S.E. 2d
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
T. Walter Brashier, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina
Department of
Transportation, Interwest
Carolina Transportation
Group, L.L.C., and
Connector 2000
Association, Inc., Respondents.
Appeal From Greenville County
Charles B. Simmons, Jr., Master-in-Equity
Opinion No. 24665
Heard May 6, 1997 - Filed August 6, 1997
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
Ray D. Lathan, of Lathan & Barbare, P.A., of Greenville,
for appellant.
J. Douglas Nunn, of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough,
L.L.P., of Columbia, for respondent South Carolina
Department of Transportation.
Jack H. Tedards, Jr., of Leatherwood Walker Todd &
Mann, P.C., of Greenville, for respondent Interwest
Carolina Transportation Group, L.L.C.
Steve A. Matthews, Robert Y. Knowlton, and John K. Van
Duys, of Sinkler & Boyd, P.A., of Columbia, for respondent
Connector 2000 Association, Inc.
Suzanne E. Coe, of Greenville, for amicus curiae petitioners
Bobby J. Ayers, David Wettlin, and Wayne Taylor,
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BRASHIER v. SC DEPT.OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.
individually and as citizens, residents, taxpayers and
registered electors of Greenville County.
WALLER, A.J.: On appeal is an order upholding an innovative financing
scheme to build a toll-access highway in Greenville County. We affirm as modified.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL POSTURE
The proposed highway, known as the Southern Connector, will connect
interstate highways 1-85 and 1-385 around the southern perimeter of the City of
Greenville. It will be an approximately sixteen-mile-long, four-lane toll-access
highway with a 70 miles per hour design speed. After many years of consideration
and planning, on July 1, 1995, the South Carolina Department of Transportation
("SCDOT") issued a request for proposals seeking developmental concepts and
financing options for the Southern Connector. Concurrently, SCDOT issued a request
for proposals to extend South Carolina Highway 153 ("SC 153") from its existing
terminus at 1-85 to connect with the Southern Connector.1
On January 5, 1996, Interwest Carolina Transportation Group, L.L.C.
("Developer")2 submitted its proposal to SCDOT. On February 29, 1.996, SCDOT
awarded Developer the right to negotiate a contract to finance and build the Projects.
The resulting plan to finance, develop and operate the Projects is embodied in four
agreements.3
Essentially, under the agreements, three separate entities will be involved in
the Southern Connector Project: SCDOT, Developer, and a nonprofit public benefit
corporation without members called the Connector 2000 Association, Inc.
_______________________
1When necessary, the Southern Connector and SC 153 projects will be collectively
referred to as "the Projects."
2 Developer was formed December 29 1.995, to act as the developmental entity for
the Projects. It consists of: (I.) Florence & Hutcheson, Inc., a South Carolina
engineering firm specializing in highway construction; (2) Thrift Bros., Inc., a South
Carolina paving contractor; and (3) Interwest Management, Inc., an Arizona
engineering and consulting firm.
3 (1) Association-Developer Agreement; (2) Agreement to Develop the Southern
Connector and SC 153; (3) First Amendment to the Development Agreement; and (4)
License Agreement. Unless otherwise specified, general references throughout this
opinion to "agreements" are intended to mean the entire scheme as embodied in these
four agreements.
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BRASHIER v. SC DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.
("Association").4 Association will pay Developer to construct the Southern Connector
with proceeds from tax-exempt toll revenue bonds. These bonds will be issued by
Association, to be repaid with the revenues of a toll exacted upon users of the
Southern Connector. Association will not have title in the Southern Connector. The
agreements provide that "[f]ee simple title to the Southern Connector, all tolling
facilities and all real property and improvements thereon and the rights of way
thereunder is and at all times shall remain vested in SCDOT." Association will pay
SCDOT a fee for a license to operate and collect tolls on the Southern Connector.
Payment of the license fee will be subordinate to the repayment of the toll bonds and
to the cost of operating and maintaining the Southern Connector. Once the bonds
have been defeased, Association's license will expire, Association will dissolve and all
of its assets will be distributed to SCDOT.
