THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Elijah C. Brown, Jr., Appellant.

Appeal From Colleton County
D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-071
Submitted January 3, 2012 – Filed February 8, 2012   

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of Beaufort, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Elijah C. Brown Jr. appeals his convictions for armed robbery, strong arm robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  He argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of his purported flight when the State did not establish he was aware he was being sought by the authorities.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Dickman, 341 S.C. 293, 295, 534 S.E.2d 268, 269 (2000) (holding an argument procedurally barred when a party did not raise it before the trial court); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party need not use the exact name of a legal doctrine in order to preserve it, but it must be clear that the argument has been presented on that ground."); id. ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.").[2]

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, PIEPER, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] Even if the issue were preserved for review, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to present evidence of Brown's purported flight.  See State v. Crawford, 362 S.C. 627, 636, 608 S.E.2d 886, 891 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting "[t]he critical factor to the admissibility of evidence of flight is whether the totality of the evidence creates an inference that the defendant had knowledge that he was being sought by the authorities); id. ("It is sufficient that circumstances justify an inference that the accused's actions were motivated as a result of his belief that police officers were aware of his wrongdoing and were seeking him for that purpose.").