In The Court of Appeals

The State,        Respondent,


Bernard Murphy,        Appellant.

Appeal From Richland County
 L. Henry McKellar, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-739
Submitted October 15, 2003 – Filed December 17, 2003


Assistant Appellate Defender Tara S. Taggart, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles W. Richardson, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Warren B. Giese, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Bernard Murphy appeals his conviction and sentence for first-degree burglary and petit larceny, arguing the trial court erred in admitting the witness’s identification.

 We affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR and the following authorities:  State v. Moore, 343 S.C. 282, 540 S.E.2d 445 (2000) (Generally, the decision to admit an eyewitness identification is in the trial judge’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion, or the commission of prejudicial legal error.); see also State v. Mansfield, 343 S.C. 66, 538 S.E.2d 257 (Ct. App. 2000) (The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and evidentiary rulings of the trial court will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion or commission of legal error which results in prejudice to the defendant.); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (There is a two-prong test to determine the admissibility of an out-of-court identification.); Moore, 343 S.C. at 287, 540 S.E.2d at 447 (2000) (First, a court must ascertain whether the identification process was unduly suggestive.  The court must next decide whether the out-of-court statement was nevertheless so reliable that no substantial likelihood of misidentification was possible.); State v. Blassingame, 338 S.C. 240, 525 S.E.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1999) (Single person show-ups are disfavored because they are suggestive by their nature.); Id. at 251, 525 S.E.2d at 541 (However, an identification may be reliable under the totality of the circumstances even when a suggestive procedure has been used.); State v. Patterson, 337 S.C. 215, 522 S.E.2d 845 (Ct. App. 1999) (Suggestiveness alone does not mandate the exclusion of evidence.); Blassingame, 338 S.C. at 251, 525 S.E.2d at 541 (Reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.).  See Mansfield 343 S.C. at 78-79, 538 S.E.2d at 263 (To determine whether an identification is reliable, it is necessary to consider the following factors: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the amount of time between the crime and the confrontation); Id. at 79, 538 S.E.2d at 263 (“The corrupting effect of a suggestive identification is to be weighed against these factors.”); Id. (“After the trial court determines the witness’s identification is reliable, the witness is permitted to testify before the jury.”). 



[1]        We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.