Regarding the SC 153 Project, SCDOT will pay for its construction with the
proceeds of general obligation state highway bonds. After its completion, SC 153 will
be owned, operated and maintained by SCDOT and will not be toll-access.
Appellant T. Walter Brashier5 filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to
have these agreements invalidated and to permanently enjoin SCDOT from
performing them. He argued SCDOT was required to comply with section 57-3-615
of the South Carolina Code before initiating the Southern Connector Project, and that
in any event the agreements violate several constitutional provisions. The case was
referred to a master-in-equity with direct appeal to this court.6 After a hearing, the
master issued an order denying Appellant injunctive relief, finding compliance with
section 57-3-615 was not required and the agreements were constitutional.
_________________________
4Association, incorporated January 12, 1996, was formed to facilitate the financing
of the Southern Connector Project. It is governed by a five-member Board of
Directors, serving in a volunteer capacity, comprised of business and civic leaders in
Greenville.
5Appellant owns approximately 1300 acres of land located in the planned path of
the Southern Connector, on which he intends to develop a golf course and industrial
park.
6Also allowed to argue before the master were certain amicus curiae petitioners.
These petitioners are a group of Greenville taxpayers who have filed a separate
lawsuit attacking the Southern Connector Project for reasons similar to those raised
by Appellant. Their lawsuit has been stayed pending resolution of the case sub judice. Petitioners were allowed to file an amicus curiae brief in this case.
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BRASHIER v. SC DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, et al
I. Was compliance with section 57-3-615 of the South Carolina Code required
before SCDOT could initiate the Southern Connector Project?
II. Does the plan to finance the Southern Connector violate Article X, section 11
of the South Carolina Constitution?
III. Do the agreements improperly delegate SCDOT's authority?
1. Section 57-3-615
Appellant argues SCDOT's ability to enter into the agreements is limited by
the following provision:
If a toll is administered on a project by the Department of
Transportation, the toll must be used to pay for the construction,
maintenance costs, and other expenses for only that project. A toll project that is in excess of one hundred fifty million dollars may only be initiated as provided in Chapter 37 of Title 4.
S.C. Code Ann. § 57-3-615 (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). The master ruled
compliance with this section was not required because it violated Article VIII, section
14 of the South Carolina Constitution. Appellant argues this ruling was error. We
disagree and affirm the master's finding of unconstitutionality.
Under section 57-3-615, certain toll projects may only be initiated as provided
in Chapter 37 of Title 4. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 4-37-10 to -40 (Supp. 1996). This
chapter prescribes procedures which a county may employ to finance and construct
highways, roads, streets, bridges, etc. Counties may raise revenue for such projects
by either sales and use taxes or by toll revenue bonds. Id. at § 4-37-40. Voter
approval is required in a county-wide referendum to accomplish whatever project is
desired. Id. at § 4-37-30(B).
Article VIII, section 14(6) of the South Carolina Constitution provides: "In
enacting provisions required or authorized by this article, general law provisions
applicable to the following matters shall not be set aside: . . . (6) the structure and
the administration of any governmental service or function, responsibility for which
rests with the State government or which requires statewide uniformity." Article
VIII, section 14 "precludes the legislature from delegating to counties the
responsibility for enacting legislation relating to the subjects encompassed by that
section." Robinson v Richland County Council, 293 S.C. 27, 30, 358 S.E.2d 392, 395
(1987). When construing Article VIII, section 14, this Court has consistently held a
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BRASHIER v. SC DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.
subject requiring statewide uniformity is effectively withdrawn from the field of local
concern. See, e.g., Davis v. County of Greenville, _ S.C. _, 470 S.E.2d 94, 96
(1996) ("Article VIII, § 14 limits the powers local governments may be granted");
Kramer v. County Council, 277 S.C. 71, 282 S.E.2d 850 (1981) (per curiam); Douglas
v. McLeod, 277 S.C. 76, 282 S.E.2d 604 (1981). We have already held that "[t]he
planning, construction, and financing of state roads is a governmental service which
requires statewide uniformity." Town of Hilton Head Island v. Coalition of
Expressway Opponents, 307 S.C. 449, 456, 415 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1992).
