In The Court of Appeals

The State,        Respondent,


James Patrick Jones,        Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County
Daniel F. Pieper, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-046
Submitted November 20, 2002 – Filed January 15, 2003


Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Chief of the State Grand Jury Robert E. Bogan and Assistant Attorney General Jennifer D. Evans, all of Columbia;  and Solicitor Ralph E. Hoisington, of N. Charleston, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Decided pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities: Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970) (“Sentencing judges are vested with wide discretion in the exceedingly difficult task of determining the appropriate punishment in the countless variety of situations that appear.”); State v. Goodall, 221 S.C. 175, 177, 69 S.E.2d 915, 916 (1952) (holding to determine whether this Court should “interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the trial judge in the imposition of sentence upon a defendant[,] . . . [t]he controlling question . . . is whether the facts show manifest abuse of discretion”); State v. Barton, 325 S.C. 522, 531, 481 S.E.2d 439, 444 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding “[a]bsent partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive, this Court lacks jurisdiction to disturb a sentence that is within the limit prescribed by statute”); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-35-370(e)(1)(a)(1) (2002) (providing a term of imprisonment of between one and ten years and fine of $10,000 for trafficking in marijuana more than ten but less than one hundred pounds); see Goodall, 221 S.C. at 177, 69 S.E.2d at 916 (indicating the facts of this case “disclose nothing [requiring us] to evoke the rare jurisdiction of this [C]ourt to interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the trial judge in the imposition of sentence upon a defendant”); cf. State v. Higgenbottom, 344 S.C. 11, 15, 542 S.E.2d 718, 720 (2001) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969)) (holding “‘whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear [on the record]’” (emphasis added)).



[1] Because oral argument would not aid the Court in resolving any issue on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.