In The Court of Appeals

The South Carolina Second Injury Fund,        Appellant


Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,        Respondent.

In Re:/Elmer F. Stewart,        Claimant


Bowater Incorporated,        Employer.

Appeal From York County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-052
Submitted November 20, 2002 – Filed January 16, 2003


Brooks Shealy, of Columbia; for Appellant.

Pope D. Johnson, of Columbia; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Employer brought suit seeking reimbursement from the South Carolina Second Injury Fund for payment made to Elmer Stewart under a clincher agreement.  The single commissioner ordered the fund to pay part of the costs, and the full commission and circuit court both affirmed.  The fund appeals, arguing there could have been no aggravation of the preexisting condition by the present injury. 

We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2001) (substantial evidence standard); Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981) (substantial evidence standard set forth in Administrative Procedures Act governs appeals from Worker’s Compensation Commission); Tiller v. Nat’l Health Care Ctr., 334 S.C. 333, 339-341, 513 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1999) (Commission can review both lay and expert evidence and assign such weight as it finds credible.); S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-400 (1976 & Supp. 2001) (requirements for reimbursement from Second Injury Fund); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 318 S.C. 516, 458 S.E.2d 550 (1995) (If carrier incurs greater liability for compensation or medical payments as a result of preexisting injury, he is entitled to reimbursement for greater payments.); State Workers’ Compensation Fund v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 313 S.C. 536, 443 S.E.2d 546 (1994) (Reimbursement was proper where claimant would not have been disabled “but for” preexisting conditions and total disability qualified as subsequent disability arising out of employment.). [1]



[1]           We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.