THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

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Gail Wilkinson,        Respondent,

v.

David Jack Wilkinson and Paul Wilkinson,        Appellants.
IN RE:
Gail Wilkinson,        Respondent,

v.

David Jack Wilkinson,        Appellant.

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Appeal From Aiken County
C. David Sawyer, Jr., Family Court Judge

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Unpublished Opinion No. 03-UP-150
Submitted January 13, 2003 - Filed February 20, 2003

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AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
IN PART, and REMANDED

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R. Murray Hughes, of Pickens, for Appellants.

Timothy S. Mirshak, of Augusta, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: David Jack Wilkinson appeals a family court order equitably dividing marital property, awarding alimony and child support, and suspending visitation rights with his two minor children. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

David Wilkinson (Husband) and Gail Wilkinson (Wife) began living together in Tennessee in 1980 and were married on September 28, 1983. They have two children: Jacqueline Elizabeth Wilkinson, born on April 10, 1986, and David Bradley Wilkinson, born on October 2, 1987.

Prior to the marriage, Husband made a down payment on the Tennessee home in which the parties lived. The house was titled in both parties' names and they both worked to pay the mortgage and maintain the home. Following the marriage, Wife continued to work instead of pursuing her teaching degree, while Husband worked part-time for his father, Paul Wilkinson, and pursued his mechanical engineering degree. When Husband obtained his degree, the parties agreed Wife would stay home with the children after their son was born in 1987.

In 1990, the parties moved to Aiken, South Carolina, after Husband began working for Westinghouse. The parties sold their Tennessee residence and used the money as a down payment on a lakefront home in Aiken, which they titled in both names. When the parties' son entered preschool, Wife resumed her college studies on a part-time basis in order to obtain her teaching certificate. Wife continued to be primarily responsible for the care of both children during this time, including transporting them to various activities.

Husband was laid off in early 1997; that May he accepted a position working for Duke Power in Florida. The parties decided Wife and the children would remain in Aiken. Husband did not return home for Wife's May 1997 graduation, although Wife and their son went to visit Husband in Florida. Thereafter, Husband only returned home to visit the family once in September and once in December. During these visits, Husband barely spoke with Wife. Without Wife's knowledge, Husband opened bank accounts in Florida and began depositing his paychecks there. Husband sent Wife $1,500 a month to pay household bills, which he later reduced to $750 per month when Wife began teaching.

In February, 1998, Husband was transferred to Charlotte. Once there, he refused to give Wife or the children his home address or home telephone number. The family's only means of contacting Husband was through a cellular telephone number. In May 1998, Wife discovered a woman's shirt in Husband's laundry that he brought home for her to launder. Thereafter, Wife contacted an attorney regarding separation proceedings. Husband immediately began liquidating marital assets, including cashing certificates of deposit.

Wife filed for separate support and maintenance on September 24, 1998; Husband was served on October 13. The next day, Husband wrote a check on the parties' home equity line of credit for $49,600, thereby creating a second mortgage on the home. He also took money out of the G.T.E. Federal Union money market account, cashed in an IRA account, and cashed in two certificates of deposit. Including the $49,600, Husband disposed of nearly $66,453 in marital assets. In so doing, Husband gave a total of $54,500 to his father, Paul Wilkinson. He also paid taxes and his attorney's fees out of the withdrawn. funds.

At a temporary hearing on October 27, 1998, Wife was awarded custody of the children and use of the marital home. Husband was granted liberal visitation and was ordered to pay both mortgages on the home, $1,000 per month in child support, and $450 per month towards Wife's $24,000 in credit card bills. At the time of the temporary hearing, Wife was unaware Husband had dissipated the marital assets. After this information came to light, the family court held another hearing in July 1999. At that time the court ordered Paul Wilkinson be made a party to the divorce proceedings and ordered Husband to immediately place $54,500 in his attorney's trust account. The order also prohibited Husband from disposing of marital assets.

A pre-trial order was issued on July 13, 2000, in which the family court adopted the parties' agreement that Wife would have custody of the children and Husband would have liberal visitation. At some point during the litigation, the parties agreed Husband could use the $54,500 in trust to pay off the $49,600 second mortgage. Husband's attorney continued to hold the remaining funds in a trust account pending final division of the marital property.

