In The Court of Appeals

The State,        Respondent,


Samuel Hepburn,        Appellant.

Appeal From Chesterfield County
Sidney T. Floyd, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-632
Submitted October 6, 2003 – Filed October 22, 2003


Deputy Chief Attorney Joseph L. Savitz, III, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Jay E. Hodge, Jr., of Cheraw, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Samuel Hepburn appeals his murder conviction arguing he should have been granted a directed verdict because there was no evidence he acted with malice aforethought.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR and the following authorities:  State v. Fennell, 340 S.C. 266, 270, 531 S.E.2d 512, 514 (2000) (“In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State.  If there is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the appellate court must find that the case was properly submitted to the jury.”); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (2003) (providing murder is “the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied”); State v. Johnson, 291 S.C. 127, 128, 352 S.E.2d 480, 481 (1987) (noting malice “has been defined as the wrongful intent to injure another and indicates a wicked or depraved spirit intent on doing wrong”); State v. Campbell, 287 S.C. 377, 379, 339 S.E.2d 109, 109 (1985) (holding malice may be implied from use of a deadly weapon); State v. Ballington, 346 S.C. 262, 272, 551 S.E.2d 280, 285 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that although malice must be aforethought, malice is not required to exist for any appreciable amount of time before the act is committed). [1]



[1]        We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.