THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Reginald Barno, Appellant.


Appeal From Sumter County
R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-500   
Submitted October 1, 2010 – Filed November 10, 2010


AFFIRMED


Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia; and Solicitor C. Kelly Jackson, of Sumter, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Reginald Barno was convicted of possession of crack cocaine and possession of marijuana.  Barno appeals, asserting the trial judge erred in giving a jury charge on inference that was burden shifting.  We affirm.[1]

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2008, investigators with the Sumter County Sheriff's Office were observing the residence of Wayne Barkley, who had previously been arrested on a drug charge, when appellant pulled up in a black Nissan. Barkley approached the vehicle, and it appeared something was exchanged between the men.    When the officers ran the tag on the Nissan, it came back as belonging to a Volvo.  After Barno pulled away, the officers followed behind and initiated a traffic stop.  When asked for his driver's license, appellant indicated he did not have one.  Barno was then detained and read his Miranda[2] rights.  The officers then noticed a white rock substance in plain view in the front seat of the car that tested positive for crack cocaine.  When one of the officers asked whose crack it was, appellant stated it was his.  Later, while being booked into the detention center, a small baggy of marijuana was found in Barno's pants pocket.

At the close of the evidence, the trial judge indicated his intent to charge that possession may be inferred when a substance is found on property under the control of the defendant, and that such inference is simply an evidentiary fact to be considered by the jury.  Barno objected to the proposed charge, arguing an instruction including the word "inferred or inference" would be burden shifting, would