The family court held a final hearing on July 21, 2000. At the outset, the parties agreed to dismiss Paul Wilkinson as a party to the action, conditioned upon his not asserting future claims against the parties or the marital assets. Twenty-six exhibits were submitted into evidence without objection by either party. Prior to the taking of testimony, Wife's attorney noted that the pre-trial order resolved all issues regarding child custody, visitation, and the $54,500 held in trust.

The family court issued a final order on September 14, 2000 dismissing Paul Wilkinson as a party, incorporating the pre-trial order by reference, and establishing the parties could not be reconciled. The court granted Wife a divorce on the ground of one year's continuous separation, and affirmed the prior order awarding custody of the two minor children to Wife. Citing Wife's testimony that Husband held her hostage with a gun, resulting in the children's fearfulness and emotional trauma, the court suspended Husband's visitation. The court further restrained Husband from having any physical or telephone contact with the children and from contacting Wife. In so doing, the court noted Husband could petition for "restricted and supervised visitation in the future," and a guardian ad litem would be appointed.

The family court order also noted Husband was evasive throughout his testimony and found him "simply not credible." In support of this finding, the court pointed to Husband's selective memory regarding financial matters and his failure to disclose an $1,800 a month per diem for housing and expenses. The court ordered Husband to pay Wife $798 per month in child support, $900 a month in permanent periodic alimony, and attorney's fees of $12,000. Because Husband failed to submit a proposed division of the marital estate, the court equitably divided the personal and real property, with each party receiving fifty percent, based on Wife's submitted proposal.

Husband filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP. Thereafter, his attorney was relieved and the family court postponed the hearing on the motion for reconsideration in order to allow Husband to obtain new counsel. Husband failed to appear at the December 7, 2000 hearing on the motion, which the family court denied. Husband now appeals.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

In appeals from the family court, an appellate court has the jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Woodall v. Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 471 S.E.2d 154 (1996); Fields v. Fields, 342 S.C. 182, 536 S.E.2d 684 (Ct. App. 2000). However, this broad scope of review does not require the appellate court to "disregard the findings of the court below." Stevenson v. Stevenson, 276 S.C. 475, 477, 279 S.E.2d 616, 617 (1981). Further, the appellate court should not ignore the fact that the family court judge was in a better position to view the witnesses and judge their credibility. Cherry v. Thomasson, 276 S.C. 524, 280 S.E.2d 541 (1981); Smith-Cooper v. Cooper, 344 S.C. 289, 543 S.E.2d 271 (Ct. App. 2001). The standard of review does not relieve the appellant of the burden to convince the appellate court that the family court erred. Fields, 342 S.C. at 186, 536 S.E.2d at 686.

Discussion

I. Special Equity

Husband argues the family court erred in failing to consider that he obtained the lot in Aiken on which the martial home was built prior to the marriage, or that the money he put down to acquire the marital home in Aiken was non-marital. We disagree.

Husband testified at the final hearing that he purchased the couple's home in Tennessee and used the funds from its sale as the down payment on the Aiken marital residence. Wife, however, testified the Tennessee home was titled in both names and both parties worked to pay the mortgage and maintain the home. Husband asked the family court to order the sale of the Aiken home and consider the down payment on it as his non-marital property. There was no testimony regarding a separate purchase of the lot upon which the Aiken home was situated.

The family court determined the Aiken residence was marital property titled in both parties' names. Although Husband testified he purchased the home with funds derived from the sale of the pre-marriage Tennessee residence, the court found he "produced no documentary evidence to substantiate a claim that the present marital residence is anything but marital property" subject to equitable division.

Marital property includes all real and personal property acquired by the parties during the marriage. S.C. Code Ann. � 20-7-473 (Supp. 2002). Non-marital property is "property acquired by either party before the marriage and property acquired during the marriage in exchange for property acquired by either party before the marriage." Corbett v. Corbett, 313 S.C. 184, 186, 437 S.E.2d 136, 138 (Ct. App. 1993). A spouse, however, has a special vested equity interest in improvements to property to which he or she has contributed, whether the property is marital or non-marital. See S.C. Code Ann. �20-7-471 (Supp. 2002); Calhoun v. Calhoun, 331 S.C. 157, 501 S.E.2d 735 (Ct. App. 1998), reversed in part on other grounds, 339 S.C. 96, 529 S.E.2d 14 (2000).