Based on this authority, we hold section 57-3-615 violates Article VIII, section
14(6). Section 57-3-615 requires compliance with Chapter 37 of Title 4 in order to
build certain toll projects in the State. Under this chapter, the decision of whether
to construct these projects rests entirely within counties' discretion. Counties are
under no obligation to even submit a certain project to a referendum. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 4-37-10 (Supp. 1996) (county must comply with requirements of chapter if it
chooses to finance construction of a transportation-related project; county may choose
to enter into agreement with other governmental entities). Furthermore, the State,
with which the duty to plan, construct, maintain and operate the state highway
system has been entrusted, and which has been specifically authorized to finance
state roads with tolls, has no other method of building these toll roads other than by
getting county approval. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 57-1-30; 57-3-200 (Supp. 1996). Thus,
counties have been delegated the authority to approve or disapprove a governmental
service requiring statewide uniformity. The master correctly held Article VIII,
section 14(6) forbids such delegation.7 We find, however, the master erred in ruling
section 57-3-615 unconstitutional only as applied to the Southern Connector Project.
He based this limitation on his finding that some highway projects might be of a
"purely local nature." This finding conflicts with the holding from Town of Hilton
Head Island, which we have here reaffirmed, that state highway projects require
statewide uniformity. Therefore, we modify the master's ruling to hold section 57-3-
615 unconstitutional on its face.
_____________________
7In light of this ruling we decline to address the master's ruling the provisions of
section 57-3-615 do not apply to the Southern Connector Project because it was
initiated before the effective date of the act and because its costs do not exceed $150
million.
Additionally, we decline to address the argument of Respondents Developer
and Association that affirmance is proper on the additional sustaining ground section
57-3-615 violates equal protection and due process. This issue is unpreserved because
it was not ruled on by the trial judge, and while these Respondents claim it was
raised below, there is no evidence in the record of this. O'Tuel v. Villani, 318 S.C.
24, 455 S.E.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Carter v. Peace, 229 S.C. 346, 93 S.E.2d
113 (1956)) (even if matter was raised to trial judge, proposition relied on as
additional sustaining ground must be presented to and passed on by trial court to
warrant consideration on appeal).
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BRASHIER v. SC DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.
II. Article X. section 11
A. Pledge of State's Credit
"The credit of neither the State nor any of its political subdivisions shall be
pledged or loaned for the benefit of any [private entity]." S.C. Const. art. X, § 11.
Appellant argues the Southern Connector Project's financing scheme violates this
section. We disagree.
There is no lending of the State's credit unless "general credit and taxing
powers are pledged." Medlock v South Carolina State Family Farm Dev. Auth., 279
S.C. 316, 320, 306 S.E.2d 605, 608 (1983). "The limitation imposed ... by Article X,
§ 11 . . . 'relates solely to general obligation bonds payable from the proceeds of ad valorem tax levies."' Carll v. South Carolina Jobs-Economic Dev. Auth., 284 S.C. 438,
443-44, 327 S.E.2d 331, 335 (1985) (quoting Elliott v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 85, 156
S.E.2d 421, 426 (1967)) (emphasis added). See also Johnson v. Piedmont Mun. Power
Agency, 277 S.C. 345, 353, 287 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1982) ("bonds issued [by the State]
which are payable out of special funds [such as revenue bonds] do not create debts");
Elliott, 250 S.C. at 86 156 S.E.2d at 427 ("The word 'credit' as here used was
intended to protect the state against pecuniary liability") (emphasis added).
Here, the Southern Connector Project is not being financed with general
obligation bonds, nor is the State required to use any tax revenues to pay the bonds.
To the contrary, the bonds will state on their face they are payable solely from and
secured by toll revenues collected from users of the Southern Connector, and will not
be a debt or loan of credit of the State. This Court has repeatedly held similar
disclaimers sufficient to protect the State from pecuniary liability. See, e.g., Car11,
284 S.C. at 444, 327 S.E.2d at 335; Medlock, 279 S.C. at 320, 306 S.E.2d at 609;
Bauer v. South Carolina State Housing Auth., 271 S.C. 219, 246 S.E.2d 869 (1978).
