THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.� IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

BB&T of South Carolina a/k/a Branch Banking and Trust Company,        Appellant,

v.

Lisa Smith Kidwell and William Brian Kidwell d/b/a Signature Residential Mortgage and John Franklin,        Defendants,

Of Whom John H. Franklin is        Respondent.

Appeal From Spartanburg County
Robert L. Couch, Master in Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2005-UP-017
Submitted November 1, 2004 � Filed January 13, 2005

REVERSED

John W. Ray, of Greenville , for Appellant.

David G. Ingalls, of Spartanburg , for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:� This is an ongoing dispute between two competing mortgagees originating from a mortgage foreclosure action.� In a previous appeal, this court determined that BB&T of South Carolina held first-lien status.� On remand, the master-in-equity ordered John H. Franklin, the other mortgagee, to hold the rents from the property in trust and to pay BB&T the principal and interest owed.� The order made specific findings regarding the amount owed, the rate of interest and the date to which interest would accrue, and the time for payment.� When Franklin failed to pay BB&T the entire amount owed, BB&T filed a rule to show cause seeking to hold Franklin in contempt.� The master reserved jurisdiction over the contempt action, and pursuant to Franklin�s request, ordered BB&T to provide further information and witnesses.�� BB&T appeals.� We reverse. [1] �

FACTS

This appeal stems from an action brought by BB&T to foreclose on real property owned by Lisa and William Kidwell.� BB&T named John H. Franklin as a necessary party and defendant.� Franklin counterclaimed alleging he had an $85,000 mortgage on the property that was entitled to priority over BB&T�s mortgage.� The master-in-equity determined the Kidwells were liable on both BB&T�s mortgage and Franklin�s mortgage and ordered a public sale of the property.� Further, the master determined that Franklin was entitled to first-lien status and therefore priority over BB&T�s mortgage.� BB&T appealed the master�s ruling.� Pending the outcome of the appeal, the master stayed the public sale and ordered that rents from the property be collected and held in trust.� On appeal, this court reversed, finding BB&T was entitled to first-lien status and remanded the case to the master �for a recalculation of the total sums due BB&T and Franklin.�� See BB&T of South Carolina v. Kidwell, 350 S.C. 382, 391, 565 S.E.2d 316, 321 (Ct. App. 2002) (affirming the master�s award of prejudgment interest on Franklin�s mortgage, but reversing the master�s determination that Franklin�s mortgage was entitled to priority and remanding for recalculation of sums due BB&T and Franklin).

On remand, the master determined that the real property subject to the BB&T and Franklin mortgages had been sold at a private sale by agreement of the parties and that the sale proceeds had been held in the attorneys� trust accounts.� Further, the master determined that all rents from the property were collected and were being held in trust by Franklin�s attorney.� The master ordered Franklin to pay to BB&T $106,065.24, which constituted the principal as well as the interest that had accrued through January 17, 2001, the date of trial.� The master also ordered Franklin to pay to BB&T interest in the amount of $27.27 per day for each day following the trial through August 29, 2002, the date of the order on remand.� These interest payments totaled $16,062.03.� Additionally, Franklin was ordered to pay interest in the amount of $27.27 per day for each day after August 29, 2002 through the date of receipt of the order by BB&T�s counsel or �the ending of any appeal from this Order, by written notice of the Defendant Franklin or Order of the appellate courts, whichever shall last occur.��� All rents from the property were ordered to be held in trust pending a further order or immediately paid over to BB&T for payment of the principal, interest, and attorney�s fees due.�

Following the master�s order, Franklin sent a copy of an undated and unfiled �Notice of Intent to Appeal� to BB&T.� After repeated requests from BB&T for either a filed appeal or written notice that Franklin�s appeal had ended, Franklin notified BB&T that he abandoned his appeal on October 15, 2002.� After BB&T received written notice that Franklin�s appeal had been abandoned, BB&T�s counsel disbursed the proceeds held in escrow.� According to BB&T, after disbursing the funds held in escrow, a shortfall of $3,313.42 remained on the money owed BB&T.� BB&T requested that Franklin utilize the rents collected from the property to pay that sum.�

