THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Kenneth Sellers, Employee,        Respondent,

v.

C.D. Walters Construction, Employer, and Capitol City Insurance Co., Carrier,        Appellants.


Appeal From Charleston County
J. C. Buddy Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-718
Submitted October 15, 2003 Ė Filed December 11, 2003


APPEAL DISMISSED


James Robert Porter, Jr., and Joseph Hubert Wood, III, both of Charleston, for Appellants.

Daniel A. Beck, and Etta K. Simons Collins, both of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:† C. D. Walters Construction and Capital City Insurance Co., (collectively Appellants) appeal from the circuit courtís affirmance of the South Carolina Workerís Compensation Commissionís order holding Appellants responsible for Kenneth Sellersís continued epidural treatment and remanding the matter to the single commissioner for a determination of Sellersís entitlement to compensation for permanent partial disability and Appellantsí entitlement to credit for overpayment of temporary total disability.† We find the matter is not immediately appealable and, therefore, dismiss the appeal.†

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Sellers suffered an injury by accident on September 5, 2000. [1] † After initially denying the claim, Appellants entered into a consent order with Sellers.† In the consent order, the parties agreed Sellers had sustained an injury to his mid-back only and he was entitled to medical care for this injury and temporary total disability benefits beginning December 15, 2000.† Thereafter, Appellants filed a Form 21, Application to Stop Payment of Temporary Disability Compensation asserting Sellers had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). 

 The Single Commissioner held the parties were bound by the consent order and although Sellers was precluded from receiving benefits for any problems he was having as of March 21, 2001, he was not precluded from receiving benefits for any causally related conditions that might have presented or may yet present after the date of the consent order for as long as the claim remains active or open.† The commissioner held Sellers had failed to prove entitlement to benefits for anything other than injury to his mid-back as a result of the September 5, 2000 accident and he had not reached MMI for this injury.† She ordered Appellants to continue to be responsible for Sellersís treatment for his mid-back injury.† Although she ruled Sellers was not entitled to weekly total temporary disability compensation after August 30, 2001, the date of the hearing, she stated this did not prohibit a claim for temporary partial disability compensation.† The commissioner ruled issues regarding credit would be decided when there was a determination of permanency.†

Appellants appealed to the full commission, which affirmed in part with amendments, reversed in part, and remanded to the single commissioner.† The full commission held the consent order was valid and constituted the law of the case.† It thereby reversed the findings of the single commissioner that indicated or suggested otherwise and any corresponding ruling of law.† The full commission also held the single commissioner erred in failing to find Sellers had reached MMI for his mid-back injury.† In view of this finding, it ruled Appellants were entitled to stop payment of temporary disability compensation.† However, the full commission ruled Appellants were responsible for paying for Sellersís continued epidural injections as they ďare beneficial to [Sellers] and tend to lessen his causally related period of disability associated with his mid-back injury sustained on September 5, 2000.Ē† Finally, the full commission remanded to the single commissioner the issues of Sellersís entitlement of compensation for permanent disability or permanent loss of use of a scheduled body member and Appellantsí entitlement to credit for overpayment of temporary disability compensation.† Appellants appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the order of the full commission.† This appeal followed.†

DISCUSSION

Under Montjoy v. Asten-Hill Dryer Fabrics, 316 S.C. 52, 446 S.E.2d 618 (1994), an order of the circuit court remanding a case for additional proceedings before an administrative agency is not directly appealable.† In the present case, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the full commission remanding the case to the single commissioner for additional proceedings on the issues of compensation for permanent disability and credit for overpayment of temporary disability compensation.† As the circuit courtís affirmance of the commission order results in remand to the single commissioner, this order is not directly appealable. 

APPEAL DISMISSED.†

HUFF, STILWELL, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.


[1] †† Sellers had suffered a previous compensable injury while working for the same employer on September 17, 1999.† The parties settled this claim on January 19, 2001.†