Furthermore, Association will issue the bonds, not the State. In no way can the State
be legally obligated to pay the bonds. While Appellant argues the State may be
morally obligated to pay off the bonds should toll revenues fall short, this same
argument was made to and dismissed by the court in Carll: "Appellant speculates
that if the Authority defaults on its bonds, the State may choose to pay off the bonds.
The purpose of [Article X, section 11] is to prevent the State from being obligated to
use State tax revenues to pay off the bonds." 284 S.C. at 444, 327 S.E.2d at 335
(emphasis in original). There will be no pledge of the state's credit.
B. Joint Ownership
"Neither the State nor any of its political subdivisions shall become a joint
owner of or stockholder in any company, association, or corporation." S.C. Const. art.
X, § 11. Appellant argues SCDOT has become a joint owner of Association and the
Southern Connector. We disagree.
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BRASHIER v. SC DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.
SCDOT has a certain amount of control over Association. Directors of
Association are subject to approval by SCDOT and SCDOT can remove any director
for cause. Also, upon Association's dissolution its assets will be distributed to
SCDOT. However, this involvement is insufficient to create joint ownership in
Association or in the Southern Connector by SCDOT. SCDOT is not a stockholder
in Association. The agreements make it clear the Southern Connector will be owned
by SCDOT but operated by Association. "[Tjhis Court has never held a public entity's
naked title to property operated by a private entity resulted in unconstitutional joint
ownership." Johnson v. Piedmont Mun. Power Agency, 277 S.C. 345, 355, 287 S.E.2d
476, 481 (1982) (also noting public entity had acquired neither stock nor any other
form of ownership in private company). At no time will SCDOT and Association
jointly own anything. Nichols v. South Carolina Research Auth.. 290 S.C. 415, 351
S.E.2d 155 (1986), cited by Appellant, is clearly distinguishable. In Nichols, a state
agency admitted that in carrying out joint ventures, it planned to procure ownership
interests in private entities. Id. at 421, 351 S.E.2d at 158.
"This project is admittedly a complex undertaking, but complexity alone does
not condemn it under our Constitution." Johnson, 277 S.C. at 354, 287 S.E.2d at 481.
The State will not be a joint owner in any private entity.
III. State Delegation of Authority
A. Setting of Toll Rates
Article X, section 5 of the South Carolina Constitution states that "[n]o tax,
subsidy or charge shall be established, fixed, laid or levied, under any pretext
whatsoever, without the consent of the people or their representatives lawfully
assembled." Appellant argues the tolls constitute a tax, and SCDOT delegated its
authority to set the tolls (i.e. to tax) because it must consult with Association before
revising toll rates and because Association sets the optimum toll rates. We disagree.
Under the License Agreement, toll rates will be set in the following manner:
Section 3.4. Toll Rates. Pursuant to Section 57-5-1340 of the Code,
SCDOT hereby fixes the initial toll rates for the Southern Connector at
those rates as set forth on Exhibit 1. SCDOT, after consultation with
the Association, shall have the right (but not the obligation) to revise
such toll rates from time to time to rates which are not less than 90%
and not more than 120% of the optimum toll rates as estimated by an
independent traffic consultant retained by the Association.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, all toll rates must satisfy the applicable
rate covenants contained in the Association's financing documents with
the Lender(s) or otherwise applicable to any Project Debt.
Initially, the tolls will not constitute a tax. See, e.g., State v. State Toll Bridge Auth.,
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BRASHIER v. SC DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.
82 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. 1954) (tolls collected to reimburse building and maintenance costs
do not constitute payment of taxes); North Carolina Turnpike Auth. v. Pine Island.,
Inc., 143 S.E.2d 319, 325 (N.C. 1965) ("Tolls are not taxes"). Furthermore, an
independent expert will be estimating the appropriate toll rate, not Association. The
contract does not require Association's consent before SCDOT can revise the toll
rates. Therefore, even assuming the tolls charged would be considered a tax, there
is no violation of Article X, section 5 and no improper delegation.8
B. Noncompetition Agreement
Appellant argues SCDOT improperly delegated its police power to plan and
implement highways by covenanting not to build "Competitive Transportation
Facilities"9 within a specified geographical area ("Zone")10 of the Southem Connector
8We reject Appellant's argument SCDOT has not been given the statutory
authority to set toll rates. SCDOT has the power to "fix and revise from time to time
and charge and collect tolls for transit over each turnpike facility constructed by it."
