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The summary following each opinion is prepared to offer lawyers and the public a general overview of what a particular opinion decides. The summary is not necessarily a full description of the issues discussed in an opinion.

5965 - National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston

This cross-appeal involves the municipal annexation by the City of North Charleston (North Charleston) of a one-acre tract of real property. The National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States (the National Trust) and the City of Charleston (Charleston) (collectively, Respondents) appeal the circuit court's order finding Respondents did not have standing to challenge North Charleston's annexation of the acre. North Charleston also appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in alternatively finding North Charleston did not properly annex the acre pursuant to section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code (2004). We affirm.

5966 - City of Charleston v. City of North Charleston

This appeal arises from three consolidated actions challenging cross annexations by Appellant City of Charleston (Charleston) and Respondent City of North Charleston (North Charleston) of certain real property (Parcel 006) owned by Respondent Millbrook Plantation, LLC (Millbrook). Charleston argues the circuit court erred in concluding: (1) Charleston lacked standing to challenge North Charleston's annexation of Parcel 006 because North Charleston's 2017 Ordinance did not annex property previously annexed in 2005 (Parcel 006-1) and (2) the Supreme Court of South Carolina has declined to adopt the "prior jurisdiction doctrine." We affirm.

5967 - Amber Geohagan v. SCDEW

Amber Geohaghan appeals the Administrative Law Court's (the ALC's) order affirming the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce's (the Department's) final decision determining Geohaghan was indefinitely ineligible for receipt of unemployment benefits. Geohaghan argues the ALC erred (1) in holding the question of whether she had good cause to resign was a question of fact subject to substantial evidence review and (2) in affirming the Department's finding she resigned without good cause when that finding was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

2-8-2023 - Opinions

5968 - The State v. Brandon J. Clark

Brandon Jerome Clark appeals his conviction and sentence for first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. He makes five arguments: the circuit court erred in (1) limiting his cross-examination of the person who conducted a recorded interview with the alleged victim, (2) admitting the recording of that interview into evidence, (3) excluding his expert on these sorts of recorded interviews, (4) denying a directed verdict, and (5) not finding a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We affirm.

2-10-2023 - Opinions

5969 - Wendy Grungo-Smith v. Joseph Grungo

Wendy Grungo-Smith appeals an order from the family court awarding primary custody of her and Joseph Grungo's children to Joseph and granting an award of child support. On appeal, she argues the family court erred in determining Joseph established a material change in circumstances warranting the change in custody and child support. We reverse.

2-15-2023 - Opinions

5916 - Huskins v. Huskins

Amanda Leigh Huskins and Jay R. Huskins (collectively, the Huskinses) appeal the circuit court's order granting Mungo Homes, LLC's (Mungo's) motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Huskinses argue the circuit court erred in (1) finding the limitations period contained in the arbitration provision was not one-sided, oppressive, and unconscionable; (2) finding the arbitration provision applied mutually to Mungo and the Huskinses; (3) failing to consider the one-sided and oppressive terms of a limited warranty provision in determining whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable; and (4) granting the motion to dismiss the Huskinses' claims involving the limited warranty provision even though it concluded the arbitration provision did not include claims arising under the limited warranty provision. We affirm the circuit court's order as modified.