The evidence presented at the final hearing showed the Aiken residence was purchased during the marriage and titled in both parties' names. Husband did not present any evidence indicating he purchased the lot upon which the residence was built prior to the marriage. He also failed to present any evidence the money used as the down payment on the residence was from separate, non-marital funds. The family court, therefore, did not err in finding the residence was marital property and in denying Husband's special equity claim.

II. Equitable Division

Husband also asserts the family court erred by adopting Wife's proposed distribution of marital assets. We disagree.

At the hearing, Husband admitted taking $49,600 from the parties' home equity line of credit, in addition to various investment funds, after the divorce action was filed, but claims it was used to repay his father for a $60,000 loan and to pay other marital bills. Specifically, Husband admitted taking the following: (1) $14,000 from a Fidelity IRA account worth $17,427; (2) $25,000 from several GTE accounts and certificates of deposit; (3) a $7,000 loan from his Duke Power retirement plan; (4) $3,750 from an AT&T credit union account; and (5) 96 shares of CBS (now Viacom) stock certificates.

Husband also admitted that, in addition to his salary, he received an $1,800 monthly per diem from Duke Power to pay rent and utilities in Charlotte since he listed his residence as his father's address in Tennessee. Husband stated he did not disclose the monthly per diem his financial declaration, despite including rent and utilities as obligations, because he believed it did not count as income. Further, Husband admitted he overwithheld income tax and received a tax refund in 1999, which he also failed to disclose.

Husband did not submit a proposed division of either personal or real property, or any other marital assets. Despite three appraisals all valuing the marital home at $141,000, Husband argued the court should value the home above the appraised value. He also asked to court to order the home sold and to equally divide the profits between the parties. During his testimony, Husband continually was evasive in many answers, prompting the court to admonish him several times.

Without objection, Wife submitted a proposal for an even distribution of the marital property at the final hearing. She proposed attributing the original value of all assets dissipated by Husband, not their current value, to Husband. Wife also proposed that she be awarded the $141,000 value of the marital home, minus the $43,288 first mortgage and $11,280 representing an 8% cost of sale, for a total value of $86,492. Wife's proposal also assigned all of the $24,000 in credit card debt to her, in addition to her retirement plan funds, and $2,242.50 from the CBS stock. Thus, Wife's proposal gave both parties total assets of $66,052.50. Wife also submitted a list of personal property, including assigned values, and a proposal for dividing the property between them.

In the final order, the family court found Husband had liquidated marital assets and withdrawn nearly all equity in the marital residence by "taking a cash advance against the home equity loan and transferring those funds to his father." The court also found Husband liquidated part of his individual retirement account and certificates of deposit without disclosing his actions to Wife.

Regarding personal property, the court adopted Wife's proposed division, noting Husband neither submitted a proposed list or valuation nor challenged Wife's proposal. Since the parties' daughter was actively involved in horseback riding, the court awarded Wife the horses and horse trailer, stating she would be responsible for all associated costs. In addition, the court awarded Wife the marital home, making her responsible for all outstanding indebtedness effective August 1, 2000. Husband's obligation to pay both mortgages on the marital residence remained in effect through July 31, 2000, and the court ordered him to execute legal documents to convey title and any interest in the marital home to Wife.

The family court equitably divided the remainder of the marital property, without objection from Husband, as follows:

In so doing, the family court specifically found Husband had "dissipated marital assets" since the filing of Wife's action, including liquidating the Fidelity IRA, the GTE Credit Union certificates of deposit, and the AT&T Credit Union account, and also borrowing against his Duke Power retirement plan.

Husband now argues the division of the property was inequitable because the court did not value the property as of the date he was served. He further argues the court erred in reducing the marital home's value by $11,280, an estimated cost of sale, because the marital home was not sold.

"The apportionment of marital property will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Bungener v. Bungener, 291 S.C. 247, 251, 353 S.E.2d 147, 150 (Ct. App. 1987). The appellate court must look to the overall fairness of the apportionment, and "it is irrelevant that this court might have weighed specific factors differently than the family court." Bragg v. Bragg, 347 S.C. 16, 24, 553 S.E.2d 251, 255 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 300-01, 372 S.E.2d 107, 113 (Ct. App. 1988)).

