STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

Appeal from York County
Honorable John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE, Appellant,

v.

BERRY SCOTT BOLIN, Respondent.

FINAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

HENRY D.  McMASTER
Attorney General

JOHN W. McINTOSH
Chief Deputy Attorney General

DONALD J. ZELENKA
Assistant Deputy Attorney General

S. CREIGHTON WATERS
Assistant Attorney General
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, South Carolina  29211
(803) 734-6305

KEVIN S. BRACKETT
Solicitor, Sixteenth Judicial Circuit
1675-1A York Highway
York, South Carolina 29745-7495
(803) -628-3020

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

Other Authorities

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN QUASHING THE INDICTMENT FOR POSSESSION OF A HANDGUN WHILE UNDER THE AGE OF 21, BASED ON THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION SETTING THE AGE OF MAJORITY AT 18, WHERE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ITSELF EXPRESSLY CONTEMPLATES FURTHER REGULATION OF YOUNG ADULTS, AND WHERE IN ANY EVENT NO LEGAL RIGHT AS TO POSSESSION OF HANDGUNS WAS INFRINGED BY THIS REASONABLE EXERCISE OF THE STATE’S POLICE POWER?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent, Berry Scott Bolin, was indicted in May 2006 by the York County Grand Jury for Murder, Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill, Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Violent Offense, Assault with Intent to Kill, Discharging a Firearm into an Occupied Vehicle, and Possession of a Pistol by Person under 21 Years of Age (2006-GS-46-1595 to -1601). 

Petitioner was represented at the trial level by Leland Greeley, Esquire.  On August 17^th, 2006, Greeley filed a Motion to Quash Indictments and Cease Prosecution Pursuant to the “Protection of Persons and Property Act”, as well as a Motion to Quash Indictment Due to “Unconstitutionality of Statute”.

A hearing on the motions was held before the Honorable John C. Hayes, III, on August 28^th, 2006.  The next day, Judge Hayes quashed the Indictment for Possession of a Pistol by Person under 21 Years of Age (06-GS-46-1601).

This State’s appeal follows.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Of course, South Carolina Code § 16-23-30 (Supp. 2006) provides criminalizes the sale or transfer of a handgun to, or the possession of a handgun by, drunkards, addicts, mental incompetents, subversives, and those adjudicated unfit, as well as:

(3) a person under the age of twenty-one, but this shall not apply to the issue of handguns to members of the Armed Forces of the United States, active or reserve, National Guard, State Militia, or R. O. T. C., when on duty or training or the temporary loan of handguns for instructions under the immediate supervision of a parent or adult instructor.

(Emphasis added).  Bolin was 19 years of age at the time of the incident, during which he is accused of using a pistol to open fire on occupants of a car.  Thus, he was charged for possession under this statute.

In his Motion to Quash, Bolin argued that this statutory crime violates two provisions of the South Carolina Constitution.  First, he noted the reference to the right to bear arms in Article I, section 20 of the South Carolina Constitution:

A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. As, in times of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained without the consent of the General Assembly. The military power of the State shall always be held in subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it. No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner nor in time of war but in the manner prescribed by law.

Bolin noted that the General Assembly had also referred to the right of the people to bear arms as supporting its recent passage of the Protection of Persons and Property Act.  See S.C.  Code Ann. § 16-11-420(C) (Supp. 2006). 

Second, Bolin pointed to Article XVII, section 14 of our state constitution:

Every citizen who is eighteen years of age or older, not laboring under disabilities prescribed in this Constitution or otherwise established by law, shall be deemed sui juris and endowed with full legal rights and responsibilities, provided, that the General Assembly may restrict the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons until age twenty-one.

Thus, Bolin concluded that since he was old enough to be sui juris and our state constitution guarantees him the right to bear arms, then he could not be charged with a crime for possession.  Bolin pointed out that despite the provision in Article XVII, Section 14 allowing a higher minimum age for alcohol, no such provision exists in the constitution for firearms.  {R pp.12-13}.

The State responded with a Memorandum dated August 28^th, 2006.  In it, the State argued that the state constitutional right to bear arms was subject to reasonable regulation through the State’s police power, and noted that the right itself was expressly linked with the societal goal of a well-regulated militia – rather than being a purely individual right.  Next, the State argued that further legislative restriction based on age was expressly authorized by the provision in Article XVII section 14 excluding those “not laboring under disabilities prescribed in this Constitution or otherwise established by law”.  Finally, the State argued that the right to self-defense did not give one unlimited choice as to the weapon used.   {R. pp.15-24}.

