THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

James R. Standard, Respondent,

v.

State of South Carolina, Petitioner.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appeal From Anderson County
James C. Williams, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Memorandum Opinion No. 2007-MO-066
Submitted December 5, 2007 – Filed December 10, 2007

REVERSED

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Robert L. Brown, all of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Deputy Chief Attorney Wanda H. Carter, South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, Division of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  The State seeks a writ of certiorari to review the order of the circuit court granting respondent’s application for post-conviction relief (PCR).  We grant the State’s petition, dispense with further briefing, and reverse the decision of the circuit court.

Respondent was charged with first-degree burglary and grand larceny.  The State gave respondent written notice of its intent to seek life imprisonment without parole pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (2003 & Supp. 2006), but failed to give trial counsel written notice.  However, trial counsel received actual notice, and trial counsel did not object to the State’s failure to give him written notice.

The PCR judge relied on State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 552 S.E.2d 339 (Ct. App. 2002), in finding trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper notice pursuant to § 17-25-45.  However, this Court has since overruled the Court of Appeals’ decision in Johnson, holding that the State has complied with the notice requirements of § 17-25-45 if both the defendant and the defendant’s counsel received actual notice.  James v. State, 372 S.C. 287, 641 S.E.2d 899 (2007).

Because the PCR judge erred in finding trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the lack of written notice, we reverse the decision of the PCR judge.

REVERSED.

TOAL, C.J., MOORE, WALLER, PLEICONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.