Shearouse Adv. Sh. No.
S.E. 2d


In The Supreme Court

The State, Petitioner,


Victor Wyatt Missouri, Respondent.



Appeal From Greenville County

C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 25031

Heard June 9, 1999 - Filed December 6, 1999


Attorney General Charles M. Condom Deputy Attorney

General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney

General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney

General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and

Solicitor Robert M. Ariail of Greenville, for petitioner.

Chief Attorney Daniel T. Stacey, of South Carolina

Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for respondent.



TOAL, A.J.: In this criminal case, this Court granted certiorari to

review the Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion in State v. Missouri, 97-UP-

448 (Ct. App. 1997). We affirm.


During January and February 1995, Greenville detectives were

investigating a crack cocaine ring with the help of a confidential informant. On

February 3, 1995, the police obtained a search warrant to search the home of

Laura and Curtis Sibert a/k/a "Hot Sauce" for cocaine. The lead detective, Eric

Cureton, submitted an affidavit in support of the search warrant. The affidavit

states, in part:

Your affiant [Eric Cureton] states that on January 25, 1995 he

received information from investigator Sam C. Cureton of the

Greenville County Sheriff's Office pertaining to Victor Wyatt

Missouri. The information that was relayed to your affiant that

Missouri was involved in the manufacture and distribution of crack

cocaine. The following is a chronological chain of events leading to

your affiants [sic] belief that Victor Wyatt Missouri, and others not

yet identified, are manufacturing and distributing crack cocaine. .

. .

The confidential source of information, who from here forward will

be referred to as CSI, stated that for the past two months he has

purchased a total of two kilograms of cocaine from Victor Missouri.

He would receive this in half kilo quantities every two weeks.

On January 31, 1995 CSI stated that he had talked with Missouri

and another subject who is only known as "Hot Sauce." During this

conversation Missouri and "Hot Sauce" stated that they were going

to Atlanta, Georgia on February 1, 1995 and obtain four kilos of

powder cocaine. This cocaine would then be delivered to

Greenville, South Carolina and cooked into crack cocaine. On

February 1, 1995 this same CSI went by "Hot Sauce's" apartment

at 400 Summit Drive apartment 5-D, Summit Place Apartments.

During a conversation with "Hot Sauce" CSI was told that he had

not been able to leave for the trip to Atlanta, that they had some

things to get together beforehand. During this same conversation

CSI told "Hot Sauce" the he wanted to purchase from him a half of



a kilo. "Hot Sauce" told CSI that it would cost him around

$13,000.00 for the half kilo. CSI told "Hot Sauce" to call him when

he left for Atlanta.

On February 2, 1995 at 4:00 in the afternoon, CSI went to

Missouri's residence at 126 Sycamore Drive in the City of

Greenville, South Carolina. At the residence was Missouri and

"Hot Sauce." "Hot Sauce" told CSI that he was leaving for Atlanta

around 4:30 and would return around midnight that same night.

"Hot Sauce" told CSI that he would page him as soon as he got back

in town.

On February 3, 1995, at 4:00 in the morning, Missouri called CSI

and told him that "Hot Sauce" was back and they needed

somewhere to cook the crack. He said he couldn't cook it at his

(Missouri) house because he had relatives there. CSI told him he

would give him an answer later and he ultimately told him no.

Around 9:00 this same morning CSI paged "Hot Sauce" via his

digital pager. "Hot Sauce" returned the call and told CSI they were

still trying to get it together. At 10:15 another page was made to

"Hot Sauce" with the same results. At 2:00 in the afternoon the

CSI drove to "Hot Sauce's" apartment at 400 Summit Drive and

went in to inquire about his portion of the cocaine. Your affiant

wired the CSI with a body transmitter that would enable your

affiant to monitor the conversations he had while inside this

apartment. Your affiant, while monitoring the audio transmitter,

heard a male voice, whom CSI later stated was "Hot Sauce",

question CSI about the phone that had been used earlier trying to

set the transaction up. This male appeared to be somewhat

reserved about talking with CSI about the cocaine. CSI told your

affiant that "Hot Sauce" did appear to be nervous about the deal

they were trying to make. "Hot Sauce" told CSI that he had the

crack but he would call him when it was right.