The day after argument, the court orally granted Bolin’s motion to quash, finding section 16-3-30(B) unconstitutional.  The court reasoned that the other disabilities set forth in the “otherwise established by law” clause of the constitutional provision referred to something other than age.  {R. p. 41}.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUASHING THE INDICTMENT FOR POSSESSION OF A HANDGUN WHILE UNDER THE AGE OF 21, BASED ON THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION SETTING THE AGE OF MAJORITY AT 18, SINCE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ITSELF EXPRESSLY CONTEMPLATES FURTHER REGULATION OF YOUNG ADULTS, AND IN ANY EVENT NO LEGAL RIGHT AS TO POSSESSION OF HANDGUNS WAS INFRINGED BY THIS REASONABLE EXERCISE OF THE STATE’S POLICE POWER.

There is no question that any possession or use of firearms is subject to legislative restriction pursuant to the State’s police power.  Since the constitutional provision as to age expressly contemplates and allows further restriction of young adults, Petitioner’s indictment for possession of a handgun under the age of 21 is constitutional.  In any event, Petitioner has no claim under the constitutional provision as to age that he was denied a legal right, because any right to bear arms he may have was not infringed by reasonable restriction that still allowed him to possess other types of firearms.       

A.  General Rules

When the issue is the constitutionality of a statute, every presumption will be made in favor of its validity and no statute will be declared unconstitutional unless its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no doubt that it conflicts with the constitution. State v. Bouye, 325 S.C. 260, 484 S.E.2d 461 (1997).  The party challenging the statute has the burden of proving it unconstitutional.  Id. See State v. Jones, 344 S.C. 48, 543 S.E.2d 541 (2001) (setting forth the above discussion)  See also State v. Curtis, 356 S.C. 622, 591 S.E.2d 600 (2004) (setting forth the above).

B.  Putting aside for the moment the state constitutional provision as to age, there can be no dispute that any right to bear arms would be subject to regulation pursuant to the State’s police power.

Of course, as noted before, Article I, section 20 of the South Carolina Constitution sets forth a right of the people to keep and bear arms.  Indeed, the General Assembly stated in its recent enactment of the Protection of Persons and Property Act that it “found” Section 20 of Article I guaranteed the right of people to bear arms – a right which should not be infringed.  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-420 (Supp. 2006).  In the Nineteenth Century, Justice Story wrote that the right to bear arms “has justly been considered as the palladium of the liberties of the republic.”  3 J. Story, Commentaries, 1890, p. 746 (1833).  And, North Carolina, which possesses virtually an identical constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to bear arms to that of South Carolina’s Art. I, § 20, has construed its amendment as bestowing the right to bear arms not just collectively but as ensuring individual rights.  State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9 (N.C. 1968).  Such a construction by the North Carolina Supreme Court possesses strong historical support in this State as well.

However, there seems to be no dispute that any right to bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation pursuant to the State’s police power.  In State v. Johnson, 16 S.C. 187, 1881 W.L. 5959 (S.C. 1881) (“Johnson I”), this Court noted that the purpose of a statute prohibiting the possession of a concealed weapon “was, as far as may be consistent with the right of the citizen to bear arms, absolutely to prohibit the carrying of deadly weapons, with a view to prevent acts of violence and bloodshed, which are too apt to be committed by persons under excitement when they have at hand such effectual means of perpetrating such acts.”  Moreover, in a different State v. Johnson, 56 S.E. 544 (1907) (“Johnson II”), this Court specifically held that a statute prohibiting the discharge of a firearm within the city limits of Charleston did not violate the constitutional right to bear arms, but clearly was within the police power granted to the city government by statute.

Moreover, the caselaw of the nation is full of decisions also upholding regulation on firearms despite various state constitutional provisions.  Some jurisdictions expressly set forth an individual right to bear arms in the language of their state constitutions; some have “militia-based” provisions on the right to bear arms; and some have found an individual right to bear arms as necessarily implicit in a “militia-based” constitutional provision.  See Robertson v. City and County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 328 n.6 (Colo. 1994) (generally categorizing the constitutional provisions of various states); North Carolina v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1968) (noting that while the right to bear arms was formulated when the weapons of the militia were the private arms of the members – a condition that no longer exists, the individual’s right to use his weapon for self-defense was assumed).  Regardless, all of these jurisdictions have found the right however defined as subject to reasonable state regulation.  Robertson, supra; Dawson, 159 S.E.2d at 10 (the right to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation by the General Assembly so long as such regulation bears “a reasonable relation to the preservation of public peace and safety”); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7^th Cir. 1982) (upholding ban on handguns against Illinois’ constitutional right to bear arms).¹

