Note: Beginning in June 2012, opinions will be posted as Adobe PDFs. You can download a free copy of Adobe Reader here.
The summary following each opinion is prepared to offer lawyers and the public a general overview of what a particular opinion decides. The summary is not necessarily a full description of the issues discussed in an opinion.
8-8-2018 - Opinions
We reverse the court of appeals and hold pursuant to Section 28-2-370 of the South Carolina Code that Petitioner David Powell is entitled to present evidence of diminution in value to his remaining property as a result of the closure of a nearby intersection and the termination of a frontage road into a cul-de-sac.
27828 - In the Matter of Frampton Durban, Jr.
27829 - Olds v. City of Goose Creek
This matter stems from Todd Olds' dispute with the City of Goose Creek (the City) as to the meaning of "gross income" under the City's business license fee ordinance. The circuit court ruled the City's definition of gross income was correct, and the court of appeals affirmed. Olds v. City of Goose Creek, 418 S.C. 573, 795 S.E.2d 163 (Ct. App. 2016). We granted Olds a writ of certiorari to address whether the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of the term "gross income" as defined and used in the City's business license ordinance, §§ 110.001-.022. Under the very narrow facts of this case, we reverse.8-22-2018 - Opinions
27831 - Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Eagle Window & Door
We reverse the court of appeals and find Petitioner Eagle Window & Door, Inc. is not subject to successor liability for defective windows manufactured by an entity which sold its assets to Petitioner in a bankruptcy sale.
We reverse the court of appeals and hold that section 17-13-45 of the South Carolina Code of Laws provided the municipal police officer, who responded to a distress call or request for assistance, with the authority to detain Respondent until the state trooper arrived to the scene. We remand this case to the magistrate court for further proceedings.8-29-2018 - Opinions
27830 - In the Matter of Robert E. Peeler
27833 - Palmetto Mortuary v. Knight Systems
We reverse the court of appeals and hold that under the facts of this case, the territorial restriction in the non-compete covenant was reasonable and enforceable. We also find the additional sustaining grounds raised by Respondents to be without merit. Therefore, we reinstate the special referee's order.
The circuit court granted Shannon Scott immunity pursuant to the Protection of Persons and Property Act, and the court of appeals affirmed. We affirm the court of appeals as modified.
We hold the State failed to properly authenticate the Global Positioning System (GPS) records, and it was error to admit this evidence. However, we affirm the court of appeals in result because this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
27837 - Repko v. County of Georgetown
The Court reverses the court of appeals and reinstates the directed verdict granted to Georgetown County by the trial court. The Court vacates the court of appeals' opinion.
The Court accepted two certified questions: first, whether a police officer who conducts an investigation of an accident qualifies as a "witness" under Section 38-77-170 of the South Carolina Code, and second, whether injuries suffered during a drive-by shooting "arise out of" the operation of the vehicle for insurance purposes. Because we answer the first question, "No," we decline to reach the second question.
27839 - Pee Dee Health Care v. Estate of Hugh S. Thompson
This is an appeal from the circuit court's decision to impose sanctions against Pee Dee Health Care, P.A., and its attorney for conduct that occurred before the circuit court entered summary judgment against it. The issue we address is whether a motion for sanctions filed nine days after remittitur from Pee Dee Health's unsuccessful appeal of the summary judgment order is untimely under the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (FCPSA) and Rule 11 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. We find the motion was untimely under the FCPSA, but the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion timely under Rule 11.