While officers of the Vice and Narcotics Bureau were surveilling

400 Summit Drive, Apartment 5-D on February 3, 1995, it was

determined that Missouri, "Hot Sauce" and others who have not

been identified, were in the apartment. Around 5:00 a black male

and black female left the apartment in a white dodge van ....

The van then traveled to Parkersway Foods at Worley Road and



Rutherford Road. The female again went inside. After the female

left Detective Sergeant T. D. Christy interviewed the clerk and he

stated that the black female had purchased 5 boxes of Arm &

Hammer baking soda. The van then traveled back to apartment 5-

D and the female took a grocery bag into the apartment. She

returned to the van and they left again. The surveillance on the

van was terminated at this time.

Your affiant, through training, experience and working with other

experienced investigators, believes that Victor Wyatt Missouri,

"Hot Sauce" and others yet unknown are manufacturing crack

cocaine inside of apartment 5-D Summit Place Apartments, 400

Summit Drive in the City of Greenville, South Carolina.

When the police executed the search warrant, officers found Missouri in

the kitchen standing over a sink, facing a set of triple beam scales. Inside the

sink was a quantity of cooked, crack cocaine. Missouri was arrested for

trafficking in crack cocaine. At his trial, Missouri moved to suppress the

evidence obtained in the search. Missouri argued the affidavit supporting the

search warrant contained false information and further omitted critical,

exculpatory information. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. In an

unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that

the omitted information was necessary for the magistrate's finding of probable

cause. See State v. Missouri, 97-UP-448 (Ct. App. 1997). Judge Hearn

dissented in a separate opinion. This Court granted certiorari to address the

following issue:

Did the Court of Appeals err in applying the test articulated by

Franks v. Delaware 1 for considering a challenge to the veracity of

a search warrant affidavit?


The State argues that the Court of Appeals improperly applied the Franks

test in deciding whether the magistrate had probable cause to issue the search

warrant. We disagree.

At the suppression hearing, Officer Cureton testified that the following

1 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).



sentence in the warrant affidavit was in fact a false statement: "`Hot Sauce' told

CSI that he had the crack but he would call him when it was right." Officer

Cureton stated that Curtis Sibert a/k/a "Hot Sauce" never told his informant

there was crack in Hot Sauce's apartment. Further on cross-examination,

Officer Cureton testified that his informant had gone into Hot Sauce's house at

about 3:00 p.m. on February 3, and the informant was told that Missouri had

the "stuff," but it was not there. The informant then left the residence and

returned at about 4:00 p.m. after Missouri had returned to the house. A "wire"

had been placed on the informant's body to enable the police to listen to the

conversations. After the informant left Hot Sauce's house, he approached

Officer Cureton and told him, "It's not there. It's not there." In addition, Hot

Sauce had earlier told the informant that he did not want to cook the cocaine

at his house because his wife was trying to go straight. This information was

not provided to the magistrate in the supporting affidavit. The trial judge

concluded that even with this information, the magistrate would have had a

substantial basis upon which to find probable cause for issuing the warrant.

In Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court held that the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments gave a defendant the right in certain

circumstances to challenge the veracity of a warrant affidavit after the warrant

had been issued and executed .2 To summarize, the Court provided the following

two-part test:

(1) To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challengers' attack must

be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a

mere desire to cross-examine. There must be allegations of

2In State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 216 S.E.2d 501 (1975), this Court also

addressed whether a defendant could attack the veracity of facts supporting a

search warrant when the warrant was valid on its face. Noting that the United

States Supreme Court had not yet squarely addressed this issue, this Court

answered the question in the affirmative, providing the following limited test:

"Did the officer, or other government official, in such capacity, intentionally,

recklessly, or in bad faith recite facts he knew or should have known to be

erroneous, without correcting the error by additional affidavit or affirmation,

to obtain the issuance of a warrant?" Sachs, 264 S.C. at 555, 216 S.E.2d at 509.

