In The Court of Appeals

Dexter Collins, Employee,        Respondent,


The Sintra Corporation, Employer, & Employee Benefits Insurance Corporation, Carrier,        Appellants.

Appeal From Florence County
James E. Brogdon, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-389
Submitted June 9, 2003 – Filed June 10, 2003


Steve Wukela, Jr., of Florence, for Respondent.

Lindsay K. Smith-Yancey, of Charleston, for Appellants.

PER CURIAM:   Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities: As to all issues: Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981) (holding the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act established the standard of review for decisions by the full commission); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2002) (stating an appellate court may reverse or modify the full commission’s decision only if its findings or conclusions are “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record”); Stokes v. First Nat’l Bank, 306 S.C. 46, 50, 410 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1991) (“‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached to justify its action.”); Brunson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 344 S.C. 107, 110, 542 S.E.2d 732, 733 (Ct. App. 2001) (“The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the full commission as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact” but rather must simply determine whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the full commission’s findings.); S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160 (Supp. 2002) (stating for an injury by accident to be compensable, it must arise out of and in the course of employment); Rodney v. Michelin Tire Corp., 320 S.C. 515, 518, 466 S.E.2d 357, 358 (1996) (“The phrase ‘arising out of’ . . . refers to the origin of the cause of the accident.  ‘An injury arises out of employment when there is . . . a causal relationship between the conditions under which the work is to be performed and the resulting injury.’” (alterations added; internal citation omitted) (quoting Owings v. Anderson County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 315 S.C. 297, 299, 433 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1993))); cf. Eadie v. H.A. Sack Co., 322 S.C. 164, 168-69, 470 S.E.2d 397, 400 (Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing the “special errand” exception to the “going and coming rule”); Wright v. Wright, 306 S.C. 331, 333, 411 S.E.2d 829, 830 (Ct. App. 1991) (“In order to receive compensation the employee need not perform a duty he was expressly hired to do.  ‘It is sufficient if the employee is engaged in a pursuit or undertaking consistent with the contract of hire and which in some logical manner pertains to or is incidental to his employment.’” (quoting Beam v. State Workmen’s Compensation Fund, 261 S.C. 327, 332, 200 S.E.2d 83, 86 (1973))).


GOOLSBY and HOWARD, JJ., and BEATTY, Acting Judge, concur.

1 Because oral argument would not aid the Court in resolving any issue on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.