THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Fannie Melette,        Appellant,

v.

Hannaford Brothers, Co., d/b/a Wilson's Grocery Store,        Respondent.

Appeal From Marion County
James E. Brogdon, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-686
Submitted September 17, 2003 – Filed November 24, 2003

AFFIRMED

Fannie Melette, of Marion, for Appellant.

William E. Hopkins, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Fannie Melette appeals the trial court’s grant of directed verdict in favor of Hannaford Brothers Company.  We affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR and the following authorities:  Hopson v. Clary, 321 S.C. 312, 468 S.E.2d 305 (Ct. App. 1996) (On appeal from an order granting a directed verdict, this court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict was granted.); see also Bloom v. Ravoira, 339 S.C. 417, 529 S.E.2d 710 (2000) (If the evidence as a whole is susceptible to only one reasonable inference, no jury issue is created and a directed verdict motion is properly granted.); Wintersteen v. Food Lion, Inc., 344 S.C. 32, 35, 542 S.E.2d 728, 729 (2001) (“To recover damages for injuries caused by dangerous or defective conditions on a storekeeper’s premises, the Plaintiff must show either (1) that the injury was caused by a specific act of the defendant which created the dangerous condition: or (2) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and failed to remedy it.”); Calvert v. House Beautiful Paint and Decorating Center, Inc., 313 S.C. 494, 443 S.E.2d 398 (1994) (The mere fact a foreign substance was on the floor is insufficient standing alone to charge the store with negligence.); Olson v. Faculty House of Carolina, Inc., 344 S.C. 194, 206, 544 S.E.2d 38, 44 (Ct. App. 2001) (“The defendant will be charged with constructive notice whenever it appears that the condition has existed for such length of time prior to the injury that, under existing circumstances, he should have discovered and remedied it in the exercise of due care; conversely, absent evidence of such preexistence, the defendant may not be so charged.”), aff’d 354 S.C. 161, 580 S.E.2d 440 (2003).

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, STILWELL, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.