The Court further provided the following caveat: "However, even if the officer

was delict, so long as probable cause was established by affidavit or affirmation

without the aid of the erroneous fact, the warrant satisfies the constitutional

demands." Id.


State v. Missouri

deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those

allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof; and

(2) If these requirements are met, and if, when material that is subject of

the alleged falsity or recklessness disregard is set to one side, there

remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding

of probable cause, no hearing is required.

Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S. Ct. at 2684, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 682.

Franks addressed an act of commission in which false information had

been included in the warrant affidavit. However, the Franks test also applies

to acts of omission in which exculpatory material is left out of the affidavit. See,

e.g., United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.

Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1979). To be entitled to a Franks hearing for

an alleged omission, the challenger must make a preliminary showing that the

information in question was omitted with the intent to make, or in reckless

disregard of whether it made, the affidavit misleading to the issuing judge.3

There will be no Franks violation if the affidavit, including the omitted data,

still contains sufficient information to establish probable cause. See Colkley,


The instant case involves both an act of commission and an act of

omission by Officer Cureton in drafting the warrant affidavit. We find that

Officer Cureton at least acted recklessly in making the false statement and in

omitting the exculpatory information. He testified unequivocally that the

statement was false, and his informant had, in fact, made a statement to the

contrary. Thus, the primary issue before this Court is whether excluding the

false information and inserting the exculpatory statement, there remains a

substantial basis upon which the magistrate could have found probable cause

to issue the warrant. In doing so, this Court must apply the "totality of the

circumstances" test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed.

2d 527 (1983). See Colkley, supra.

The supporting affidavit begins with the allegation that Victor Missouri

and others "are manufacturing and distributing crack cocaine." The affidavit

3See Edward Gregory Mascolo, Controverting An Informant's Factual

Basis for a Search Warrant: Franks v. Delaware Revisited and Rejected Under

Connecticut Law, 15 Q.L.R. 65 (1995).


State v. Missouri

then discusses a series of chronological events which are intended to support

this prefatory allegation. The affidavit's description of the informant's contact

with the suspects on the day the search warrant was obtained culminates with

the false statement that Hot Sauce told the informant he had the crack but

would call him when it was right. If our task were simply to consider the

affidavit without this statement, we would likely find a substantial basis for

probable cause. The absence of the false statement makes the location of the

drugs less certain, but this uncertainty is negated by the other events recounted

in detail in the affidavit.

However, under Franks, our inquiry does not end here. We must also

consider the effect of adding the informant's statement, "It's not there," as well

as the information that Hot Sauce did not intend to cook the cocaine at his

apartment. In doing so, we hold that the affidavit would not support a finding

of probable cause to search Hot Sauce's apartment.

We begin with the presumption that the Fourth Amendment does not

require an affiant to include all potentially exculpatory evidence in the affidavit.

See Colhley, supra. A presumption to the contrary "would perforce result in

perniciously prolix affidavits that would distract police officers from more

important duties and render the magistrate's determination of probable cause

unnecessarily burdensome." Colkley, 899 F.2d at 303. However, in the instant

case, the omitted information goes to the very heart of the affidavit's purpose,

which is to establish probable cause to search Hot Sauce's apartment for crack

cocaine. Instead of simply creating some uncertainty in the affidavit, the

inclusion of the omitted information creates an affirmative hurdle which the

remaining portions of the affidavit must overcome. These other portions reveal

that the suspects had arranged to sell a quantity of crack cocaine to the

confidential informant. The suspects purchased cocaine in Atlanta and

transported it to Greenville for this purpose. The affidavit further reveals that