And, there also is no doubt that for policy reasons our State regards young adults between the ages of 18 and 20 as inexperienced and more susceptible to lapses of judgment.  Marcum v. Bowden, No. 26259, 2007 W.L. 415672 (S.C. filed February 5^th, 2007) (although drinkers 18, 19, and 20 have full legal rights, “the public policy of this State treats these individuals as lacking full adult capacity to make informed decisions concerning the ingestion of alcoholic beverages”). Norton v. Opening Break of Aiken, 313 S.C. 508, 443 S.E.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1994) (although adults, individuals from 18-20 who drink pose a high risk of danger to themselves and others).  Similarly, there is no doubt that valid policy concerns support limitations on handguns not also placed on long guns, as handguns are more typically used in crime due to their concealability, ready availability, and lower cost.  See, e.g. Johnson v. State, 839 A.2d 769 (Md. Ct. App. 2003) (noting the Maryland General Assembly’s determination that current laws were insufficient to curb the “more frequent use of handguns” in crime); Zawitz, Marianne, “Guns Used in Crime”, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, July 1995 NJ-148201 (finding that 75% of gun crime is committed with handguns, that inmates say they prefer concealable weapons, and that juvenile offenders are more likely to have handguns than adult offenders).  Indeed, it is common knowledge that the combination of young people, handguns, and gangs creates a particularly toxic mix.  Tellingly, the General Assembly, in enacting the Concealable Weapons Act, reiterated that persons under the age of 21 are ineligible for a concealable weapons permit.  See, § 23-31-215 (F)(1) (applicant must certify “he is not a person prohibited under state law from possessing a weapon ...”). 

Accordingly, a prohibition against possession of a handgun prior to the age of 21 has never been thought to be and is not now arbitrary or irrational, and is reasonably related to legitimate government interests.  See generally Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age is not a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause); In the Interest of Ronnie A., 355 S.C. 407, 585 S.E.2d 311 (2003) (substantive due process guarantee requires a rational basis for legislation depriving a person of life, liberty, or property); Arnold v. Ass’n of Citadel Men, 337 S.C. 265, 523 S.E.2d 757 (1999) (unless a fundamental right or suspect class is involved, equal protection is satisfied if the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose, members of the class are treated alike, and the classification rests on some reasonable basis).  Certainly if it is appropriate for the Legislature to stop a nineteen year old from having a Heineken, it is also appropriate under the same power to prohibit that same nineteen year old from having a Glock 9mm semiautomatic pistol.

C.  Not only does the constitutional provision as to age authorize further reasonable regulation of young adults, but any enforceable right of Respondent to bear arms was not infringed by this reasonable exercise of the State’s police power.

The previous conclusion is not the real rub of this case, however, as the question is whether any age-based restriction from 18-20 on handguns runs afoul of our state constitutional provision that lowered the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen.  Of course, the state constitution is a limitation upon and not a grant of power to the General Assembly.  Duncan v. York County, 267 S.C. 327, 228 S.E.2d 92 (1976).

At common law, the age of majority was twenty-one.  South Carolina Jurisprudence Vol. 21, Children and Families § 171 (1993).  Accordingly, the Constitution of 1868 granted all males of age twenty-one or older the right to vote; the Constitution of 1895 retained this age minimum and added poll taxes and literacy tests.  South Carolina Constitution of 1895 Art. II, §§ 3-4. 

This common law age of majority was also often applied to the right to bear arms.  As St. George Tucker wrote, “children under the age of discretion,” or those under the common law age of majority at 21, as well as others such as criminals, could not bear arms.  Cornell, “St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings,” 47 William and Mary Law Review 1123, 1144 (Feb. 2006).  Indeed, the choice of twenty one years of age as the universally accepted age of majority in this country for over two hundred years was “based upon that being the age at which a young man attained sufficient strength and ability to bear arms.”  Castle, “Early Emancipation Statutes: Should They Protect Parents As Well as Children?”   20 Family Law Quarterly, 343, n. 36 (Fall, 1986).

Thus, the age of 21 has strong historical roots as that age at which one possessed as a citizen of the republic the right to bear arms.  Historically, persons below such age possessed the very same disability from bearing arms as others in society who were considered unable to possess firearms in a responsible manner.