S.C. Code Ann. § 57-5-1340(2) (1976). Appellant's argument SCDOT is not
constructing the Southern Connector is meritless. SCDOT is a party to the
agreements and will own the highway being constructed. Finally, appellant's
argument the Southern Connector is not a turnpike facility because it will not be
financed with state turnpike bonds is equally meritless. "Turnpike facility" is defined
as a "highway constructed under the provisions of this article by the department,
whether or not financed with turnpike bonds . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 57-5-1320(2)
(Supp. 1996). See also id. at § 57-5-1330 (giving SCDOT power to build turnpike
facilities whenever it determines such facility is justified); id. at § 57-5-1350 (SCDOT
may request issuance of state turnpike bonds to finance facility). Turnpike facilities
do not have to be financed by the issuance of state turnpike bonds.
Additionally, to the extent SCDOT has agreed to contractually limit its own
authority by way of this agreement, we find no improper delegation for the reasons
discussed infra in Part III(B).
9Competitive Transportation Facilities are defined as:
[A]ny facilities which are not Exempt Transportation Facilities and
which are one of the following:
(a) any tolled or non-tolled State Highway, expressway or freeway
which (i) is placed into service after the Agreement Date and (ii)
is located within the [Zone];
(b) any new lanes for use by all types and occupancies of motor
vehicles (except those developed by [Developer] and/or the
Association) (i) which are added to State Highways existing as of
the Agreement Date, (ii) which are not necessary for improved
safety, or emergency maintenance purposes, (iii) which are placed
into service after the Agreement Date, (iv) which are located
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BRASHIER v. SC DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.
until termination of the agreements.11 We disagree.
SCDOT has been given the police power and duty to plan, construct, maintain,
and operate the state highway system consistent with the needs and desires of the
public. S.C. Code Ann. § 57-1-30 (Supp. 1996). See also id. at § 57-1-20 (establishing
SCDOT as an administrative agency); 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways,Streets & Bridges
§ 32 (1968) (laying out of highways and streets for public use involves exercise of
state's police power). Initially, we point out that in making these covenants SCDOT
did not actually give its authority to another entity; rather, it contractually limited
__________________________
within the [Zone], and (v) which have a materially adverse impact
on Total Revenues.
Exempt Transportation Facilities are defined as:
Any State project listed in the approved 1995 State
Transportation Improvement Plan[;]
Any State highway improvement, enhancement or modification
necessary for improved safety or emergency maintenance
purposes;
Any action or program carried out by any city, county or other
non-state jurisdiction which has not included funding provided by
SCDOT; and
Any improvements which do not add vehicle capacity or
significantly improve operating speed on competitive routes.
Any state project which is determined to have no material adverse
impact on the Total Revenues of the Southern Connector Project.
For this purpose, "material adverse impact" shall mean a
reduction in the estimated Total Revenues following completion
of the Competitive Transportation Facility which would, with the
delivery of notice, the passage of time, or both, give rise to the
occurrence of an Event of Default of the Association under any
Agreement evidencing or securing any Project Debt.
10Greenville County, south of and including the following routes:
U.S. Route 123 at Pickens County Line to 1-385 in Greenville;
1-385 from downtown Greenville to 1-85; and
1-85 from 1-385 to Spartanburg County Line.
Anderson County south of and including I-85 and east of and including U.S.
Route 76.
Laurens County north of and including U.S. Route 76 and west of I-385.
11The agreements will terminate upon repayment of the bonds, which should occur
thirty-five years after issuance as currently scheduled.
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BRASHIER v. SC DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.
its authority. As a general rule, administrative bodies cannot alienate, surrender, or
abridge their powers and duties, by contract or otherwise.12 However, courts have
upheld contracts entered into by administrative bodies or local governments arguably
bartering away police power if that body has legislative authority to do so. See, e.g,
Vap v. City of McCook 136 N.W.2d 220 (Neb. 1965) (contract to improve federal
highways within city's borders whereby city, in order to secure federal funds,
promised to prohibit parking on a certain street, held not an improper delegation
because legislature authorized governmental entities to do whatever necessary to
secure federalfunds); Bidlingmeyer v. City of Deer Lodge, 274 P.2d 821 (Mont.