the suspects purchased baking soda and brought it back to Hot Sauce's

apartment. Baking soda is known to be a common cutting and drying agent

when converting powdered cocaine into crack cocaine. Standing alone, these

facts are not conclusive as to the presence of crack cocaine in Hot Sauce's

apartment, but they make it a fair probability. Yet, when the omitted

information is inserted, the probable presence of the crack cocaine in the

apartment is defeated. This, in turn, erodes the basis upon which a magistrate

could find probable cause to search Hot Sauce's apartment. The remaining


State v. Missouri

portions of the affidavit fail to rehabilitate this basis.4

We realize this case presents a close call on the probable cause

determination. However, the combination of the police officer's deliberate

falsehood and his omission of critical facts pollute the affidavit to the extent

that a magistrate could not have found that probable cause existed to issue the

search warrant. There is no doubt that the officer intended to mislead the

magistrate in obtaining the search warrant. We realize that police officers

routinely leave out facts they believe are immaterial to the probable cause

determination. Yet, when an omission is combined with an affirmative

falsehood, it reveals that the affiant not only believed the omitted information

was critical, but that a statement in the affidavit to the contrary was necessary

for establishing probable cause. We recognize that under Franks our role is not

to punish dishonest police officers but, rather, to ensure that a substantial basis

exists to find probable cause. That said, the depth of the prevarication

perpetrated by the officer in this case undermines any remaining legitimacy the

affidavit might possess. Under these circumstances, this Court is required by

the Constitution to invalidate the search warrant where the facts create such

a close call on the probable cause determination.


Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the Court of Appeals.

Moore, AA concurs. Finney, CA, concurs in result only.

Burnett and Waller, JJ., dissenting in a separate opinion.

4 The cases cited in Judge Hearn's dissent are inapposite to the instant

case because they do not involve the reckless or intentional omission of material

facts. Rather, these cases deal with the constitutionality of including in the

search warrant affidavit reconnaissance information gathered from thermal

imaging machines. In addressing this issue, the cases found that even without

the thermal imaging information, there was sufficient information in the

affidavits to support a finding of probable cause. See United States v. Cusmano,

83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir.

1995); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).



Burnett, A.J. (dissenting): I respectfully dissent. Although Officer

Cureton's conduct is reprehensible, the issue is whether probable cause

existed in spite of the investigator's inclusion of a false statement and

omission of exculpatory information from the supporting affidavit.1d In my

opinion, probable cause remained in spite of the officer's misrepresentations.2d

In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76

L.Ed.2d 527; 548 (1983), the United States Supreme Court adopted the

"totality of the circumstances" test for probable cause determinations:

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,

common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set

forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and

"basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information,

there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime

will be found in a particular place.

See State v. Bellamy, Op. No. 24957 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed June 28,

1999)(Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 22 at 1).

"`In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name implies, we

deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and

practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent

men, not legal technicians, act'." State v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454, 458, 462

S.E.2d 279, 282 (1995), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175,

1d See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684, 57

L.Ed.2d 667, 682 (1978)(1) where defendant establishes deliberate falsehood

or reckless disregard for the truth and those allegations are accompanied by

offer of proof and 2) if these requirements are met, and if, when material

that is subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side,

there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding

of probable cause, no hearing is required).

2d In my opinion, respondent did not have standing to challenge the

sufficiency of the search warrant as he had no expectation of privacy in his

co-defendant's apartment. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct.

2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980).



69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949).

Here, Officer Cureton included the following false statement in

his affidavit: "`Hot Sauce told [the informant] that he had the crack but he

would call him when it was right." The majority concludes that, disregarding

this false statement, there still existed a substantial basis from which to find

probable cause. I agree.

