Supreme Court Seal
Supreme Court Seal
South Carolina
Judicial Department
2003-UP-444 - State v. Roberts

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State,        Respondent,

v.

Donald Roberts,        Appellant.


Appeal From Horry County
Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-444
Heard May 14, 2003 � Filed June 26, 2003���


AFFIRMED


Tara Dawn Shurling, of Columbia; for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster; Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh; Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson; Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, of Columbia; Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:� Donald Roberts appeals his convictions for kidnapping, criminal sexual conduct, and possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a violent crime.� We affirm.

We affirm Roberts�s convictions pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities:� State v. Perry, 279 S.C. 539, 540, 309 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1983) (holding that a trial court reviewing a motion for a directed verdict is concerned only with the existence of evidence, not its weight); State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 452, 457, 290 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1982) (holding that the trial court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and will deny a motion for a directed verdict if any evidence, direct or circumstantial, tends to prove the guilt of the accused), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991); State v. Mathis, 287 S.C. 589, 593, 340 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1986) (citing S.C. Code Ann. � 16-3-651(h) (1976)) (holding that evidence of intrusion is required to prove criminal sexual battery); State v. Burroughs, 328 S.C. 489, 495-96, 492 S.E.2d 408, 411 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 1) a defendant�s denial at trial to even having consensual sex with the victim creates a credibility issue between his and the victim�s version of events and 2) such tests of credibility are not normally properly disposed of by directed verdict, but are resolved by the jury); see, e.g., State v. Ham, 268 S.C. 340, 342, 233 S.E.2d 698, 698 (1977) (�Where the determination of guilt is dependent upon the credibility of the witnesses, a motion for a directed verdict is properly refused.�), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1019 (1978); State v. Rosemond, 335 S.C. 593, 596, 518 S.E.2d 588, 589-90 (1999) (holding that the relevance, materiality, and admissibility of photographs are matters within the trial court�s discretion and an appellate court will not disturb their introduction absent a showing of abuse of discretion); State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 167, 478 S.E.2d 260, 266 (1996) (holding that a photograph should be excluded only if it is calculated to arouse the jury�s sympathy or prejudice or is irrelevant or unnecessary to substantiate facts; however, if the photographs serve to corroborate testimony, it is not an abuse of discretion to admit them); State v. Clifton, 302 S.C. 431, 433, 396 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1990) (holding that a magistrate deciding whether to issue a search warrant must make a common sense decision, under the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit (including the veracity of the person supplying the information and the basis of her knowledge), whether a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)), overruled on other grounds by Brightman v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 (1999); State v. Crane, 296 S.C. 336, 339, 372 S.E.2d 587, 588 (1988) (holding that a magistrate�s probable cause determination is entitled to substantial deference so that a reviewing court must only decide whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed), accord Clifton, 320 S.C. at 433, 396 S.E.2d at 832; and State v. Corns, 310 S.C. 546, 426 S.E.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1992) (upholding a warrant based on an affidavit whose factual basis was sixty days old and noting that in looking at the totality of the circumstances a magistrate may consider the characteristics, including the consumable and incriminating nature, of the items sought in the warrant).�

AFFIRMED.

GOOLSBY and HOWARD, JJ., and BEATTY, A.J., concur.