THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Donna S. McClellion, Appellant,

v.

W. Richard McClellion, Respondent.


Appeal From Anderson County
William J. Wylie, Jr., Family Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-077
Submitted February 9, 2011 – Filed February 24, 2011   


AFFIRMED


O.W. Bannister, of Greenville, for Appellant.

J. Calhoun Pruitt, Jr., of Anderson, for Respondent.  

PER CURIAM:  Appellant Donna S. McClellion seeks review of an order of the family court denying her claim for equitable distribution.  She challenges the family court's finding that her execution of a premarital agreement with W. Richard McClellion was voluntary.  She also challenges the family court's conclusion that she failed to carry her burden of proving that the agreement was unfair.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.  As to whether the family court erred in failing to find that Wife signed the premarital agreement under duress:  S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A)(4) (Supp. 2010) (allowing parties contemplating marriage to determine for themselves what is excluded from the term "marital property," as long as the parties are separately represented by counsel and their execution of the contract is both voluntary and prefaced by full financial disclosure); Holler v. Holler, 364 S.C. 256, 267-68, 612 S.E.2d 469, 475 (Ct. App. 2005) (setting forth the standard for establishing that a contract was procured through duress).       

2. As to whether the family court erred in failing to find that the premarital agreement was unconscionable:  Hardee v. Hardee, 355 S.C. 382, 390, 585 S.E.2d 501, 505 (2003) (defining unconscionability); Lemaster v. Dutton, 694 So.2d 1360, 1364 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) ("[A] court should not concern itself with the disparity in income between parties to an antenuptial agreement in the absence of fraud, duress, or other culpable conduct on the part of one of the parties."). 

AFFIRMED.[1]

WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.