In general, the value of marital property for the purposes of equitable distribution is the value of the property at the time of the commencement of the marital litigation. See Mallett v. Mallett, 323 S.C. 141, 473 S.E.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1996). In dividing marital property, the family court must consider fifteen statutory factors. See S.C. Code Ann. � 20-7-472 (Supp. 2002). The court may also consider willful misconduct, including the purposeful dissipation of marital assets, in determining the equitable distribution of such assets. See Dixon v. Dixon, 334 S.C. 222, 512 S.E.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding the family court should have considered value of family business at the commencement of the divorce action instead of zero value of the business at the time of the final hearing, where husband deliberately destroyed business to keep wife from obtaining any of its value); see also McDavid v. McDavid, 333 S.C. 490, 496, 511 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1999) ("[T]here must be some evidence of willful misconduct, bad faith, intention to dissipate marital assets, or the like, before a court may alter the equitable distribution award for such misconduct.").

Husband is primarily concerned with the family court's valuation of the parties' investments, arguing the values submitted by Wife were not accurate. Husband, of course, never objected to Wife's proposed division or valuation of the marital property, except for he value of the marital home.

Although the parties' investments were worth substantially less at the time of the final hearing than the time of filing, the family court specifically found Husband purposefully dissipated these assets. As a result, the court chose to assign the investments their pre-dissipation value. Further, the court relied upon the established appraisals in assigning value to the marital home. As there was ample evidence to support the family court's findings, we find no error in the valuation of the marital home and investments.

However, nothing in the record evinces a basis for the $11,280 deduction from the marital home's value representing an 8% cost of sale. Furthermore, the marital home was not sold but was awarded to Wife. Accordingly, we find the family court abused its discretion in reducing the value of the marital home by $11,280, and the equitable distribution should be adjusted accordingly.

III. Alimony

Husband argues the family court erred in considering Wife's testimony regarding abuse and Husband's per diem in awarding Wife alimony. He also states the $900 per month award of alimony is excessive when considering the amount of child support he is required to pay.

Wife submitted her financial declaration at the final hearing reflecting a net monthly income of $2,063.39 and monthly expenses of $3,414.75. Husband's financial declaration indicated he earned $5,300 per month, not including the $1,800 monthly per diem; at the same time, Husband included $1,175 in rent, utilities and food, in his list of monthly expenses.

At the time of trial, Wife had only been working as a teacher for three years. Dr. Sheehan, principal of the school where Wife taught, testified she was an excellent teacher. Sheehan also testified that if Wife had begun working as a teacher in 1986, she would have been earning an additional $9,000 per year. Husband's only argument regarding alimony at the final hearing was that he did not want Wife to be awarded alimony because she received child support.

In awarding Wife $900 in monthly alimony, the family court considered the seventeen-year length of the marriage, the fact Wife remained at home and delayed pursuing her teaching degree for a substantial length of time, and the fact Wife supported Husband both financially and non-economically while he pursued his engineering degree. The court also noted the parties relocated to allow Husband to pursue career advancements. As a result, there was a great disparity in the parties' income. Although the family court found the award appropriate under the statutory factors enumerated in � 20-3-130, the court did not indicate it considered Wife's testimony regarding the alleged abuse in rendering its alimony decision.

Whether to award alimony is a decision within the discretion of the family court that will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. See Allen v. Allen, 347 S.C. 177, 554 S.E.2d 421 (Ct. App. 2001); Williams v. Williams, 297 S.C. 208, 375 S.E.2d 349 (Ct. App. 1988). "Alimony is a substitute for the support which is normally incident to the marital relationship" and should place the supported spouse in the same position he or she enjoyed during the marriage. Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 300, 372 S.E.2d 107, 113 (Ct. App. 1988). The family court must make an alimony award that is "fit, equitable, and just if the claim is well founded." Allen, 347 S.C. at 184, 554 S.E.2d at 424.

The statutory factors include: (1) duration of the marriage; (2) physical and emotional health; (3) educational backgrounds; (4) employment history and earning potential; (5) standard of living established during the marriage; (6) current and reasonably anticipated earnings; (7) current and reasonably anticipated expenses; (8) marital and nonmarital property; (9) custody of children; (10) marital misconduct or fault; (11) tax consequences; (12) prior support obligations; and (13) other factors the court considers relevant. See S.C. Code Ann. � 20-3-130(C) (Supp. 2002). No one particular factor is dispositive. Lide v. Lide, 277 S.C. 155, 283 S.E.2d 832 (1981).

