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South Carolina
Judicial Department
2011-UP-452 - Martin v. Michelin

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Lisa Martin, Employee, Respondent,

v.

Michelin North America, Inc., Employer, and Arch Insurance Company, Carrier, Appellants.


Worker's Compensation Commission
Appeal from the Appellate Panel


Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-452
Submitted October 1, 2011 � Filed October 11, 2011


AFFIRMED


Matthew C. Robertson, of Columbia, for Appellants.

Ann McCrowey Mickle, of Rock Hill, and Stephen B. Samuels, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:� Michelin North America, Inc. and Arch Insurance Company (collectively Employer) appeal the order of the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (Appellate Panel) that found Lisa Martin sustained compensable injuries arising from repetitive trauma to her shoulders while working for Employer.� Employer argues the Appellate Panel erred in (1) finding Martin's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations and (2) failing to make sufficient factual findings in its order concerning Employer's statute of limitations claim.� We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether substantial evidence supports the Appellate Panel's factual finding that February 25, 2008, was the date the statute of limitations began to run: S.C. Code Ann. � 42-15-40 (Supp. 2010) (providing claims for a repetitive trauma injury are barred if not filed "within two years after the employee knew or should have known that his injury is compensable but no more than seven years after the last date of injurious exposure"); Murphy v. Owens Corning, 393 S.C. 77, 82-83, 710 S.E.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 2011) (providing this court reviews the Appellate Panel's factual findings concerning the statute of limitations under the substantial evidence standard of review); Mauldin v. Dyna-Color/Jack Rabbit, 308 S.C. 18, 21-22, 416 S.E.2d 639, 640-41 (1992) (finding employee's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations even though she filed her workers' compensation claim more than two years following her initial injury because the statute of limitations did not begin to run until employee discovered she had a compensable injury).

2. As to whether the Appellate Panel made sufficient factual findings in its order: S.C. Code Ann. � 42-17-40(A) (Supp. 2010) (requiring the Appellate Panel's order to include "a statement of the findings of fact, rulings of law, and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue"); Brayboy v. Clark Heating Co., 306 S.C. 56, 58-59, 409 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1991) (declaring the Appellate Panel's findings of fact must be sufficiently detailed to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the law has been properly applied to those findings and whether the findings are supported by the evidence) (citing Able Commc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 290 S.C. 409, 411, 351 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1986)).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.