THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State,        Respondent,

v.

Gerald Vincent Williams        Appellant.


Appeal From Chester County
Paul E. Short, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No.  2003-UP-303
Submitted February 20, 2003 – Filed May 1, 2003 


VACATED


Assistant Appellate Defender Tara S. Taggart, of Columbia; for Appellant.

Deputy Director for Legal Services Teresa A. Knox; Legal Counsel Tommy Evans, Jr.; Legal Counsel J. Benjamin Aplin, of Columbia; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Gerald Vincent Williams appeals the decision of the circuit court denying his pro se motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(a), SCRCP.  Williams insists the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services improperly revoked his parole eligibility.  Williams contends the trial judge erred in declining to clarify which version of S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370 he was sentenced under.

After a thorough review of the record and Williams’ pro se brief, we dismiss Williams’ appeal and vacate [1] the judgment of the circuit court pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities:  Lee v. Thermal Engineering Corp., 352 S.C. 81, 572 S.E.2d 298 (Ct. App. 2002), Rule 60(a), SCRCP (“Rule 60(a), SCRCP provides ‘[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.’”);  Michel v. Michel, 289 S.C. 187, 345 S.E.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 252 (6th ed. 1990)) (“Generally a clerical error is defined as a mistake in writing or copying.  As applied to judgments and decrees, it is a mistake or omission by a clerk, counsel, judge or printer which is not the result of exercise of judicial function.  While a court may correct mistakes or clerical errors in its own process to make it conform to the record, it cannot change the scope of the judgment.”). [2]

VACATED.

HEARN, C.J., CURETON and GOOLSBY, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to rule 215, SCACR.

[2] Following the DPPPS’s determination that Williams was ineligible for parole under 1990 Act No. 694 § 17 as applied to S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(e), Williams then had the same right to review as the inmate in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (1999).  In Al-Shabazz, the Court outlined the nature of the review available to inmates raising non-collateral issues that implicate liberty interests; these procedures apply equally to inmates affected by final decisions of the DPPPS that affect the permanent denial of parole eligibility.  See Furtick v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, Op. No. 25581 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 13, 2003) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 14 at 73).