1954).13 This is in keeping with the well-settled principle such bodies may only
exercise those powers specifically delegated to them. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 57-1-
20 (Supp. 1996) (SCDOT shall have such functions and powers as provided by law);
Riley v. South Carolina State Hwy. Dept., 238 S.C. 19, 118 S.E.2d 809 (1961) (powers
exercised by Highway Department must be found in some legislative act because it
has no inherent authority). Thus, the issue here is whether SCDOT has legislative
authority to enter into noncompetition agreements such as are involved here. We
hold that it has.
To accomplish its functions and purposes of "the systematic planning,
construction, maintenance, and operation of the state highway system ... consistent
with the needs and desires of the public,"14 SCDOT has the following relevant powers.
Generally, it has the power to "lay out, build, and maintain public highways and
bridges."15 It may "enter into such contracts as may be necessary for the proper
discharge of its functions and duties," and "do all other things required or provided
by law."16 More specifically, SCDOT has been given authority to "enter into . . .
partnership agreements with . . . private entities to finance, by tolls and other
financing methods, the cost of acquiring, constructing, equipping, maintaining and
___________________________
12See, e.g., Curtis Martin Inv. Trust v. Clay, 274 S.C. 608, 266 S.E.2d 82
(1980); Sammons v. City of Beaufort, 225 S.C. 490, 83 S.E.2d 153 (1954). See also 73
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law & Procedure § 56 (1983).
13Noncompetition covenants of the sort included here have been allowed as part
of bondholder agreements. See, e.g. State v. State Toll Bridge, Auth., 82 S.E.2d 626,
626 (Ga. 1954) (legislature has authority to grant exclusive franchise "in the form of
covenants with bondholders prohibiting the building of a bridge in competition within
restricted limits"); State v. Yelle, 351 P.2d 493 (Wash. 1960) (en banc); 40 Am. Jur.2d
Highways, Streets & Bridges § 619 (1968) ("The legislature may so regulate the
construction and operation of toll roads ... that no rival structure can lawfully be
established within certain fixed distances").
14S.C. Code Ann. § 57-1-30 (Supp. 1996).
15S.C. Code Ann. § 57-3-110(l) (Supp. 1996).
16S.C. Code Ann. §§ 57-3-110(10), -110(12) (Supp. 1996).
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BRASHIER v. SC DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.
operating highways, roads, streets and bridges in this State."17 SCDOT has the
discretionary power to construct turnpike facilities.18 To accomplish the express
powers granted it regarding turnpike facility construction, SCDOT may "[d]o all acts
and things necessary or convenient."19 Here, SCDOT found it necessary to enter into
these covenants because of the understandable practical concerns future bondholders
would have regarding bond repayment. We find the legislature gave SCDOT the
power to enter into such covenants as part of its broad power to contract.20 We
therefore affirm the master's ruling of no improper delegation.
Finally, we affirm the remaining arguments raised in Appellant's brief
pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Issue VII:
Anderson v. Baehr 265 S.C. 153, 217 S.E.2d 43 (1975); Carll v. South Carolina Jobs-
Economic Dev. Auth. 284 S.C. 438, 327 S.E.2d 331 (1985). Issue VIII: Nichols v.
South Carolina Research Auth.. 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E.2d 155 (1986).
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
FINNeY, C.J., MOORIe and BURNeTT, JJ., concur. Acting Associate
Justice George T. Gregory, Jr., not participating.
17S.C. Code Ann. § 57-3-200 (Supp. 1996).
18S.C. Code Ann. § 57-5-1330(l) (Supp. 1996).
19S.C. Code Ann. § 57-5-1340(8) (1976)
20We note the legislature has recognized the importance of noncompetition
covenants as part of bond resolutions. See S.C. Code Ann. § 4-37-40(B)(5)(f) (Supp.
1996) (county transportation authority must disclose all such covenants made in its
bond resolution); § 57-5-1450 (Supp. 1996) (in making state bond resolutions, State
Budget and Control Board may prescribe any noncompetition covenants deemed
necessary).
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