 77, 515 S.E.2d 104 (1999).  Furthermore, according to S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160,:

Stress arising out of and in the course of employment unaccompanied by physical injury is not considered compensable if it results from any event or series of events which is incidental to normal employer/employee relations including, but not limited to, personnel actions by the employer such as disciplinary actions, work evaluations, transfers, promotions, demotions, salary reviews, or terminations, except when these actions are taken in an extraordinary and unusual manner.

Here, because the Claimant’s alleged psychological problems were unaccompanied by physical injury, they must have been caused by unusual or extraordinary circumstances in comparison to the normal conditions of her employment as a special education teacher to be compensable under S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160. 

The Petitioner argues that there is evidence the Claimant had a panic attack and depression as a result of her relationship with her co-workers at the Beaufort County School District.  This argument appears to center on the Petitioner’s assertion that the Commission should have weighed conflicting evidence differently.  However, the law is clear that the issue of the weight to be accorded the evidence is reserved exclusively to the Commission. See Rogers v. Kunja Knitting Mills, Inc., 440 S.E.2d 401, 403, 312 S.C. 377, 380 (stating  “The final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the full commission and it is not the task of the court to weigh the evidence as found by the commission.  Where there are conflicts in the evidence over a factual issue the findings of the commission are conclusive.”) (internal citations omitted).  Furthermore, a causal relation is insufficient, as S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160 requires that the alleged mental injuries were caused by some unusual or extraordinary circumstances unrelated to normal employer/employee relations.  

The Commission discussed in detail the facts upon which it determined that the Petitioner’s working conditions at the time of her alleged mental injury were neither extraordinary, nor unusual in comparison to the normal conditions of her employment as a special education teacher.  The Commission described the “normal” conditions of the Petitioner’s past employment as working with disturbed children who had killed their mothers, committed bestiality, and made death threats.  (A. p. 177). The Petitioner apparently witnessed the execution of one of her former students and the sexual assault of another       . (A. p. 177).  Based upon the Petitioner’s own testimony regarding her chosen profession, the Commission found that “a heightened stress level was typical in special education setting,” such as the one in which the Petitioner worked.

Yet the Claimant alleges that the stress that caused her alleged mental problems was not related to working with special needs children.  Instead, the Claimant alleges that the circumstances leading to her panic attack and treatment for depression was related to problems she had in working with two aides assigned to her classroom and in dealing with her supervisor regarding the aides. (A. p. 170).  The Petitioner’s supervisor, Assistant Principal Tillman, testified before the Commission:

the conflicts the [Petitioner] was having with Ms. Grimes and Ms. Hamilton [the aides] were normal problems with school personnel, and it was a situation which could have resolved and made work.  She testified that it was not unusual, during the course of the school year, that a school employee would come to her office hysterical, or to the principal’s office upset and/or crying about some incident.

(A. p. 180, see also A. p. 166, lines 9—20; p. 170, line 21; p. 171, line 2)  The Commission specifically refers to this testimony in making its decision, stating that:

Ms. Tillman testified she felt as though the conflicts the Claimant was having with Ms. Grimes and Ms. Hamilton were normal problems with school personnel, and it was a situation which could have resolved and made work.  (A. p. 162).

This testimony alone constitutes substantial evidence in support of the Commission’s finding that the conditions of the Petitioner’s employment with Beaufort County School District were neither extraordinary, nor unusual and obviously formed the basis of the Commission’s findings and conclusions.  (A. p. 166 &181).

Conclusion

The central issue by Petitioner was not raised before the Court of Appeals or in her petition for rehearing.  Therefore, this issue is procedurally barred under Rule 226(d)(2) SCACR.  Furthermore, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Circuit Court, Workers’ Compensation Commission Appellate Panel, and the Hearing Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the applicable law.  Based upon the foregoing, the Respondents respectfully request the decision of the Court of Appeals be affirmed.