In addition, Officer Cureton failed to inform the magistrate of

certain exculpatory information. First, he did not tell the magistrate that

when the informant first returned from Hot Sauce's apartment on February

3, the informant stated he was told respondent had the "stuff," but it was not

there. Furthermore, the investigator failed to tell the magistrate respondent

subsequently entered Hot Sauce's apartment. As a result, while wearing a

wire, the informant again entered Hot Sauce's apartment and, upon return,

stated, "It's not there. It's not there." Finally, the investigator did not advise

the magistrate Hot Sauce had earlier told the informant he did not want to

cook the cocaine at his apartment because his wife was trying to "go

straight." The majority concludes if Officer Cureton had included the

omitted information in the supporting affidavit, probable cause to search Hot

Sauce's apartment would not have existed. I disagree with this conclusion.

Considering the totality of the circumstances as reflected in the

supporting affidavit, minus the false statement, and with the addition of the

exculpatory information, there remains a substantial basis from which to

find probable cause. The totality of the circumstances indicate Hot Sauce

and respondent planned to go to Atlanta and obtain cocaine which they

would then cook into crack cocaine in Greenville. The informant wanted to

purchase cocaine in the same quantity as he had purchased it from

respondent every two weeks for the past two months.

Three days later, respondent called the informant and said Hot

Sauce had returned and they were looking for a location to cook the cocaine.

The informant paged Hot Sauce twice the same morning. Hot Sauce

returned the pages and told the informant he was continuing to look for a

location to cook the cocaine. In the afternoon, the informant entered Hot

Sauce's apartment. Hot Sauce suddenly appeared nervous and unwilling to

discuss the drug buy. Hot Sauce indicated respondent, who was not present,

had the cocaine and stated he did not want to cook the cocaine at his



apartment because his wife was trying to "go straight."

After the informant left, respondent arrived at Hot Sauce's

apartment. Two other individuals left Hot Sauce's apartment, purchased

large quantities of baking soda, which is known to be used to process powder

cocaine into crack cocaine, and returned to Hot Sauce's apartment with the

baking soda.3d

These circumstances provide a fair probability that contraband

or other evidence of a crime could be found at Hot Sauce's apartment at the

time the search warrant was issued. Even assuming the informant

unequivocally knew the drugs were not present in Hot Sauce's apartment,

i.e., either because Hot Sauce had become suspicious and, hence, told the

informant the drugs were not there or because respondent did not enter the

apartment after the informant left, there was still probable cause to believe

evidence of a crime could be found in the apartment. A warrant need not be

based on the probability of discovering an illegal item on the premise to be

searched.4d Although common household items like baking soda are not

incriminating, the purchase of a large quantity of baking soda by individuals

associated with a recent drug purchase and looking for a location to cook

cocaine is evidence of a crime. While officers may ultimately choose to wait

until contraband is on the premise before obtaining a search warrant,

3dI note Officer Cureton's testimony indicates the informant entered Hot

Sauce's apartment twice on the afternoon of February 3, 1995, while the

supporting affidavit states the informant entered the apartment only once.

However, the important portion of the testimony and affidavit, that the

informant last informed Officer Cureton the drugs were not in Hot Sauce's

apartment, is contained in both.

4d Illinois v. Gates, supra (probable cause exists when "there is a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a

particular place"); see United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.

1995)("observations of conduct consistent with drug trafficking, even though

apparently innocuous, can give rise to probable cause"); United States v.

Moody, 977 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 1992)(warrant authorizing search for

envelopes, pieces of cardboard, paperclips, and string was unobjectionable for

alleged crimes involving homemade bombs).



knowledge the illegal substance is not on the premises does not

automatically negate a finding of probable cause.

In my opinion, the trial judge properly ruled the evidence seized

as a result of the search warrant should not be suppressed. State v. Asbury,

328 S.C. 187, 493 S.E.2d 349 (1997)(in criminal cases, appellate courts are

bound by fact findings in response to preliminary motions where there has

been conflicting testimony or where the findings are supported by the

evidence and not clearly wrong or controlled by an error of law). I would

reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Waller, A.J., concurs.