THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

Christina Mewborn, Respondent,

v.

State of South Carolina, Petitioner.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appeal From Charleston County
 Roger M. Young, Circuit Court Judge

Memorandum Opinion No. 2007-MO-049
Submitted June 20, 2007 – Filed July 23, 2007

REVERSED

Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Jeanette Van Ginhoven, all of Columbia, for Petitioner.

H. Stanley Feldman, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Reversed pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authority:  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 210 (1985) (“[I]n order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”); Johnson v. Catoe, 336 S.C. 354, 358, 520 S.E.2d 617, 619 (1999) (“A defendant who pleads guilty on the advice of counsel may collaterally attack the plea only by showing that (1) counsel was ineffective and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty.”)