S.E. 2d
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Ronnie L. Phillips, Respondent,
v.
State of South Carolina, Petitioner.
ORDER
It is ordered that the opinion heretofore filed in this case,
Opinion No. 24820, filed July 20, 1998, be withdrawn and the attached
opinion substituted.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________C.J.
For the Court
Columbia, South Carolina BURNETT, A.J., not participating
August 17, 1998
p.7
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Ronnie L. Phillips, Respondent,
v.
State of South Carolina, Petitioner.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Appeal From Greenville County
Thomas L. Hughston, Jr., Post-Conviction Judge
Frank Eppes, Jr.. Trial Judge
Opinion No. 24820
Submitted May 27, 1998 - Filed July 20, 1998
Refiled August 17, 1998
REVERSED
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Teresa A. Knox, all of
Columbia, for petitioner.
Wanda H. Haile, of South Carolina Office of
Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for respondent.
FINNEY, C.J.: In this post-conviction relief (PCR) action, the
circuit court granted respondent relief, finding the application of a statute
denying respondent parole eligibility violated his ex post facto rights. The
Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. We reverse.
p.8
PHILLIPS v. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In 1986 and 1987, respondent committed numerous crimes,
including first degree burglaries. He ultimately pled guilty in 1987 to
several charges, including four counts of first degree burglary, all
committed after June 3, 1986. Respondent had a 1982 conviction for
armed robbery. The Legislature enacted South Carolina Code Ann. 16-1-
60, which took effect June 3, 1986. Under this statute, both first degree
burglary and armed robbery were defined as violent crimes. The parole
eligibility statute denied parole to those "serving a sentence for a second
or subsequent conviction, for violent crimes ....... S.C. Code Ann. 24-21-
640 (Supp. 1997).1
Respondent brought this PCR action, alleging his ex post facto
rights were violated when, as the result of the enactment of ] 6-1-60, his
1982 armed robbery conviction was used to deny him parole eligibility on
his 1987 burglary pleas.2 It is not a violation of the ex post facto clause
for the legislature to enhance punishment for a later offense based on a
prior conviction, even though the enhancement provision was not in effect
at the time of the prior offense. State v. Dabney, 301 S.C. 271, 391 S.E.2d
563 (1990). Accordingly, the order granting respondent post-conviction
relief is
REVERSED.
TOAL, MOORE and WALLER, JJ., concur. BURNETT, A.J., not
participating.
1 The relevant language has not been altered in the statutory
amendments made between 1986 and 1997.
2 We note that between 1993 and 1995, 16-1-60 was amended to
provide it had prospective effect only. We express no opinion on the
impact of this language on persons committing offenses during this period.
p.9