Here, the family court emphasized the disparity in the parties' earnings and the earning potential Wife gave up in order to run the household and care for the parties' children. Although $900 per month alimony is a generous award, there is support for the award in the record. Conversely, nothing in the record supports Husband's argument that the family court considered Wife's testimony regarding the alleged abuse in making its determination on alimony. Further, Husband's argument that the award is excessive in light of the child support award consists of one sentence and is conclusory to such an extent that it could be deemed abandoned. Because the record reveals the family court considered the statutory factors and did not consider Wife's abuse testimony, we find no error.

IV. Visitation

Husband next argues the family court erred in suspending his visitation with the children. We agree.

In the pre-trial order, the parties agreed Wife would maintain custody of the children and Husband would have "such reasonable and liberal rights of visitation as may be agreed by the parties." Then, at the final hearing, Wife's attorney confirmed the order resolved all issues regarding child custody, visitation, and the $54,500 held in trust. Wife testified she encouraged Husband to visit with the children during their separation, but that his visits were "brief and sporadic," adding that she no longer wanted Husband to have visitation. Husband's testimony, on the other hand, centered on the equitable distribution of the marital property such that he did not make any requests regarding visitation.

In reply, Wife explained why she no longer wanted Husband to have visitation, stating Husband had come to the marital home the weekend before the final hearing to return their son from a camping trip. Wife claimed that after both children had left the house, Husband grabbed her at gunpoint, threatened to kill her, and demanded that she agree to $950 in child support and to pay him $80,000 for the marital home. Wife said she later told the children about the incident, and that they were very afraid. In support of her testimony, Wife submitted photos of bruises she allegedly sustained in the struggle. Although Husband failed to object to this testimony, the family court allowed him to proffer testimony denying the incident ever occurred.

In the final order, the family court incorporated the pre-trial order by reference as "part and parcel" of the final order, but also suspended Husband's visitation rights. The order noted Husband could petition for restricted and supervised visitation in the future, and that it would appoint a guardian ad litem to determine appropriate visitation if requested. In so doing, the court stated "the best interests of the children are paramount in this matter."

The determination of visitation is a matter within the broad discretion of the family court, and the court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Woodall v. Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 471 S.E.2d 154 (1996); Paparella v. Paparella, 340 S.C. 186, 531 S.E.2d 297 (Ct. App. 2000). The primary consideration in awarding visitation is the welfare and best interest of the child. Woodall, 322 S.C. at 12, 471 S.E.2d at 158; Frye v. Frye, 323 S.C. 72, 448 S.E.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1994). The family court has the discretion to place restrictions on visitation as the court deems proper. Frye, 323 S.C. at 76, 448 S.E.2d at 588.

The termination of visitation is a drastic remedy that should be used sparingly. Venable v. Venable, 273 S.C. 96, 254 S.E.2d 309 (1979); Hyde v. Hyde, 302 S.C. 280, 395 S.E.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1990). The family court, however, "has the power to absolutely forbid visitation in an extreme case." Hyde, 302 S.C. at 281, 395 S.E.2d at 187.

In Stefan v. Stean, 320 S.C. 419, 465 S.E.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1995), a husband repeatedly violated family court visitation orders by (1) entering the wife's home uninvited and refusing to leave; (2) splintering the door to wife's home; (3) acting in a threatening manner in front of wife and the children; (4) harassing and calling the wife; disparaging the wife in the children's presence; (5) refusing to inform the wife about the children's whereabouts during visitation; and (6) refusing to return the children's clothes after visitation. The family court suspended the husband's visitation rights, ordering him to obtain the approval of a guardian ad litem and complete parenting classes before visitation could be resumed. This Court reversed, holding that "[w]hile the husband's conduct and disregard for court orders caused the family court justifiable concern, it was not sufficient to serve as a basis for suspending his visitation rights, particularly in the absence of a guardian's recommendation that it would be in the children's best interest." Stefan, 320 S.C. at 423, 465 S.E.2d at 737.

As an initial matter, it does not appear Husband's right to visitation was an issue the parties intended to litigate in the final hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, Wife's attorney announced the issue was resolved in the pre-trial order; thereafter, the family court incorporated it into the final order. Thus, even assuming Husband in fact unreasonably threatened Wife, we find the family court abused its discretion in suspending visitation. The children did not witness the events testified to by Wife. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates Husband ever acted inappropriately towards the children at any time. Although the restraining order forbidding Husband from contacting Wife was certainly appropriate, nothing supports a finding Husband would ever harm the children.

