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2-2-2022 - Opinions
In this case, Barnes challenges the ruling of the court of appeals in affirming the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the case on the ground that his right to a speedy trial was violated. In analyzing the factors identified by the United States Supreme Court for consideration of a speedy trial claim, the court of appeals held Barnes chose to retain counsel who he knew was under an order of protection in another case, and therefore, the delay during this period was attributable to Barnes and weighted against him. While we agree with the court of appeals that this period of delay is not attributable to the State, we hold this period of delay is also not attributable to Barnes because he was entitled to retain his lawyer, even though doing so delayed his trial, and should carry a neutral weight in the analysis. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision as modified.2-9-2022 - Opinions
In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Court imposes a public reprimand.
In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Court imposes a public reprimand.2-23-2022 - Opinions
This is an appeal from an order pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, dismissing Jeanne Beverly's claims against Grand Strand Regional Medical Center, LLC. The primary question before us relates to whether Beverly is a third-party beneficiary who may bring an action to enforce a contract to which she is not a party. The specific question we address is whether a contract clause stating, "This Agreement is not intended to, and shall not be construed to, make any person . . . a third party beneficiary" overrides an otherwise manifestly clear purpose of the contracting parties to provide a direct benefit to non-contracting parties. Mindful that we are reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal order, not an order on the merits, we hold it does not. We affirm the court of appeals' opinion reversing the 12(b)(6) dismissal. We remand the case to circuit court for discovery and trial.
In this opinion, we address (1) the meaning of the word "show" as it is used in subsection 56-5-2953(A) and (2) whether per se dismissal of a DUI charge is the proper remedy for a video's failure to "show" a DUI defendant being advised of his Miranda rights at the incident site. We affirm the court of appeals' holding that subsection 56-5-2953(A) requires a video recording to visually depict a defendant being advised of his Miranda rights at the incident site. However, we hold that from this point forward, suppression of tainted evidence flowing from the failure to administer Miranda warnings in accordance with subsection 56-5-2953(A)--not per se dismissal of the DUI charge--is the proper remedy.