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South Carolina
Judicial Department
2003-UP-135 - State v. Frierson
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State,        Respondent,

v.

Michael Frierson,        Appellant.


Appeal From Marion County
John M. Milling, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No.� 2003-UP-135
Submitted January 13, 2003 � Filed February 19, 2003


AFFIRMED


Deputy Chief Attorney Joseph L. Savitz, III, of Columbia,for appellant.�

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Attorney General William Edgar Salter, III, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, III, of Florence; for respondent.�

PER CURIAM:� Michael Frierson appeals his convictions for three counts of murder, two counts and assault and battery with intent to kill, first degree burglary, conspiracy, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, arguing the trial court erred in explaining to the jury that the law requires references to a defendant in a jointly-tried co-defendant�s statement be redacted when the co-defendant does not testify.�

We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities:� Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972) (�The mere finding of a violation of the Bruton rule . . . does not automatically require reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction.� In some cases the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the co-defendant�s admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission was harmless error.�); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1987) (�[W]here a nontestifying codefendant�s confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant . . . the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial. . . .� Of course, the defendant�s confession may be considered at trial in assessing whether his codefendant�s statements are supported by sufficient �indicia of reliability� to be directly admissible against him . . . despite the lack of opportunity for cross-examination, and may be considered on appeal in assessing whether any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless.�) (internal citations omitted); State v. Howard, 295 S.C. 462, 468, 369 S.E.2d 132, 135-36 (1988) (�We quote extensively here [from Cruz] to emphasize that the United States Supreme Court has not condemned admission of a co‑defendant�s confession but has merely shifted the focus of analysis.� Such a statement will no longer be considered reliable simply because some of the facts it contains �interlock� with the defendant�s own statement.� The presumption of unreliability that applies to a co-defendant�s statement will be overcome only if those portions of the statement concerning the defendant�s participation are �thoroughly substantiated� by the defendant�s own confession.� Even when this analysis is not applied at trial to determine the statement�s admissibility, on appeal the same analysis is appropriate to determine whether any Confrontation Clause violation was harmless.� Appellants� statements mutually and completely substantiated each other.� We hold any Confrontation Clause violation to either appellant was harmless.�) (internal citations omitted).�

AFFIRMED.�

GOOLSBY, HUFF, and SHULER, JJ., concur.