In The Court of Appeals

Daniel Strickland and Mary Formby, Appellants,


Glen Kinard d/b/a Town & Country of Hampton, Respondent.

Appeal From Allendale County
Walter H. Sanders, Jr., Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-365
Submitted June 1, 2011 – Filed June 30, 2011   


Leo A. Dryer, Jr., of Columbia, for Appellants. 

Daniel Webster Williams, of Barnwell, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Daniel Strickland and Mary Formby (collectively Appellants) purchased a car from Glen Kinard, d/b/a Town & Country of Hampton (Kinard).  After Kinard repossessed the vehicle, Appellants sued.  They appeal the master-in-equity's order dismissing their case and awarding costs of suit to Kinard, arguing the master erred in (1) declining to find Kinard's contract did not comply with the Consumer Protection Code, (2) ignoring Kinard's disposition of the vehicle, (3) condoning Kinard's repossession of the vehicle by finding the vehicle was uninsured and in peril, (4) accepting Kinard's proposed order after the established deadline, (5) entering its order upon a misunderstanding of the facts in the case, and (6) impugning Formby's credibility.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. As to the contract's compliance with the Consumer Protection Code and consequent creation of a security interest in Kinard's favor:  S.C. Code Ann. § 37-2-407 (2002) (providing in a consumer credit sale, the seller "may take a security interest in the property sold"); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-1-201(37) (2003) (defining "security interest" as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation"); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-103(a) & (b) (2003) (explaining when a buyer and a seller agree the goods the buyer purchases from the seller will be collateral against the unpaid portion of their purchase price, the seller has a purchase-money security interest in those goods); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-203(a) (2003) ("A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-203(b) (2003) (stating a seller's security interest is enforceable "only if:  (1) value has been given; (2) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party; and (3) . . . (A) the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral."). 

2. As to Kinard's disposition of the vehicle, with regard to the master's use of the term "non traditional repossession" instead of "non judicial self help repossession":  Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58, 403 S.E.2d 122, 123-24 (1991) (precluding an appellate court from vacating a trial court's judgment f or lack of specificity when the trial court adequately stated the basis for its ruling). 

3.  As to Kinard's disposition of the vehicle, with regard to whether Kinard sent Strickland a right-to-redeem letter:  Dixon v. Dixon, 362 S.C. 388, 399, 608 S.E.2d 849, 854 (2005) (holding an issue raised for the first time in a post-trial motion such as one pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, is not preserved for appellate review). 

4. As to Kinard's disposition of the vehicle, with regard to whether the disposal was "commercially reasonable":  In re Michael H., 360 S.C. 540, 546, 602 S.E.2d 729, 732 (2004) ("An issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal.  In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court."). 

5.  As to whether the master erred in failing to award Appellants damages for conversion:  Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR ("Ordinarily, no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of the issues on appeal.").

6. As to Appellants' remaining issues:  Rule 208(b)(1)(D), SCACR (requiring arguments in appellate briefs to include citations to legal authority); Eaddy v. Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., 355 S.C. 154, 164, 584 S.E.2d 390, 396 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[S]hort, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not preserved for our review.").[2] 


FEW, C.J., and KONDUROS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur. 

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] We feel compelled to comment on Appellants' contention that the master misunderstood the facts.  Although, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the master's decision Kinard does not owe money to Appellants, to whatever extent this decision may later be used as evidence Appellants owe Kinard a debt, we do not believe the record supports a determination that Appellants owe Kinard $2,000.