However, in 1970 Congress lowered the voting age to eighteen when extending the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but the United States Supreme Court ruled the Act’s voting age could not apply to the States.  Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).  The States then ratified the lower voting age in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to avoid having two sets of voting rules.  Consequently, in 1975 the General Assembly approved Act No. 42 which lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen in Article II, section 4 of our state constitution.  Consistently, by 1975 Act No. 15, the General Assembly also approved Article XVII, section 14 of our state constitution, which lowered the age of majority to eighteen:

Every citizen who is eighteen years of age or older, not laboring under disabilities prescribed in this Constitution or otherwise established by law, shall be deemed sui juris and endowed with full legal rights and responsibilities, provided, that the General Assembly may restrict the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons until age twenty-one.

The General Assembly also passed in 1976 South Carolina Code section 15-1-320, which provided that all references to minors in the law of South Carolina would mean persons under the age of eighteen.  South Carolina Jurisprudence Vol. 21, Children and Families § 171 (1993).

With the way this constitutional provision developed in mind – as a mechanism for to equalize voting ages – it is clear that our state constitutional provision as to the right to bear arms does not invalidate criminalization of possession of a pistol under 21 based on the constitutional provision lowering the age of majority.  As noted before, such a right to bear arms would still be subject to reasonable state regulation.  See Johnson II, supra.

The constitutional provision as to age expressly contemplates further regulation by the General Assembly, by providing that to have “full legal rights and responsibilities”, a person over eighteen years old must also not be “laboring under disabilities prescribed in this Constitution or otherwise established by law” (emphasis added).  While the trial court believed this clause referred to disabilities other than age, this conflicts with the plain meaning of the provision.  The term “established by law” for purposes of a constitutional provision means “provided by legislation.”  St. Mary’s Anesthesia Associates, Inc. v. Hospital Service Dist, 836 So.2d 379 (La. 2003).  See generally Fraternal Order of Police v. South Carolina Department of Revenue, 352 S.C. 420, 574 S.E.2d 717 (2002) (determining and applying the plain meaning of a state constitutional provision).  The provision does not speak to “other” disabilities than age; it merely says “disabilities . . . otherwise established by law”.  Unquestionably, being under a certain age is a classic legal disability.  Black’s Law Dictionary p.461 (6^th ed. 1990) (disability includes “persons under age”).  Moreover, age has always been deemed a disability for purposes of firearms regulations. 

In addition, the mere fact that the constitutional provision specifically mentions subsequent prohibition of drinking by those under twenty-one does not necessarily exclude any other regulation of the conduct of young adults.  It is true that the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius holds that “to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of another.”  South Carolina Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 345 S.C. 251, 547 S.E.2d 881 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001).  However, the rule is a rule of construction, not substantive law, and it should not be used to defeat legislative intent, but rather should be used “with care”.  Id.

Here, nothing in the plain meaning of the age provision specifically limits further regulation only to drinking age, just as nothing in that provision expressly limits the earlier “otherwise established by law” provision.  Indeed, even though the statute criminalizing the possession of a handgun under the age of twenty-one was in existence prior to the constitutional amendment setting the age of majority at eighteen, the General Assembly did not include it among other statutes that it amended to delete references to the age of twenty-one to replace them with eighteen.  1976 Act No. 695.  Moreover, the General Assembly has since twice amended the statute containing the prohibition against those under twenty-one possessing handguns, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-30 (Supp. 2005), but never reduced the age limit in that statute.  2006 Act No. 336; 2004 Act No. 294.  And, as indicated, the Concealable Weapons Act – legislation which expresses the very essence of the right to bear arms – recognizes that persons under 21 are ineligible for a Concealable Weapons Permit. 

This certainly indicates the intent of the General Assembly in passing and ratifying the constitutional provision as to age that reasonable regulation of firearms and young adults was not considered abridged by the provision.  See generally Berkebile v. Outen, 311 S.C. 50, 426 S.E.2d 760 (1993) (basic presumption that General Assembly has knowledge of previous legislation when later statutes are passed on a related subject).  The obvious intent of the constitutional provision was set the age of majority at eighteen as a general matter – consistent with the lowering of the voting age after the federal impetus – not to preclude all other reasonable State regulation of young adults and inherently dangerous activities.  Thus, in this case, merely specifying one does not exclude the possibility of others.² 

Further, the concerns raised by the trial court {R. pp. 36-38; 39-40} do not preclude this interpretation of the constitutional provision as to age.  Obviously, restriction of any sort of fundamental right would be subjected to strict scrutiny review, and a statute, for example, prohibiting 18-20 year olds from marrying or engaging in First Amendment freedoms would not survive this heightened review.  Similarly, a law that 18-20 year olds did not have a right to a speedy trial would not be enforceable in a criminal proceeding, as it would inherently raise criminal procedure concerns on its own right – indeed, it is hard to conceive of a rational basis for such a statute anyway.

