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7-5-2005 - Opinions
In this case, the court determines double jeopardy does not prevent a new trial based on a subsequent indictment, following a mistrial granted on the defendants' motion, which was prompted by remarks made by the prosecuting attorney in his opening statement.
The court of appeals found Rule 52(a), SCRCP, requires findings of fact and conclusions of law in annual probable cause determination hearings required under South Carolina’s Sexually Violent Predator Act. The court found the circuit court erred in failing to make such findings in the case at bar, but that the error was harmless because the record clearly documents a factual basis for concluding that probable cause was lacking. The court further found a Constitutional challenge to the Act was unpreserved.
The Dennises appeal an order finding that their property was subject to an easement.
The defendant appeals his convictions on three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Appellant presents two issues: (1) Were the attorney’s fees awarded by the Master-in-Equity excessive and punitive in nature? (2) Did the Master-in-Equity properly consider the Blumberg factors as outlined in Blumberg v. Nealco, Inc., 310 S.C. 492, 427 S.E.2d 659 (1993)?
Appellants present several issues on appeal: (1) Did the Millers perform and work overtime hours at Blumenthal Mills, Inc. so as to give efficacy to a FLSA claim? (2) Did the Circuit Judge err in misapplying and relying on the holding in Darrikhuma v. Southerland Corp., 975 F. Supp. 778 (D.Md. 1997)? (3) Did appellants engage in pre-shift activities which are compensable under the FLSA?
7-18-2005 - Opinions
On August 2, 2001, Collins Music Co., Inc. was awarded a jury verdict against IGT a/k/a IGT-North America in the amount of Fifteen Million and No/100 ($15,000,000.00) Dollars. A judgment was entered in the office of the Clerk of Court for Horry County in the sum of Fifteen Million and No/100 ($15,000,000.00) Dollars on August 3, 2001. The Circuit Judge issued an order on December 22, 2003, granting and awarding Collins Music Co., Inc. Fourteen (14%) Percent interest on the Fifteen Million and No/100 ($15,000,000.00) Dollar judgment to be computed from August 3, 2001 until paid. In substance, IGT a/k/a IGT-North America presents three issues on appeal: (1) Does the amendment of S.C. Code Section 34-31-20(B) by Act Number 344, Section 4, of the 2000 General Assembly create a window of time where no interest is paid on a judgment similar to the judgment obtained by Collins; (2) Whether pursuant to Section 34-31-20(B), as amended, Collins’ judgment accrued post-judgment interest, if at all, at the legal rate of Twelve (12%) Percent because it was enrolled and entered on or after January 1, 2001; and (3) Whether pursuant to Act Number 344, Section 4, of the 2000 General Assembly, the South Carolina common law post-judgment interest rule applies? Collins argues: (1) Section 34-31-20(B), as amended, left intact the legal rate of Fourteen (14%) Percent interest on the Collins’ judgment; and (2) All issues are moot because IGT a/k/a IGT-North America paid the sum of Twenty Million Six Hundred Three Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty One and 08/100 ($20,603,831.08) Dollars in satisfaction of judgment in Nevada. IGT a/k/a IGT-North America contends the interest issue was reserved in Nevada.
The issue on appeal is whether the Circuit Court erred in affirming the Probate Court’s finding that Trustee Moran – not Appellant University – was the “competent person . . . having beneficial interests . . . affected by the compromise” under S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-1102 (1987). Stated differently, the issue is whether Appellant University of Southern California, which is the sole remainder beneficiary of the revocable trust, is a necessary party to that Compromise and Settlement Agreement.
Finding that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the applicants made a statement with the intent to defraud the insurer, the court reverses the grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and remands to allow the jury to decide.
7-25-2005 - Opinions
This case determines that the jury finding of comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff in one cause of action is not applicable in a separate cause of action tried in the same suit, and reverses an award of punitive damages.