In The Court of Appeals

Ray Anthony Pickett, Employee/Claimant,        Appellant,


Borden Decorative c/o Cosco, Employer, and Cigna, Carrier,        Defendants,

of whom Borden Decorative c/o Cosco, Employer is the,        Respondent.

Appeal From Richland County
L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-626
Submitted October 6, 2003 – Filed October 21, 2003


J. Marvin Mullis, Jr., of Columbia, for Appellant.

James R. Courie, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities:  Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 134, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981) (holding the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act establishes the standard of judicial review for decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Commission); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2002) (stating this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact but may reverse where the decision is affected by an error of law); Smith v. Union Bleachery/Cone Mills, 276 S.C. 454, 456, 280 S.E.2d 52, 53 (1981) (holding an appellate court may reverse or modify an agency’s decision “‘if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are . . . affected by other error of law’” (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6));  Lyles v. Quantum Chem. Co., 315 S.C. 440, 445, 434 S.E.2d 292, 296 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding this Court will not set aside findings of the Worker’s Compensation Commission unless they are not supported by substantial evidence or are controlled by error of law); Miller by Miller v. State Roofing Co., 312 S.C. 452, 454, 441 S.E.2d 323, 324 (1994) (“Substantial evidence is ‘not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.’”); Smith, 276 S.C. at 456, 280 S.E.2d at 53 (holding where the facts are undisputed, the question of whether an accident is compensable is a question of law); Clade v. Champion Labs., 330 S.C. 8, 11, 496 S.E.2d 856, 857 (1998) (holding the claimant has the burden of proving facts that will bring the injury within the workers’ compensation law); Baggott v. Southern Music, Inc., 330 S.C. 1, 5, 496 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1998) (holding to be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an injury by accident must both “arise out of” and “in the course of” employment); Id. (“‘[A]rising out of’ refers to the origin of the cause of the accident; ‘in the course of’ refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurred.”); Douglas v. Spartan Mills, Startex Div., 245 S.C. 265, 269, 140 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1965) (“[An injury] arises ‘out of’ the employment, when . . . a causal connection [exists] between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury . . . . [Thus,] . . . if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work[,] it arises ‘out of’ the employment . . . [However,] . . . [injuries are excluded if they] cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate       cause . . . [or if they] come[] from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment.  The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the          neighborhood . . . .’” (quoting Employers’ Liab. Assurance Corp., 102 N.E.2d 697, 697 (1913) (alterations added))); Bridges v. Elite, Inc., 212 S.C. 514, 520, 48 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1948) (holding, although employee was shot with a gun while at work, the shooting arose out of employee’s private life, and thus, the injuries sustained as a result thereof were not compensable).


STILWELL, HOWARD, and KITTREDGE,   JJ., concurring.

[1] Because oral argument would not aid the Court in resolving any issue on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.