These examples show that in analyzing rights under the constitutional age provision, it is the nature of the right itself in issue that should be analyzed for the reasonableness of restriction and regulation – in other words, any claim under the constitutional provision as to age necessarily depends on the rules surrounding the specific right a person claims was infringed due to age.  While Bolin as a 19 year old has legal rights, the specific right he claims was violated by indictment for possession of a pistol – the right to bear arms – is a “right” in and of itself that unquestionably subject to reasonable State regulation.  Indeed, throughout history perhaps no other constitutional right has been more subject to legislative restriction than the right to bear arms. 

Here, any right of Bolin to bear arms is not infringed in the constitutional sense, but merely limited by a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power.  Bolin is still free to possess long guns, and also can temporarily possess handguns under supervision of an parent or instructor.  Moreover, nothing prohibits him from possessing a handgun when on military duty.  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-30(A)(3) (Supp. 2006).  Mere restriction of one sort of particularly troublesome firearm does not amount to infringement in the constitutional sense.  See generally Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1235 (Conn. 1995) (ban on assault weapons did not infringe the right to bear arms, as the law continued to permit a “wide array of weapons”); Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031 (R.I. 2004) (restriction on handguns does not infringe the state constitutional right to bear arms, as it is a reasonable regulation and does not create a total ban on the right to bear arms); State v. Cline, 488 S.E.2d 376 (W. Va. 1997) (state constitutional provision setting forth right to bear arms for lawful hunting and recreation not infringed by statute prohibiting transport of loaded weapons in vehicle); State v. Warden, 901 P.2d 900 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (statute prohibiting person from casting artificial light from a motor vehicle while is possession of a firearm did not unreasonably infringe a person’s right to bear arms, but was a reasonable exercise of police power).  Cf. Robertson v. City and County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1994) (precluding assault weapons was a reasonable exercise of police power despite right to bear arms).

Since the constitutional provision as to age expressly contemplates further regulation, and since the reasonable restriction of one specific type of firearm did not infringe on his constitutional right to bear arms anyway, then Bolin was denied no legal right based on his age.  The quashing of the indictment was improper.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully submits that the trial judge’s ruling that the statutory provision was unconstitutional should be reversed, and the quashed indictment should be reinstated.

June 28, 2007

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

Appeal from York County
Honorable John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE, Appellant,

v.

BERRY SCOTT BOLIN, Respondent.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, S. Creighton Waters, Counsel for Appellant, certify that I have this date served the Final Brief of Appellant dated June 28, 2007, on Respondent by depositing three copies of the same in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to his attorney of record:

Leland B. Greeley, Esquire
Post Office Box 2981
Rock Hill, South Carolina 29732

I further certify that I have served all parties required by Rule to be served.

This 28^th day of June, 2007.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE SUPREME COURT

Appeal from York County
Honorable John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

THE STATE, Appellant,

v.

BERRY SCOTT BOLIN, Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

The undersigned certifies that this Final Brief of Appellant complies with Rule 211(b), SCACR.

June 28, 2007.

¹  In passing, it should be noted the United States Supreme Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to a firearms restriction by noting that the defendant’s individual claim had no merit because it had no relationship with the preservation of the common good or efficiency of a regulated militia.  United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).  See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir.2003) (referring to Miller 's implicit rejection of traditional individual rights position).  But see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 226 (5th Cir.2001) (reading Miller as indecisive and, at best, supporting an individual's right to bear arms).

²  Indeed, the state constitution itself still imposes a minimum age of 21 for Representatives, State Librarian, and Departmental Clerks.  See S.C. Const. Art. III § 7; S.C. Const. Art. XVII § 1.  And, our state statutes still retain in various contexts the age of 21 as a minimum.  See, e.g. S.C. Code Ann. § 14-23-1040 (must be 21 to be probate judge); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-555 (statute of limitations as to sexual abuse begins, in part, at age 21); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-5-130 (must be 21 to be a coroner); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-7810(E) (person convicted as juvenile for violent offense and given indeterminate sentence until age of 21 must be transferred to SCDC upon turning 17);  S.C. Code Ann. § 24-19-50 (allowing indeterminate sentences without consent of youthful offenders under the age of 21); S.C. Code Ann. § 40-18-100 (no person can be granted a Security Weapons Permit without being at least 21); S.C. Code Ann. § 40-47-30 (minimum age for practicing medicine is 21); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-34-100 (unlawful to tattoo a person under 21; those 18 or older need parental consent); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-3670 (goggles and face shields to be worn by all motorcyclists under 21).