As in Stefan, Husband's egregious behavior in this incident was cause for great concern to the family court. However, the family court could have taken other action to ensure the best interests of the children were served without taking the drastic measure of suspending visitation. Because the family court's order is not supported by the record, we reverse the portion of the order suspending Husband's visitation and remand the matter for the court to establish an appropriate visitation schedule.

V. Attorney's Fees

Husband further argues there is no evidence in the record that $250 per hour is a reasonable attorney's fee for a domestic case in Aiken County. We disagree.

Wife testified at trial that she paid her attorney $250 per hour. Wife's attorney submitted an affidavit at the final hearing detailing his hourly rate and the amount of time expended on the case. At the end of the final hearing, the family court judge awarded Wife attorney's fees, holding:

I find from the affidavits that have been submitted that the hourly rates and nature of the services, time devoted, all of which have been rendered by the attorney for [Wife], and I find [Wife] has prevailed on almost every issue that has been litigated here today.

I find the total fees submitted in the affidavits to be thirteen thousand five hundred thirty-seven dollars and thirty-four cents, which the Court finds to be extremely reasonable considering the nature and difficulty of the litigation, and much of the difficulty that was encountered and incurred was because of the obstinance of [Husband], including his failure to cooperate and reveal assets as was ordered by the Court.

I'm going to require that [Husband] contribute twelve thousand dollars toward payment of [Wife's] fees and cost, with that contribution to be paid in full within sixty days.

It does not appear Husband ever objected to the hourly rate charged by Wife's attorney.

The decision to award attorney's fees is a matter within the family court's discretion and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 295 S.C. 412, 415, 368 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1988). The family court should consider several factors before awarding attorney's fees, including: (1) each party's ability to pay his or her own fee; (2) the beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; and (4) the effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of living. E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 476-77, 415 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992); see Heins v. Heins, 344 S.C. 146, 543 S.E.2d 224 (Ct. App. 2001). When determining the actual amount of attorney's fees to award, the court should consider: (1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the services rendered; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) counsel's professional standing; (4) the contingency of compensation; (5) the beneficial results obtained; and (6) the customary legal fees for similar services. Glasscock v. Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 161, 403 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1991); see Shirley v. Shirley, 342 S.C. 324, 536 S.E.2d 427 (Ct. App. 2000).

Because Husband did not object to the rate charged by Wife's attorney, this issue is not preserved for appellate review. See S.C. Dep't Soc. Servs. v. Basnight, 346 S.C. 241, 551 S.E.2d 274 (Ct. App. 2001) (matters not raised to or ruled upon by the trial judge are not preserved for appellate review).

In any event, it appears from the record that the litigation between the parties was complex and heavily contested. The family court considered the beneficial results obtained by Wife's attorney, time devoted to the case, and the customary fees charged for the service. Because the family court considered the appropriate factors, including the hourly rate, we find no error in awarding Wife attorney's fees.

VI. Personal Jurisdiction

Finally, Husband complains the family court did not have jurisdiction over his father, Paul Wilkinson, and that his joinder amounted to a denial of due process. We disagree. Not only did the parties agree to dismiss Paul Wilkinson at the commencement of the final hearing, Husband's joinder argument appears without any citation to cases or other supporting authority. Therefore, because Husband's argument on this issue is conclusory, we deem it abandoned and refuse to address it on appeal. See First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 444 S.E.2d 513 (1994) (holding the failure to provide argument or supporting authority for an issue renders it abandoned). Moreover, it does not appear Husband has standing to raise this issue, as the question of Paul Wilkinson's joinder concerns potential violations of his, not Husband's, rights.

For the foregoing reasons, the family court order granting Wife attorney's fees, child custody, alimony, and fifty percent of the marital estate is affirmed. We also affirm the family court's valuation of the marital property and decision to join Paul Wilkinson as a party to the action. However, we reverse the court's inclusion of the 8% cost of sale in the valuation of the marital home, along with the decision to suspend Husband's visitation rights. We therefore remand the case to the family court to resolve these issues in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.

GOOLSBY, HOWARD, and SHULER, JJ., concur.