S.E. 2d
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
In the Interest of
Vincent J., a minor
under the age of
seventeen, Appellant.
Appeal From Orangeburg County
Alvin C. Biggs, Family Court Judge
Opinion No. 24854
Heard September 22, 1998 - Filed November 16, 1998
AFFIRMED
Assistant Appellate Defender Tara S. Taggart, of
the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, of
Columbia, for appellant.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,
Assistant Attorney General G. Robert Deloach, III,
all of Columbia; and Solicitor Walter L. Bailey, Jr.,
of Summerville, for respondent.
BURNETT, A.J.: This is an appeal from a sentence imposed
by a family court judge in a juvenile criminal contempt proceeding. We
affirm.
FACTS
The appellant, Vincent J., pled guilty to two counts of
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In the Interest of Vincent J.
malicious injury to personal property and was sentenced to probation with
a condition of alternative placement. Appellant was informed by the judge
that he could be held in contempt of court if he violated the conditions of
his probation.
On December 15, 1997, a contempt hearing was held and
appellant pled guilty to violating certain provisions of the previous
sentencing order, including being terminated from the New Directions
program (alternative placement). The judge ordered appellant committed
to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for 180 days, suspended upon
the service of 178 days.
Appellant filed a motion to reconsider the order of commitment
based on the alleged illegality of sentencing a juvenile to more than a
ninety day determinate sentence. In an order issued on January 6, 1998,
the judge denied this motion finding the family court has the inherent
power to imprison a juvenile criminal contemnor for a period of 180 days.
On March 4, 1998, appellant sought supersedeas from this
Court. Chief Judge Howell, of the Court of Appeals, granted supersedeas
and remanded the matter to the family court for reimposition of conditions
of probation. On March 16, 1998, the family court sentenced appellant
to an additional ninety days of DJJ placement and an additional twenty-four
months of probation.1
ISSUE
Does S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-7810(B) (Supp. 1997) prevent a
family court judge from committing a juvenile criminal
contemnor to a determinate sentence of more than ninety days?
1Although appellant has served the confinement part of his sentence,
this case is not moot because this is a situation that is capable of
repetition yet evading review. Byrd v. Irmo High School, 321 S.C. 426,
468 S.E.2d 861 (1996); In the Interest of Darlene C., 278 S.C. 664, 301
S.E.2d 136 (1983).
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In the Interest of Vincent J.
DISCUSSION
Appellant claims 20-7-7810(B)2prevents the family court from
enforcing its orders by sentencing a juvenile contemnor to commitment to
the custody of DJJ for a determinate sentence of more than ninety days.
We disagree.
The primary function of the Court in interpreting a statute is
to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Wright v. Colleton County
School District 301 S.C. 262, 391 S.E.2d 564 (1990). Under the
plain meaning rule, it is not the Court's place to change the meaning of a clear
and unambiguous statute. See Paschal v. State Election Comm'n, 317 S.C.
434, 454 S.E.2d 890 (1995) (if a statute's language is plain and
unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of
statutory interpretation are not needed and the Court has no right to
impose another meaning); Gilstrap v. South Carolina Budget and Control
Bd., 310 S.C. 210, 423 S.E.2d 101 (1992) (in construing a statute, the
Court must give clear and unambiguous terms their plain and ordinary
meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or
expand the statute's operation).
Prior to July 1, 1996, the family court could sentence a
juvenile in the following manner:
All commitments to the custody of the Department of Juvenile
Justice for delinquency as opposed to the conviction of a
specific crime may be made only for the reasons and in the
manner prescribed . . ., with evaluations made and proceedings
conducted only by the judges authorized to order commitments
in this section. When a child is committed to the custody of
the department under the proceedings, commitments must be
2 Appellant attempts to classify himself as a status offender because
S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-7810(F) (Supp. 1997) expressly restricts a family
court's authority to sanction a status offender contemnor. A family court
cannot commit this type of contemnor to more than 90 days of
confinement. Id. A status offender is a juvenile who commits an offense
that would not be a crime if committed by an adult. See S.C. Code Ann.
20-7-30(6) (1976). However, since appellant was previously adjudicated a
delinquent and not a status offender, 20-7-7810(F) does not apply.
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In the Interest of Vincent J.
for an indeterminate sentence, not extending beyond the
twenty-first birthday of the child unless sooner released by the
department.
Act No. 83, 20, 1995 S.C. Acts 569, amending S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-
2170(D) (1985) (emphasis added).
This restriction on commitment did not apply to contempt
proceedings because the provision related only to initial delinquency
proceedings. Thus, the family court's inherent power to hold a juvenile in
criminal contempt and to sanction the contemnor by committing him to
the custody of DJJ for a determinate period of 180 days was not restricted
by this statutory provision.
On July 1, 1996, 20-7-2170(D) was repealed and recodified as
20-7-7810(B) and amended to read as follows:
All commitments to the custody of the Department of Juvenile
Justice for delinquency as opposed to the conviction of a
specific crime may be made only for the reasons and in the
manner prescribed . . ., with evaluations made and proceedings
conducted only by the judges authorized to order commitments
in this section. When a child is committed to the custody of
the department, commitment must be for an indeterminate
sentence not extending beyond the twenty-first birthday
of the child unless sooner released by the department, or for a
determinate commitment sentence not to exceed ninety days.
S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-7810(B) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). This
amendment deleted the reference to "under the proceedings" and added the
ninety day determinate sentence limitation.
Appellant argues because the legislature deleted the "under the
proceedings" language, it intended for this sentencing limitation to apply
to all juvenile proceedings, including contempt proceedings. Thus,
according to appellant, the amended statute limits the judge's ability to
commit a delinquent juvenile contemnor to the custody of DJJ for a
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In the Interest of Vincent J
determinate period more than ninety days.3
We disagree. In our opinion, the deletion of the language
"under the proceedings" does not expand the scope of this statutory
provision to include all juvenile proceedings. We find this
provision refers only to delinquency proceedings since this provision is part of a paragraph
which deals with commitments for delinquency. In recodifying this
paragraph, the legislature simply eliminated unnecessary language. It did
not alter the meaning of this paragraph. Thus, this section does not
restrict the sanctions available to a family court under its inherent
contempt power
Our interpretation is further supported by the fact the
legislature specifically limits the available sanctions for a status offender
contemnor. S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-7810(F) (Supp. 1997).
Section 20-7-7810(B) does not limit a family court's power to
commit a delinquent juvenile contemnor to the custody of DJJ for a period
of time exceeding 90 days; therefore, we uphold appellant's sentence.
AFFIRMED.
FINNEY, C.J., TOAL, MOORE, and WALLER, JJ., concur.
3 Because an indeterminate sentence might result in a sentence that
is more than 180 days, the family court cannot sentence a contemner to
imprisonment for an indeterminate amount of time. A jury trial is
required to sentence a contemnor to more than 180 days (6 months) of
imprisonment and the family court does not conduct jury trials. See
Poston v. Poston, Op. No. 24802 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed June 8, 1998); S.C.
Code Ann. 20-7-755 (Supp. 1997).
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