THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
The State, Respondent,
v. Sherinette Wannamaker, Appellant.
Appeal From Richland County
Larry R. Patterson, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 25333
Heard May 23, 2001 - Filed July 23, 2001
AFFIRMED
Deputy Chief Attorney Joseph L. Savitz, III, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for appellant.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General Derrick K. McFarland; and Solicitor Warren B. Giese, all of Columbia, for respondent.
JUSTICE BURNETT: Appellant was convicted of the armed robbery and murder of Amber Bone ("the victim"). We affirm.
FACTS
The victim was stabbed in the back nine times and her skull was crushed. Appellant's friend LaShawn Roberts was separately tried and convicted for the same crimes. Appellant's defense was that Roberts was obsessed with appellant and killed the victim in a jealous rage because of the victim's sexual advances toward appellant. Appellant raises two alleged errors which, she asserts, undermine both convictions:
I. Did the trial court err by refusing to suppress a custodial statement improperly obtained after appellant invoked her right to counsel?
II. Did the trial court err by refusing to admit evidence that LaShawn Roberts wrote appellant a letter admitting she killed the victim because she was jealous?
DISCUSSION
I. Invocation of Right to Counsel
Appellant argues the trial court erred by refusing to suppress a custodial statement improperly obtained after she invoked her right to counsel. We disagree.
Appellant gave the police three written statements, each admitting progressively more involvement in the crimes of which she was convicted. The admissibility of the third statement is at issue here. In it, appellant admits that (1) she hit the victim in the back of the head with a pipe, (2) she covered the victim's back with a pillow (on Roberts' orders) because blood was shooting up, (3) she helped Roberts clean up after the murder, (4) the victim was still alive when she and Roberts left the scene, and (5) she helped Roberts dispose of evidence of the crime.
Appellant moved to suppress the statement on the ground it was improperly obtained after she had invoked her right to counsel. At the in camera suppression hearing, the police officer who questioned appellant testified as follows:
After I advised her of her rights, the substance of the conversation was her involvement in this particular incident. . . . She requested to speak to either a lawyer or her mother. . . . I asked her if she had a lawyer in mind that she wanted me to call. She hesitated momentarily and said she didn't have a lawyer, just contact her mother for her and I said okay.
Thereafter, appellant's mother arrived at the police station and they were allowed to speak with each other privately. (1) In her mother's presence, the officer then advised appellant of her rights again, and appellant's mother signed the advice of rights form as a witness. Appellant's in camera testimony does not dispute the officer's version of events concerning her request for an attorney or lack thereof.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court found appellant did not make an unequivocal request for an attorney. Furthermore, any defects, if they existed at all, were cured by the subsequent Miranda warnings given prior to taking the third statement.
This issue is unpreserved because trial counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the statement being read into evidence. See State v. Hughes, 336 S.C. 585, 591, 521 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1999) (an in limine ruling is not final and does not preserve the issue for appeal).
In any case, the issue is without merit. The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to speak with counsel upon request in a custodial setting. U.S. Const. amend V; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). If a suspect invokes her right to counsel, police interrogation must cease unless the suspect herself initiates further communication with police. Id. However, police officers are not required to cease questioning a suspect unless her request for counsel is unambiguous. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, (1994) ("Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," was not a request for counsel); but see State v. Kennedy, 333 S.C. 426, 510 S.E.2d 714 (1998) ("I think I need a lawyer" was a request for counsel). The Supreme Court has noted that "if a suspect is 'indecisive in his request for counsel,' the officers need not always cease questioning." Davis