THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jeffery Ray Addy,        Appellant,

v.

Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Charles M. Condon, and Donald V. Myers, Solicitor, Eleventh Judicial Circuit,        Respondents.

Appeal From Lexington County
G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-672
Submitted November 11, 2003 – Filed November 17, 2003

AFFIRMED

M. Gwyn DuBose-Schmitt, of Lexington, and Tommy Arthur Thomas, of Irmo, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  In 1984, Jeffrey Addy was convicted of murder and armed robbery and sentenced to life plus ten years in prison.  Addy’s direct appeal and subsequent actions for post-conviction relief (PCR) and a writ of habeas corpus have all been denied.  Addy’s current petition for a writ of mandamus was denied by the trial court.  We affirm. [1]

1.  The trial court did not err in denying the writ of mandamus as there was no ministerial duty required to be performed by any of the Respondents.  “Mandamus is the highest judicial writ and is issued only when there is a specific right to be enforced, a positive duty to be performed, and no other specific remedy.”  City of Rock Hill v. Thompson, 349 S.C. 197, 199, 563 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002).  “A writ of mandamus is a coercive writ that orders a public official to perform a ministerial duty.”  Id. at 200, 563 S.E.2d at 102.  “Mandamus will issue only to compel a public official to perform a mandatory legal duty. . . .  When the legal right is doubtful, or the performance of duty rests in discretion, or when there is another adequate remedy, a writ of mandamus cannot rightfully be issued.”  Id.  There is no duty on the part of the Attorney General or the solicitor to release Addy from custody.  Moreover, absent a finding that Addy’s incarceration is invalid or that his rights have been violated, there is simply no duty on the part of anybody to release him.  We conclude the trial court properly denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. 

2.  Addy maintains the trial court should have sua sponte vacated his conviction on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct.  Addy’s co-defendant testified against him at trial in exchange for a plea agreement made by the solicitor that occurred after the co-defendant had already been convicted and had moved for a new trial.  This issue was raised in several of Addy’s previous claims and has already been determined.  No grounds were presented from which the trial court could sua sponte vacate the conviction.

AFFIRMED.

GOOLSBY and ANDERSON, JJ., and CURETON, Acting J., concur.