On October 24, 2002, BB&T filed a rule to show cause seeking to hold Franklin in contempt for failing to provide a detailed accounting of rents and failing to apply the rents towards satisfaction of the debt owed to BB&T.�

On October 25, 2002, Franklin sent BB&T a response [2] and a subpoena requesting that BB&T produce all records concerning �a mortgage loan to Lisa S. Kidwell and William Brian Kidwell dated November 5, 1999.�� BB&T filed a motion to quash the subpoena alleging that the subpoena was improper because BB&T was a party, that the doctrine of res judicata barred Franklin from asserting claims, that Franklin should be estopped from engaging in discovery, and that service was invalid.� BB&T also filed a return to Franklin�s response asserting, among other allegations, that the issues raised in the response were barred because they had been previously litigated.� On November 22, 2002, BB&T filed a �Certificate of No Objection, Return nor Denial to Rule to Show Cause,� which alleged that Franklin�s response to the rule was unfiled and arguing that Franklin�s request for a recalculation of interest was affirmative relief which had been fully decided by the 2001 order, 2002 opinion of this court, and 2002 order on remand.�� Additionally, BB&T�s certificate stated that by agreement of the parties a hearing before the equity court on the rule to show cause was set for November 22, 2002.

At the hearing, the parties addressed BB&T�s motion to quash the subpoena.� The master asked Franklin whether he had received the information requested.� Franklin responded that based on the information he received, he was not clear when the mortgage on the property had been paid off.� Franklin asserted that he was only liable to BB&T for rents on the property up to the date the mortgage was paid off, and BB&T conceded that point.� Franklin suggested that the mortgage was paid off prior to the August 29, 2002 date that the master determined interest was due through.� BB&T asserted, however, that the issue was barred because Franklin made no objection, made no post-trial motion, or appealed from the order on remand, which set the dates interest would accrue through.� The master concluded the hearing by ordering BB&T to provide the court with information as to when BB&T�s mortgage account was credited with payment and how much BB&T received.�

The master�s written order determined that he retained jurisdiction over the matter, ordered BB&T to identify the person who was the keeper of payments and disbursals made on the Kidwell account, and ordered that person to be a witness at the merits hearing.� From this order, BB&T appeals.

LAW/ANALYSIS

BB&T argues the master erred in ordering BB&T to identify the person who was the keeper of payments and disbursals made on the Kidwell account and in ordering that person to be a witness at the merits hearing.� Specifically, BB&T contends that because Franklin never appealed from the master�s order on remand, the dates set in that order and the amount owed became the law of the case.� We agree.�

�An unappealed order becomes the law of the case. �A portion of a judgment that is not appealed presents no issue for determination by the reviewing court and constitutes, rightly or wrongly, the law of the case.��� McCall v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 359 S.C. 372, 378, 597 S.E.2d 181, 184 (Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted).

In this case, Franklin never appealed from the master�s order on remand, which (1) held Franklin was liable on interest that accrued, not only through August 29, 2002, but through the date BB&T received written notice of the conclusion of any appeal from that order, and (2) ordered Franklin to hold all rents from the property in trust pending a further order or immediately pay over rents to BB&T for payment of the principal, interest, and attorney�s fees due.� Because Franklin never appealed from this order, Franklin is liable on the interest that accrued through October 15, 2002, the date Franklin notified BB&T in writing that he abandoned his appeal.� Moreover, Franklin was obligated by that order to hold all rents in trust for payment of his liability.� The date that payment was made on the mortgage was simply irrelevant in light of this order.��

Any argument Franklin had concerning the date payment was made on the mortgage and its effect on the amount he owed to BB&T in rents should have been raised on appeal from the order on remand.� Because Franklin did not appeal from the order on remand, it is the law of the case.� See id.� Therefore, the master erred in ordering BB&T to provide any information or witnesses concerning the mortgage payments and disbursals.

REVERSED. [3]

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.